Wallingford v. Dept. of Public Health

Decision Date25 March 2003
Docket Number(SC 16632)
Citation262 Conn. 758,817 A.2d 644
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesTOWN OF WALLINGFORD v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Janis M. Small, town attorney, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant, the department of public health (department), has jurisdiction over land owned by the plaintiff, the town of Wallingford (town), even though the land is not owned by the town's water division and is not used for water utility purposes pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 25-321 et seq. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the town's appeal from the department's declaratory ruling that the land is subject to the department's jurisdiction as "`water company land'" under § 25-32. The town appeals2 from, and we affirm, the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The town is a municipality that operates its own water division as a governmental department under the town charter. The town's board of public utilities commission, whose commissioners are appointed by the town mayor and confirmed by the town council, supervises and sets policy for the water division.3 Water division personnel are town employees.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 7-240,4 the water division is a self-sustaining entity, the funds of which are held separately from the town's general fund; all moneys received by the water division are used for the provision of water service. The water division's operation is paid for by the businesses and residents that it serves; not all residents or businesses are connected to the water division's water supply system. The water division's budget, however, is controlled and approved by the town council. Moreover, the public utilities commission has no authority to develop a budget or operate the water division without town council approval, and the water division does not pay taxes to the town. The town purchases insurance for the water division; that cost, however, is recouped annually through the division's rates. Under the town charter, any land purchased by the water division must be acquired in the name of the town. When the water division discontinues the use of any such property, the use of the property reverts to the town.

In January, 1999, the town purchased the parcel at issue in this case, the Cooke property, for open space or other necessary purposes. No water division funds were used to make the purchase. The property is located within the watershed of the south central regional water authority, which supplies the New Haven region with drinking water. Although the property is part of the watershed, potentially impacting New Haven's drinking water, it has no effect on the town's drinking water supply. In May, 1999, the mayor, on behalf of the town, notified the department that the property had been purchased and that the town was considering constructing a golf course on the Cooke property. In June and July, 1999, the department notified the town that a permit was required to change the property's use, such as by constructing a golf course, despite the fact that the property is not part of the watershed impacting the town's water supply.

In March, 2000, the town filed this petition with the department seeking a declaratory ruling to determine whether the Cooke property was, pursuant to § 25-32, subject to the department's jurisdiction as "water company land." The town claimed that the statute was not applicable because the town could not be considered a water company; therefore, the town contended that the land at issue was not water company property. The department ruled that the statute applied to all land owned by the town, and that the property was, therefore, subject to department jurisdiction as "water company land located on a public drinking water supply watershed." In issuing its ruling, the department noted the town's "special duties and responsibilities to the public" because of its role as a governmental entity that is also a water company.

The town appealed from the department's ruling to the trial court. While that appeal was pending in the trial court, the General Assembly enacted Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2001, No. 01-4, § 13 (Spec. Sess. P.A. 01-4).5 This act resolved the specific controversy over the Cooke property that led to the town's request for the department's declaratory ruling. It permits "any municipality owning land purchased in January, 1999, that was formerly used for agricultural purposes and that is watershed land or is located adjacent to watershed land [to] use such municipally-owned land for the construction and operation of a golf course," subject to certain environmental protection conditions on land ownership and management. Spec. Sess. P.A. 01-4, § 13; see footnote 5 of this opinion. The trial court ruled as a threshold matter that the legislation did not render the case moot because it did not resolve the issue of the department's jurisdiction over the remainder of the town's nonwater utility land. Both parties agreed with the trial court's mootness determination because the town owned other land not used for water utility purposes that might also be subject to the department's jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits of the case, the trial court then applied the standard of review set forth by this court in Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995),6 and noted that the department's factual findings were uncontested. The trial court then proceeded to construe the language and legislative history of § 25-32. It concluded that the town was a water company explicitly subject to regulation by the department, and that requiring it to comply with the department's water supply planning requirements would not harm the town, while at the same time it would effectuate the legislative policy of protecting Connecticut's drinking water. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the town's appeal. This appeal followed.

I MOOTNESS

As a threshold matter, we first address whether the trial court properly concluded that the passage of Spec. Sess. P.A. 01-4, § 13, did not render the matter moot because of the effect of the department's ruling on the other town owned, nonwater utility lands.7 The department claims that the matter is not moot because Spec. Sess. P.A. 01-4 does not change the ruling that the town government is a water company subject to its jurisdiction, or negate the regulatory scheme, except for the limited authorization to use the property in question as a golf course. The town contends that the matter is not moot because its position is that the Cooke property is not subject to department jurisdiction in any way, whatever its intended use. The town also claims that this case falls into the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. See Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 385, 660 A.2d 323 (1995). We agree with the parties and the trial court that this matter is not moot. We base our conclusion, however, on the collateral consequences doctrine, as recently stated in State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), and Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it "implicates [this] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . ." Board of Education v. Naugatuck, 257 Conn. 409, 412, 778 A.2d 862 (2001). Indeed, we are required to address this question of justiciability, even in the "unusual situation" where all of the parties agree that the matter is not moot. Id. We begin with "the four part test for justiciability established in State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). . . . `Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.' . . . Id., 111-12." Board of Education v. Naugatuck, supra, 416.

The mootness doctrine is rooted in the first factor of the Nardini test. State v. McElveen, supra, 261 Conn. 204-205. It is founded on "the same policy interests as the doctrine of standing, namely, to assure the vigorous presentation of arguments concerning the matter at issue. . . . This court recently reiterated that the standing doctrine is designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 204. Indeed, we note that "courts are called upon to determine existing controversies, and thus may not be used as a vehicle to obtain advisory judicial opinions on points of law." Id., 204-205.

"[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,...

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