Walsh v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 12 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 16 Civ. 3558 (NSR),16 Civ. 3558 (NSR) |
| Parties | STEPHEN P. WALSH, Plaintiff, v. SCARSDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, and MICHAEL McDERMOTT Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Stephen P. Walsh ("Plaintiff" or "Walsh") commenced this action against his former employer, the Scarsdale Union Free School District ("SUFSD") and Michael McDermott (collectively, "Defendants") on May 12, 2016. (See Complaint, ("Compl."), ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him because of his age and that the discrimination against him culminated in his constructive discharge. The action arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") § 290 et seq. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and other relief, permitted under federal and New York State anti-discrimination laws, arising from Defendants' illegal, discriminatory, and disparate treatment of Plaintiff.
On March 22, 2019, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. ("Summary Judgment Order," ECF No. 45.) Trial is scheduled to begin on June 1, 2020. Before the Court is Defendants' pre-trial motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of backpay and frontpay damages and/or dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for such damages and liquidated damages as asserted in the Complaint. (See Defendants' Mot. in Limine ("Def. Mot."), ECF No. 51.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is DENIED in its entirety.
The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him because of his age—Plaintiff was sixty-three (63) years old at the conclusion of his employment with SUFSD—and that the discrimination against him culminated in his constructive discharge. (Compl. at ¶ 1.) As a result of Defendants' discriminatory actions, Plaintiff alleges that he retired one year earlier than planned: while he had planned to retire at the end of the 2015-2016 school year, he instead retired at the end of the 2014-2015 school year. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25, 41.) Plaintiff collected a $10,000 retirement bonus provided for in the applicable teacher contract for that time period. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff alleges injuries in the form of financial harm as well as severe emotional distress. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Consequently, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and other relief arising from Defendants' illegal, discriminatory, and disparate treatment of Plaintiff, as a result of his age, under federal and New York State anti-discrimination laws. (Id. at ¶ 2.) In particular, he seeks backpay compensation for the loss of a year of salary (the 2015-2016 school year), as well as frontpay for the reduction in his retirement benefits due to his early retirement in 2015. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 59.)
Defendants' pre-trial motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence of backpay and frontpay damages pursuant to Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence .) In the alternative, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for such damages as asserted in the Complaint under Rules 12(h)(2) and 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Def. Mot.; Def. Mem. at 1, 4-5.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) provides that "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised . . . by a motion under Rule 12(c)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The standard for analyzing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is identical to the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a "court may consider the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint together with the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference." Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Courts may also consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken" and "documents eitherin plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).
Conversely, when documents are included on a motion to dismiss that do not fall into these categories, "a district court must either exclude the additional material and decide the motion on the complaint alone or convert the motion to one for summary judgment . . . and afford all parties the opportunity to present supporting material." Friedl v. City of N.Y., 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 12(d) provides:
If, on a motion under Rule . . . 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a district court acts properly in converting a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment when the motion presents matters outside the pleadings, as long as the Court gives "sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond." