Walsh v. Mayorkas

• Decision Date: 01 December 2022
• Docket Number: 20-cv-00509
• Parties: SEAN JOHN WALSH, Plaintiff, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,[1] et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

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SEAN JOHN WALSH, Plaintiff, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,^[1] et al., Defendants.

No. 20-cv-00509

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

December 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN F. KNESS, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff a citizen of Ireland, filed this action after the United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his Form I-485 application for an adjustment of status (colloquially called a “green card”). Defendants Alejandro Mayorkas (the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) and Kevin Riddle (the Director of USCIS's Chicago Field Office) have moved to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed both to exhaust his available administrative remedies and to show he was statutorily eligible for permanent resident status. Separately, because the Court questioned its jurisdiction over this matter, it requested and received supplemental briefing on that issue.

Upon further review, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of Plaintiff's application. USCIS adjudicated Plaintiff's application under 8 U.S.C. § 1255; but the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibits courts from reviewing “any judgment[s] regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). As the Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified in Patel v. Garland, that prohibition extends to “judgments ‘of whatever kind' under § 1255, not just discretionary judgments or the last-in-time judgment.” 142 S.Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022). As a result the INA bars the Court from reviewing USCIS's denial of Plaintiff's adjustment of status.

Even if the Court had jurisdiction, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he exhausted his available administrative remedies. If anything, Plaintiff's complaint suggests that he has not exhausted the remedies available to him under the laws and regulations governing immigration. Plaintiff's complaint is therefore premature in any event.

For these reasons, and as explained more fully below, the case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16) is granted in part, as Plaintiff has not adequately established that he has exhausted all the administrative remedies available to him.

I. BACKGROUND

Thirteen years ago, Plaintiff Sean John Walsh, a “native and citizen” of Ireland, was apprehended by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) when a CBP officer “observed Plaintiff . . . crossing the border from Canada to the United States.”

(Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22-23 (under seal).) Plaintiff was released and given a Notice to Appear before the Immigration Court. (Id. ¶ 24.) That Notice (which is not attached to the complaint) was edited twice by the Department of Homeland Security, and, according to Plaintiff, the Notice charged that Plaintiff was an “arriving alien” who “entered without inspection or admission or parole.” (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) On March 14, 2012, an immigration judge terminated Plaintiff's removal proceedings so that Plaintiff could pursue an adjustment of status application (I-485). (Id. ¶ 29.)

At some point (it is not clear when), Plaintiff married a naturalized U.S. citizen. Plaintiff's new spouse then successfully sought a Form I-130 visa (Petition for Alien Relative). (Id. ¶ 30.) On March 7, 2019-seven years after the immigration judge terminated Plaintiff's removal proceedings-Plaintiff filed a Form I-485 application (which permits foreign nationals to pursue status adjustments under 8 U.S.C. § 1255) based on the approved I-130 application. (Id. ¶ 31.) On October 4, 2019, USCIS denied Plaintiff's application because he “failed to provide evidence [he was] either lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States” under the relevant provision of the INA. (Dkt. 1-1 at 5 (under seal).)

Concluding that he was “left with no basis to dispute the USCIS finding that he is ineligible for adjustment of status,” Plaintiff sued Defendants Chad Wolf (then-Acting Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security) and Kevin Riddle (Field Office Director for the Chicago Field Office of the USCIS). Plaintiff asks the Court to: (1) “Declare that Plaintiff is eligible for adjustment of status”; (2) “Hold unlawful and set aside Defendants' decision [to deny Plaintiff an adjustment of status] as arbitrary, capricious and/or otherwise not in accordance with the law;” and (3) “Order the Defendants to take corrective action, including but not limited to granting the adjustment of status application of Plaintiff[.]” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 33, at 8.)

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. 16.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not adequately exhausted the administrative remedies available to him through the immigration administrative process and that, even if he has done so, Plaintiff “fail[s] to meet his burden to show he was statutorily eligible for permanent resident status.” (Dkt. 17 at 1.) After briefing on the motion to dismiss was completed, the Court directed the parties to submit memoranda addressing the Court's jurisdiction over this matter. (Dkt. 22; see Dkts. 23, 24.)^[2]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put another way, the complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys a story that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though factual allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, however, mere legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678-79.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Federal courts have the power to hear cases only if such power is granted by the Constitution and authorized by statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts have an “independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore must raise and decide jurisdictional questions.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2001).

Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction under the INA as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (Dkt. 1 ¶ 3.)^[3] Each of these asserted bases is addressed in turn.

1. Jurisdiction under the 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (INA)

In general, courts lack jurisdiction to review denials of adjustments of status under Section 1255. Section 1252 explains that

[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . . and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title[.] . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Section 1252 controls the jurisdictional question in this case. In its recent Patel decision, the Supreme Court explained that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “prohibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under § 1255 and the other enumerated provisions.” Patel, 142 S.Ct. at 1622 (emphasis in original). Adhering to the statute's plain language, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he provision does not restrict itself to certain kinds of decisions.” Id. Instead, the Supreme Court found that

“any” means that the provision applies to judgments “of whatever kind” under § 1255, not just discretionary judgments or the last-in-time judgment. Similarly, the use of “regarding” in a legal context generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject. Thus, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of relief” but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief.

Id. (cleaned up). Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as clarified in Patel, bars this Court from reviewing the denial by USCIS of Plaintiff's request for an adjustment of status.

There is, to be sure, an exception to Section 1252's general bar on judicial review for cases that present constitutional or legal questions. Subsection (D) of Section 1252 provides that

[n]othing in [the subsections limiting or barring judicial review] shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Plaintiff cites to subsection (D) in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to review the legal questions presented in his complaint. (See Dkt. 23 at 1.) But even assuming Plaintiff's complaint can be construed as a “petition for review,”^[4] Plaintiff makes it only halfway home because he mistakenly conflates review by the “court of appeals” with review by any “court.” As the language of the statute plainly states, the limited exception in subsection (D) allows a petition for review to be “filed with an appropriate court of appeals,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's action, of course, is presently before the district...