Walling v. Bown

• Decision Date: 29 February 1904
• Parties: WALLING v. BOWN
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

76 P. 318

9 Idaho 740

WALLING v. BOWN

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 29, 1904

STARE DECISIS.

1. When the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the construction and interpretation placed by this court upon a constitutional or statutory provision will not greatly exceed the disastrous and evil effects likely to flow therefrom, the court will decline to reopen those questions where rights and interests have become settled under such decisions, and they have been acquiesced in by the legislature, and the people for any reasonable period of time.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court in and for Elmore County. Honorable Lyttleton Price, Judge.

Action by plaintiff for statutory damages. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed, with costs.

Rice &amp Thompson and Wyman & Wyman, for Appellant.

The rule of stare decisis, as we understand it, is as follows Where a court of final resort has laid down a rule which becomes a law of property and under which property rights have been acquired, it ought not, except upon grave consideration, to change that rule in any subsequent action to the injury of any person who has relied upon it and acquired rights under it. (Parke v. Boulware et al. ante, p. 225, 73 P. 19.) It is the duty of the court to reverse all erroneous decisions where it can be done without injury to property rights which have been acquired in reliance upon the prior decision. Where the court finds it has erroneously construed the constitution, it will always return to a correct interpretation thereof. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 36; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 600-602; Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646 (667-669); San Francisco v. Spring Valley W. W., 48 Cal. 493 (syllabus); Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex. 48.)

Daniel McLaughlin and Hawley & Puckett, for Respondent.

As stated by counsel for appellant, the facts of the case were fully understood and admitted by all of the parties to the record, and have not at any time been disputed. The question presented to this court is one of law exclusively. The contention of appellant's counsel throughout their brief in its entirety is that sections 1210 and 1211 of the Revised Statutes of this state, commonly known as the two-mile limit law, is unconstitutional. Their argument would certainly be interesting, and very likely instructive as well, were the question herein involved presented for the first time to this court for decision; but in view of the fact that upon two other occasions this court has passed upon the constitutionality of the sections of the statute in question, after full argument by able counsel, we are hardly called upon, we apprehend, to seriously consider the positions taken by appellants in their brief. (Sifers v. Johnson, 7 Idaho 798, 97 Am. St. Rep. 271, 65 P. 709, 54 L. R. A. 785; Sweet v. Ballentine, 8 Idaho 431, 69 P. 995.) The questions heretofore decided were constitutional questions, and while courts of last resort have always been averse to overruling former decisions of any kind, it has always been held that a constitutional question, once decided, should not be reconsidered, even if the court believed that an error had been committed in the first instance. When a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a court of appeals or review, and never by the same court, except for very cogent reasons and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would leave us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law. (1 Kent's Commentaries, 475, 476; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 Term Rep. 419; Butler v. Duncombe, 1 P. Wms. 352; Fletcher v. Lord Sandes, 3 Bing. 588; Selby v. Bardons, 3 Barn. & Adol. 17; Giblin v. Gordon, 6 Cal. 416; Welch v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 165; Piercy v. Sabin, 10 Cal. 30, 70 Am. Dec. 692; Clark v. Troy, 20 Cal. 224; Pioche v. Paul, 22 Cal. 109; Hihn v. Courtis, 31 Cal. 401; Vassault v. Austin, 36 Cal. 696; Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484; Lindsay v. Lindsay, 47 Ind. 286; Day v. Munson, 14 Ohio St. 488; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 256, 64 Am. Dec. 159; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 23; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo. 206; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 691; Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex. 48; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal. 403; People ex rel. Attorney General v. Alturas Co., 6 Idaho 418, 55 P. 1067, 44 L. R. A. 122; Parker v. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 112; State v. Silver, 82 Iowa 714, 47 N.W. 772; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Goodsale, 62 N.H. 66; State v. Stout, 61 Ind. 143; Brown v. Eagle Creek etc. Co., 78 Ind. 421; Commonwealth v. National Oil Co., 157 Pa. 516, 27 A. 374; Commonwealth v. Mill Creek Coal Co., 157 Pa. 524, 27 A. 375.)

