Walsh v. Communications Workers of America, Local 2336

• Decision Date: 16 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 104,104
• Citation: 259 Md. 608,271 A.2d 148
• Parties: , 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2629, 64 Lab.Cas. P 52,426 John A. WALSH v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 2336.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 608

259 Md. 608

271 A.2d 148, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2629,

64 Lab.Cas. P 52,426

John A. WALSH v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 2336.

No. 104.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 16, 1970.

Thomas P. Smith, Hyattsville (William L. Kaplan, Karl G. Feissner, Fred R. Joseph and Andrew E. Greenwald, Hyattsville, on the brief) for appellant.

Amicus curiae brief by Local 2108, Communications Workers of America (Matthew A. Kane and Kane & Koons, Washington, D. C., on the brief).

John T. Bell, Rockville (Charles W. Bell, Frank S. Cornelius and Bell & Bell, Rockville, on the brief) for appellee.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.

HAMMOND, Chief Judge.

Appellant Walsh, a member of the Communications Workers of America, Local 2336, disapproved of a strike called by the Union and worked during the strike for his employer, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, earning some $400.00. This violated the provision of Art. XIX, § 1(e) of the Union constitution, which provides that:

'Members may be fined, suspended or expelled by the Locals in the manner provided in the Constitution for any of the following acts:

'(e) Working without proper Union authorization, during the period of a properly approved strike in or for an establishment which is being struck by the Union or Local.'

The Union took a very dim view of his non-conforming activities and after the strike invoked the disciplinary procedures in its constitution and the by-laws of Local 2336. Walsh was notified by certified mail by the chairman of the Local trial board that a hearing would be held on July 29, 1968, at a place specified, to determine if he had violated Union rules by working during the strike in April and May 1966. He was invited to attend, to select a Union member as his counsel, to produce witnesses and documentary evidence and to speak in his own behalf, and notified that if he did not appear he would be tried and sentenced in absentia. Walsh did not appear. The trial board heard evidence that Walsh did work during the strike and had earned $400.00 by so doing. He was fined $500.00.

Walsh did not pay the fine, and, although notified of the trial board's action and his right to appeal, did not take or attempt to take any of the appeal speps given him by Art. XXI, § 4, of the Union constitution. These include appeal to a membership meeting 'which may affirm or reverse the decision or reduce the penalty'; appeal from the final decision of the Local to the executive board of the Union and appeal from the decision of the executive board to the next convention of the Union.

The Union filed suit at law to enforce collection of the $500.00 fine and Judge Bowen, sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, gave judgment for the Union. We affirm the judgment.

Walsh argues that under controlling federal legislation it is an unfair labor practice for a Union to impose a fine on a Union member, that federal labor laws preempt action by a State court to enforce a fine, or at least an unreasonable fine, and, assuming there is no federal preemption, the Union cannot prevail because it seeks to enforce a penalty judicially, although the Union's governing provisions permit only suspension or expulsion as a sanction for non-payment of a fine.

The Supreme Court has left no doubt on any of these points. In National Labor Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 388 U.S. 175, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, 1129-1130, the Court held that the federal labor laws permit a State court to give judgment for the amount of a union fine. The Court said:

'To say that Congress meant * * * to strip unions of the power to fine members for strikebreaking, however lawful the strike vote, and however fair the disciplinary procedures and penalty, is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. It is also to attribute to Congress an intent at war with the understanding of the unionmembership relation which has been at the heart of its effort 'to fashion a coherent labor policy' and which has been a predicate underlying action by this Court and the state courts. More importantly, it is to say that Congress limited unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of their role as exclusive statutory bargaining agents by impairing the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon. It is no answer that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) preserves to the union the power to expel the offending member. Where the union is strong and membership therefore valuable, to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine. Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value, the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice except to condone the member's disobedience. Yet it is just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function.'

In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 89 S.Ct. 1154, 22 L.Ed.2d 385, the Court in effect reiterated the holdings of Allis-Chalmers. That case involved suits in the State court to collect fines levied by the union on its members. Some of those who had been fined claimed before the National Labor Relations Board that this was an unfair labor practice. The claim was rejected by the Board and by the Supreme Court, which in a footnote found at page 425 of 394 U.S., at page 1156 of 89 S.Ct., at page 391 of 22 L.Ed.2d said:

'Unless the (Union) rule or its enforcement impinges on some policy of the federal labor law, the regulation of the relationship between union and employee is a contractual matter governed by local law.'

The Court said further (p. 428 of 394 U.S., p. 1157 of 89 S.Ct. pp. 392-393 of 22 L.Ed.2d):

'A union rule, duly adopted and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer, forbidding the crossing of a picket line during a strike was therefore enforceable against voluntary union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine. * * * Moreover, the...