Walls v. Rees

• Decision Date: 06 July 1989
• Citation: 569 A.2d 1161
• Parties: Joseph M. WALLS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Scott REES, New Castle County Department of Police, and New Castle County Department of Public Safety, Defendants Below, Appellees. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1161

569 A.2d 1161

Joseph M. WALLS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Scott REES, New Castle County Department of Police, and New Castle County Department of Public Safety Defendants Below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: July 6, 1989.

Decided: Jan. 8, 1990.

Joseph M. Walls, pro se.

Donald E. Marston, First Asst. County Atty., Wilmington, for appellees.

Before CHRISTIE, Chief Justice, HORSEY, and HOLLAND, Justices.

CHRISTIE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in a claim against New Castle County and its agents. Appellant, Joseph M. Walls, contends that the trial court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the appellees, Scott Rees (Rees) and the New Castle County Department of Public Safety (the county) were immune from suit in connection with his claim for the value of an automobile which was seized by the county as authorized by statute and later destroyed, even though the statute required that it be returned to the owner.

On March 28, 1984, Walls was arrested and incarcerated in connection with a criminal investigation. Because it was thought that his vehicle had been used in the commission of a felony and it was involved in the investigation, it was seized by the New Castle County Police pursuant to 11 Del.C. § 2322. ¹ Upon completion of the criminal investigation on April 24, 1984, appellee Rees, a New Castle County Police Department employee, sent a letter to Walls by certified mail, return receipt requested, advising him that his vehicle could now be released. The letter also advised Walls that unless he made alternative arrangements with the county, the vehicle would be towed to a "commercial storage facility" after 30 days. The letter concluded: "[A]fter the vehicle leaves our facility, a daily storage fee set by the private vendor will be incurred by you." Walls was incarcerated at that time, but his wife, Donna M. Walls, who was joint owner of the automobile, contacted the New Castle County Police and tried to secure release of the vehicle. She was not successful for reasons which are not revealed in the record.

On November 2, 1984, Walls was acquitted of the criminal charges which involved the possible use of the vehicle. Thereafter, he and/or his representative again attempted to regain possession of the vehicle. At that time, he was advised by an unidentified county employee that the vehicle would be returned only upon a showing of proof of ownership, proof of insurance, and the payment of towing and storage fees. While he was able to prove ownership and the existence of insurance, Walls refused to pay the towing and storage fees.

Nearly two years later, on August 15, 1986, the county transferred possession of the vehicle to B & F Towing and Salvage Company, Inc. (B & F), a commercial storage facility often used by the county for this purpose. Walls was not notified of this transfer. In October, 1987, B & F contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of Delaware for authorization to dispose of the vehicle pursuant to 21 Del.C. Chapter 44, as a vehicle which had been abandoned. Thereafter and without notice to the appellees, the vehicle was sold for $25.00 to Breitenbach Auto Recyclers on October 20, 1987, and crushed for scrap metal.

Meanwhile, on November 24, 1986, Walls had filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking an order compelling the appellees to return the vehicle to him, or, in case the vehicle could not be returned, seeking $2,500.00 plus interest in compensatory damages and $5,000.00 in punitive damages. In the answer to the complaint, the appellees admitted that Walls was the record owner of the vehicle at the time of the seizure and that he had been acquitted of the charges which had precipitated the seizure. Appellees denied, however, that Walls was entitled to the relief requested and raised as an affirmative defense the contention that the appellees were immune from this suit according to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and pursuant to the terms of the Delaware Tort Claims Act (the Act). 10 Del.C. Ch. 40, Subch. II. Additionally, appellees argued that the seizure had been a proper seizure under the terms of the statute and that Walls had not complied with the procedures set out for release of the vehicle, which included paying the towing and storage fees. Further, appellees argued that they were no longer in possession of the vehicle, having had it moved to a lot owned by B & F.

