Walnorch v. McMonagle
Decision Date | 31 March 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 75-79 and 74-2489. |
Citation | 412 F. Supp. 270 |
Parties | James Edward WALNORCH, Plaintiff, v. Mr. McMONAGLE et al., Defendants. James Edward WALNORCH, Plaintiff, v. Joseph F. MAZURKIEWICZ et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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Janet Parrish, Thomas D. Panebianco, Indigent Prisoner Litigation Program, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Dean C. Graybill, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Michael Minkin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
The question presented on defendants' motion for summary judgment in this case is whether their alleged failure to provide proper medical treatment for plaintiff rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment so as to be cognizable under the Civil Rights Act.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed this Section 1983 action1 against employees of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania, for violation of his constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment, and to due process and equal protection of the laws.2 He seeks declaratory relief and damages of $100,000. from each defendant. The complaint and affidavits submitted by plaintiff thereafter allege, inter alia, that in August, 1973, while incarcerated at Graterford, plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his left knee while playing football3 and that he was allowed to remain for three days without treatment despite constant complaints to a correctional officer, Sergeant Eugene Wilfong. The complaint further asserts that both Mr. Donald McMonagle, the prison hospital administrative officer, and Dr. Calvin English, a prison doctor, were aware of plaintiff's condition but took no action to relieve the pain and weakness in his knee; both refused plaintiff's requests to be taken to Pottstown Hospital for x-rays; an arthrogram was performed on August 30, 1974;4 on September 28, 1974, Dr. Menkowitz, an orthopedic surgeon, recommended surgery; and as of the date of filing the complaint, February 3, 1975, plaintiff had not received corrective surgery and is still suffering from the injury. Plaintiff's affidavit of June 13, 1975, further refines the complaint. It states that he was scheduled for surgery on October 26, 1974, but was unable to undergo it because he was confined in the prison's Behavior Adjustment Unit; that he saw Dr. Menkowitz again in November, 1974, at which time he was promised knee braces and physical therapy; that he has not received any treatment or surgery; and that he continues to suffer pain and difficulty of movement in his knee.
After a careful examination of the entire record in this matter, I conclude that for purposes of the motion for summary judgment the events which occurred prior to August 27, 1973, — the date plaintiff was first seen by prison medical personnel — must be separated from those which occurred after that date.
In connection with their motion for summary judgment, the defendants have produced plaintiff's complete medical record at Graterford. Plaintiff alleged that his injury occurred in late August, 1973, and his complaint admits that he was treated within three days, receiving an Ace bandage and some pain pills. The medical records show that between August 27, 1973, and December 20, 1974, shortly before his transfer to Dallas,5 plaintiff was seen by various doctors relative to his knee injury on at least eleven occasions.6 In chronological order, these records reflect the following:
It is clear that the very purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to pierce through the pleadings, 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 56.222 (1974), and that faced with this extensive record plaintiff may not rely on the conclusory allegations of his complaint. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970); Brown v. Cliff, 341 F.Supp. 177, 179 (E.D.Pa.1972). Yet with one exception, neither in his affidavit nor at oral argument has plaintiff disputed the essential accuracy of these records.
In order for a motion for summary judgment to be granted the movant must show two things: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and (2) that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). See generally Moore's, supra, at §§ 56.09-56.23 (1974). A review of the entire record shows the only post-August 27, 1973, fact in dispute concerns October 26, 1974: defendants contend plaintiff refused surgery on that date whereas Walnorch contends that he was unable to keep his appointment for surgery due to his confinement in the Behavior Adjustment Unit at Graterford. If, despite accepting plaintiff's version of this factual dispute, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the factual issue is not material. Such is the case here.
In this Circuit, an allegation amounting to nothing more than negligence is insufficient to state an eighth amendment claim for improper or inadequate medical treatment. Gittlemacker, supra.
As noted previously, plaintiff does not dispute the fact that he received the medical care reflected by the records. Rather, he contends that the care given him was grossly inadequate. Within a certain range, the question of whether medical treatment is so improper or inadequate as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment would, no doubt, be for a trier of fact and therefore be inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment. Cf. Conner v. Jeffes, 67 F.R.D. 86, 90 (M.D.Pa.1975); United States ex rel. Ingram v. Montgomery County Prison Bd., 369 F.Supp. 873 (E.D.Pa.1974). However, when the standard of Gittlemacker is applied to the medical treatment afforded plaintiff after August 27, 1973, it is apparent as a matter of law that he was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Even if plaintiff's explanation of why he did not appear for surgery on October 26, 1974, is accepted, the other undisputed medical records show that after August 27,...
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