AILSHIE, J. Sullivan, C. J., concurs. STOCKLAGER, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This case was here for consideration once before (Walling v. Bown, ante, p. 184, 72 P. 960), and was remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views there expressed. After the remittitur was sent down the plaintiff was allowed to file an amended complaint, to which the defendant demurred. The demurrer was overruled and defendant failed to answer or make any further appearance, and such further proceedings were had on the part of the plaintiff, that, thereafter, a judgment was duly entered in favor of plaintiff. Defendant has appealed from the judgment which brings up the judgment-roll alone for our consideration. The transcript apparently contains a history of the case from its inception in the justice's court, but the only matters properly here for our consideration are the amended complaint, demurrer, order overruling demurrer and judgment. (Rev. Stats., sec. 4456.) The record contains no certificate under sections 4819 and 4821, showing that any other papers were used on the hearing in the trial court. The question raised by the appeal is the constitutionality of sections 1210 and 1211 of the Revised Statutes, commonly known in this state as the "two-mile limit law."

Appellant in his brief says: "That the facts of the case were fully understood and admitted by all the parties to the record. There never has been at any time any dispute as to what the evidence shows. The question has always been exclusively one of law. It will be seen that the admitted facts bring this action strictly within the terms of the statute."

Respondent refers to this statement contained in appellant's brief and affirms and reiterates it, and, in answer to the questions raised, cites Sifers v. Johnson, 7 Idaho 798, 97 Am. St. Rep. 271, 65 P. 709, 54 L. R. A. 785, and Sweet v. Ballentine, 8 Idaho 431, 69 P. 995, both from this court, contending that these decisions have become the law of the state on the subject matter treated therein.

The issues, therefore, discussed by the respective parties on this appeal are these: Appellant urges the unconstitutionality of the two sections of the statute. Respondent relies on the doctrine of stare decisis. The latter proposition demands our attention first, and if applicable here, precludes our consideration of the former.

It is well enough to say here and now that while the personnel of this court has changed since the decisions above cited were announced, the principles of law have not changed, and we shall endeavor to apply them as they appear to us.

Now, to our first inquiry: The doctrine of stare decisis is founded largely upon expediency and sound principles of public policy. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 24.) It seems to be generally conceded that where the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the construction and interpretation placed by a court of last resort upon a constitutional or statutory provision will not greatly exceed the disastrous and evil effects likely to flow therefrom, courts should refuse to reopen such questions. This is the position which was taken by our supreme court in People v. Alturas County, 6 Idaho 418, 55 P. 1067, 44 L. R. A. 122, where it was said in reference to a former decision holding a legislative act valid: "No good would be accomplished by overruling that decision, but much evil and confusion would result therefrom. Whether that decision was right or not, public policy and sound legal principle demand that we now adhere to it, and regard that question as a sealed book which is no longer open to public scrutiny."

The reasons for this rule are illustrated in a practical way by the supreme court of Wisconsin in Fisher v. Horicon etc. Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, where it is said: "It is the duty of this branch of the government to pass finally upon the construction of a law, and determine whether the legislature in its action has transcended its constitutional limits, and the community has a right to expect, with confidence, we will adhere to decisions made after full argument and upon due consideration. The members of the court may change totally every six years, and if each change in the organization produces a change in the decisions, and a different construction of laws, under which important rights and interests have become vested, it is easy to see that the consequences will be most pernicious."

Following these reasons for invoking the rule here, let us examine the conditions now confronting us and determine whether, under the recognized and established rules of law, we would be justified in opening the question as to the constitutionality of these statutes for an original investigation and determination.

Sections 1210 and 1211 have been on the statute books of the territory and state of Idaho since 1875. In June, 1901, they were construed and held constitutional by this court in Sifers v. Johnson, supra. In June, 1902, they were again considered and held valid and enforceable by the same court in Sweet v. Ballentine. In August,...