On May 28, 1987, defendants moved for summary judgment. On July 6, 1987, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the tort claims for damages on the ground that the county was immune from such a suit according to 10 Del.C. § 4011(a). ² On the request for the return of the vehicle, the court delayed its ruling pending presentation of memoranda by both parties on the questions of whether the appellees had authority to require Walls to pay the towing and storage fees and whether the appellees were required to provide additional notice to the owner when the vehicle was moved to B & F. On February 18, 1988, after considering the memoranda, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining issues and ordered them to return the vehicle to Walls. As a result of that order, the question of notice was deemed irrelevant.

Shortly thereafter, defendants finally discovered that the vehicle had been destroyed while the case was pending and that they were therefore unable to comply with the court order. On April 18, 1988, and by amended order dated May 23, 1988, the Superior Court ordered the parties to negotiate a settlement of the matter and allowed the appellees to request a hearing on the fair market value of the vehicle. The court stated further that such a request would constitute an admission by appellees that the appellant was entitled to compensation for the vehicle. On the other hand, the court stated that if the appellees took the position that they did not owe the appellant any compensation, they were to submit argument on that issue. Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they were immune from a tort claim for damages pursuant to 10 Del.C. § 4011. On October 28, 1988, the court granted their motion and thus held them immune from liability. A motion for reargument was later denied. The appellant then filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

I.

First, the Court must determine whether the appellees' actions, quite apart from government immunity, constituted actionable wrongdoing. The parties agreed that the seizure of the vehicle was lawful pursuant to 11 Del.C. § 2322. Appellees also argue, however, that their continued possession was lawful. If the county were correct in requiring Walls to pay for the costs incurred as a result of the seizure, appellees might not be liable for what was done during the period of the detention. The claim for payment of expenses before the release of the vehicle, however, was not consistent with the written procedures of the New Castle County Department of Public Safety, ³ or with prior decisions of the Superior Court. Thompson v. Danvir Corp., Del.Super., 264 A.2d 361 (1970). See also, State v. Lloyd, Del.Super., 552 A.2d 498 (1988).

There is no indication in the order governing department procedures that a vehicle is to be released only after the owner pays the towing fees. To the contrary, the order indicates that careful records must be kept so that the towing charges may be accounted for within the department. Paragraph 5 of Section III specifically prohibits the officer from giving the "tow card" to the owner or operator of the vehicle. The order also instructs the seizing officers to retain only those vehicles which are ultimately likely to be forfeited, because "any time in storage only adds to the cost absorbed by the Department."

The Superior Court has held that "in the absence of a statute specifically creating a lien in favor of the garageman or requiring the owner to pay the costs of seizure, the plaintiff is not liable for costs of towing and storage." Thompson, 264 A.2d at 363. Accordingly we find no error in the order of Superior Court dated February 18, 1988, applying the Thompson holding to this case and ruling that the appellant was not required to pay towing and storage fees incurred by the county in order to secure release of his vehicle. Because the county no longer had any right to the vehicle once Walls was acquitted, the vehicle should have been released to him upon proof of ownership in November, 1984. 11 Del.C. § 2311(a)(2). ⁴ See also, Campbell v. Cochran, Del.Super., 416 A.2d 211, 220 (1980) (the court interpreted 11 Del.C. § 2311 to indicate that the failure of the State to prove the crime would terminate the State's right to retain the property). Thus, the county is liable for the loss of the vehicle unless it is immune from all such liability because it is a governmental entity.

II.

We must then consider whether the appellees are relieved of their liability to Walls by the fact that they are a governmental employee and entities. The doctrine of sovereign immunity in Delaware is now largely framed by statute. Fiat Motors of N.Am., Inc. v. Mayor and Council of the City of Wilmington, Del.Supr., 498 A.2d 1062 (1985). Whether the appellees were immune from liability depends in this case on whether the appellant's claim is not subject to the immunity provided to governmental entities and their employees in most circumstances by the Tort Claims Act. 10 Del.C. Ch. 40, Subch. II.

The Superior Court, by order dated July 6, 1987, granted summary judgment to appellees, thereby ruling that the statute conferred immunity from the tort claims for both compensatory and punitive damages. To the extent that Walls's claim is for mere negligence or the improper exercise of discretion by the county or its employees, the Act bars...