Walsh v. Finley
| Decision Date | 30 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 44205,44205 |
| Citation | 281 N.E.2d 654,51 Ill.2d 174 |
| Parties | Frank J. WALSH, Appellee, v. Lillian FINLEY et al., Lillian Finley, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Beverly, Pause, Duffy & O'Malley, Chicago (Frank J. Pause, John J. O'Malley, and Dom J. Rizzi, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Harold L. Ward and Leonard M. Ring, Chicago (Richard L. Wattling, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This is an appeal by Lillian Finley, one of the defendants herein, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, First District (Walsh v. Finley (Ill.App.1971), 268 N.E.2d 534), reversing the trial court, which had entered a judgment in favor of the defendant Finley, notwithstanding the jury verdict in the sum of $25,000, in favor of the plaintiff and against both of the defendants.
The cause of action out of which this appeal arose was for personal injuries sustained in a four-car collision on September 7, 1961. The involved cars were all west bound in the same lane of traffic on North Avenue--a four lane highway in western Cook County--between First and Fifth Avenues. The surface of the highway was dry, the traffic was heavy, and the first car, a 1960 Roadmaster Buick, driven by Ellis R. Lewis (not a party to this action), was either stopped or barely moving.
The plaintiff, who was driving the second car--a 1961, four-door Cadillac--testified that he had stopped three or four feet behind the Lewis car and remained in that position for one or two minutes before the accident occurred; that he had his foot on the power brake and looked but saw nothing in his rear view mirror just before he was struck from the rear; that there were two separate and distinct impacts to the rear of his car, each accompanied by a loud noise; and that both occurred almost simultaneously. He stated that the force of the impact knocked off his glasses, and that he was bruised and dazed thereby.
Lillian Finley, defendant-appellant, the driver of the third car--a 1959 four-ddor Pontiac--testified that her car was stopped before it was struck from behind; and that although she had her foot on the brake, the force of the impact from the fourth car caused her car to strike the plaintiff's car and move it forward. She testified to two impacts, one to the rear of her car and another when her car struck the rear of the car in front of her--the Walsh car.
The defendant, Mary Kelly, the driver of fourt car--a Rambler station wagon--testified the fourth car--a Rambler station wagon--testified which was in first gear, in the line of traffic and had her foot on the brake; that while she was stopped, the motor of her car died; that none of the cars in front of her moved forward; that when she started her car it was still in gear, and it lurched forward and struck the Finley car in the rear with a mild impact; and that she neither saw nor heard the Finley car, which was in front of her, strike the plaintiff Walsh's car.
The damage to the cars was: the Lewis Buick, the first car in the line of traffic, suffered a damaged rear bumper, which had to be replaced; the Walsh Cadillac, the second in line, suffered extensive damage to the front fenders, grille, hood, rear bumper and trunk; the Finley Pontiac, the third in line, was damaged in both the front and rear; and the only damage to the Kelly Rambler, the fourth car, was a broken right from headlight glass.
The testimony of the plaintiff Walsh and the defendant Finley as to how the accident happened is conflicting. The plaintiff testified that there were two distinct impacts to the rear of his car, each accompanied by a loud noise. The defendant Finley testified that her car had but one impact with the rear of the plaintiff's car. If the jury believed the plaintiff Walsh it could reasonably infer that the first impact was not between the Kelly car and the Finley car, but was between the Finley car and the Walsh car; and that the second impact to the rear of the plaintiff Walsh's car, was an aftermath of a subsequent impact between the Kelly car and the Finley car. If the jury believed the testimony of defendant Finley, it would have had to reject the testimony of the plaintiff Walsh--that he felt two impacts from the rear. The jury had to, and did resolve this conflict in the testimony. Under these...
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