Walrath v. Bd. of Com'rs of Valencia County

• Decision Date: 21 July 1913
• Citation: 134 P. 204,18 N.M. 101
• Parties: WALRATHv.BOARD OF COM'RS OF VALENCIA COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

18 N.M. 101

134 P. 204

WALRATH

v.BOARD OF COM'RS OF VALENCIA COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 21, 1913.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a county has contracted with a party to construct a courthouse and jail, and a taxpayer seeks to enjoin the board of county commissioners from paying said contractor for work and labor performed and to be performed under said contract, the contractor is an indispensable party to the suit, and where such contractor was not made a party the court properly dismissed the petition.

Appeal from District Court, Valencia County; Herbert F. Raynolds, Judge.

Action by Frank L. Walrath against the Board of County Commissioners of Valencia County and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

In a suit by a taxpayer to enjoin county commissioners from paying a contractor for work and labor performed and to be performed under a contract to build a courthouse, the contractor is an indispensable party.

Neill B. Field, of Albuquerque, for appellant.

H. M. Daughtry, of Socorro, and A. B. McMillen, of Albuquerque, for appellees.

ROBERTS, C. J.

This is an action by Frank L. Walrath against the board of county commissioners of Valencia county and the individual members of the board to restrain them from carrying into execution a contract for the construction of a courthouse and jail at the county seat of said county. The pleadings show that a contract had been entered into between the board of county commissioners and Campbell Bros., by which the latter were to construct and complete the courthouse and jail in accordance with plans and specifications, and that the contractors had begun work under said contract, and had expended large sums of money thereon for labor and material. Campbell Bros., although within the jurisdiction of the court, were not made parties to the suit. The petition was filed to test the validity of an act of the Legislative Assembly of the territory, approved March 8, 1909, and being chapter 19, Sess. Laws 1909, whereby the Legislature attempted to confer upon the county of Valencia authority to use the proceeds of bonds received by it from the county of Torrance for the purpose of constructing a courthouse and jail. Appellees filed an answer to the merits, upon the incoming of which appellant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. His motion was overruled by the court, and he elected to stand upon said motion and demanded judgment upon the pleadings. The court found that the appellant was not entitled to the relief prayed for in his complaint, and dismissed the same. From such judgment this appeal was taken.

For a reversal of the judgment, appellant relies upon four propositions, viz.: “(1) That the act in question is a local and special law, in contravention of the act of Congress commonly called the ‘Springer Act’ (July 30, 1886, c. 818, 24 Stat. 170). 2. That, the Legislature having prescribed a method by which funds for the erection of courthouse and jail might be raised in any county, that method is exclusive. 3. That the act is inconsistent with certain provisions of the state Constitution, and was not continued in force by the schedule of that instrument. 4. That the contract in question created an indebtedness of the county of Valencia which, together with the existing indebtedness of the county, exceeded 4 per centum upon the assessed valuation of the taxable property of the county in violation of the restrictions of the so-called Springer Act.” But, whatever may be the views of the court on the questions stated, if the court below rightfully refused the injunction, we can do nothing more than affirm the decision.

Appellees argue that the contractors, Campbell Bros., were necessary and indispensable parties to the suit; and, if this be true, then this court would be warranted in assuming that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint was rendered because no other judgment could have been rendered in the absence of a necessary and indispensable party to the suit; Jeffries-BaSom v. Nation, 63 Kan. 247, 65 Pac. 226. The question, then, to be determined, is whether the contractors were necessary and indispensable parties to the suit.

The rule is stated as follows in Story's Equity Pleadings, § 72: “It is the constant aim of courts of equity to do complete justice, by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the subject-matter of the suit, so that the performance of the decree of the court may be perfectly safe to those who are compelled to obey it, and also that future litigation may be prevented. Hence the common expression that courts of equity delight to do justice, and not by halves. And hence, also, it is a general rule in equity, that all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of the suit, are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or defendants, however numerous they may be, so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind them all. By this means the court is enabled to make a complete decree between the parties, to prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity of a multiplicity of suits, and to make it perfectly certain that no injustice is done, either to the parties before it, or...