Walling v. Villaume Box & Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1943
• Docket Number: No. 353.,353.
• Citation: 58 F. Supp. 150
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
• Parties: WALLING, Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, United States Department of Labor, v. VILLAUME BOX & LUMBER CO.

58 F. Supp. 150

WALLING, Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, United States Department of Labor, v. VILLAUME BOX & LUMBER CO.

No. 353.

District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

April 14, 1943.

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James M. Miller, of Minneapolis, Minn., and Frank P. Ryan, of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff.

Harold L. Rutchick and Richard S. Felhaber, both of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant.

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Truck Drivers

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the truck drivers are engaged in commerce, as the same is defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 203, and therefore are entitled to the benefits flowing from said Act.

On the other hand, the defendant contends that the truck drivers do not come within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act relating to maximum hours, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207, because of Section 13 (b) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b) (1), which reads as follows: "(b) The provisions of section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 304 of Title 49."

The applicable section of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. § 304, provides, inter alia, that "It shall be the duty of the Commission Interstate Commerce Commission — to regulate common carriers by motor vehicle * * * and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to * * * qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment. * * * and to establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation * * *."

Other applicable provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. are as follows:

"§ 302. Application of provisions

"(a) The provisions of this chapter apply to the transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and to the procurement of and the provision of facilities for such transportation, and the regulation of such transportation, and of the procurement thereof, and the provision of facilities therefor, is hereby vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission."

"§ 303. Definitions and exceptions

"(a) Definitions. As used in this chapter —

* * * * * *

"(10) The term `interstate commerce' means commerce between any place in a State and any place in another State or between places in the same State through another State, whether such commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly by motor vehicle and partly by rail, express, or water.

* * * * *

"(17) The term `private carrier of property by motor vehicle' means any person not included in the terms `common carrier by motor vehicle' or `contract carrier by motor vehicle', who or which transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which such person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.

* * * * *

"(19) The `services' and `transportation' to which this chapter applies include all vehicles operated by, for, or in the interest of any motor carrier irrespective of ownership or of contract, express or implied, together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith.

"(20) The term `interstate operation' means any operation in interstate commerce."

The defendant company was at all times engaged in the manufacture of boxes and wood products. The boxes which the company manufactured were for patrons of the company in Minnesota. The truck drivers, in the performance of their duties, never crossed a state line. There is some evidence that on rate occasions the truck drivers delivered boxes to Hudson, Wisconsin, but such deliveries, according to the testimony of the defendant, constituted a very small percentage of the business of the defendant company. So we have here boxes being processed, in the first instance, by the defendant company, with some of the boxes being further processed by another company also within the State of Minnesota which, after being fully processed, were then delivered to defendant's customers in Minnesota. These customers packed and filled said boxes with their respective products, which were destined without the State of Minnesota. Can it be said that, under such circumstances, the truck drivers of the defendant company were engaged in the transportation of any of the merchandise of the defendant without the State? I think not.

We must bear in mind that the coverage of the Wage and Hour Law is all-enveloping as to labor having to do with the processing of merchandise intended to be moved in interstate commerce. The Motor Carrier Act relates only to the transportation —to the actual carriage—of goods from one state to another.

The participation of the truck drivers with respect to "producing goods intended for interstate commerce" was in the work and labor expended by said persons in the delivery of the boxes to the customers of the defendant company within the State. When that was accomplished, the labors of the truck drivers with respect to the boxes ceased and terminated. The deliveries of the boxes by the defendant were not to a public carrier. The interstate movement had not commenced. There was no intention on the part of the defendant, the truck drivers, or the customers of the defendant company, that the boxes should continue in interstate commerce in their then condition. In other words, these boxes which were delivered to the customers of the defendant company were not, at the time of their delivery to such customers, any part of a shipment or movement in interstate commerce. The packages were not then in condition or shape to be moved in interstate commerce. The interstate shipment which followed consisted of the boxes and their contents. It might be said that the boxes were merely containers of the shipment.

At an early date, in Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 S.Ct. 475, 477, 29 L.Ed. 715, the court stated that exportation is not begun "until they logs are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the state to the state of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that state."

That rule of law was affirmed in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L.Ed. 999. The doctrine as laid down in those cases has not been modified, but on the contrary has been affirmed by many subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.

See: United States et al. v. Erie R. Co. et al., 280 U.S. 98, 50 S.Ct. 51, 74 L. Ed. 187; Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 47 S.Ct. 170, 71 L.Ed. 359; Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 40 S.Ct. 512, 64 L.Ed. 907; Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R. Co. v. Settle et al., 260 U. S. 166, 43 S.Ct. 28, 67 L.Ed. 189; Buckingham Transportation Co. of Colo., Inc., v. Black Hills Transportation Co. et al., 66 S.D. 230, 281 N.W. 94; Railroad Commission of Ohio v....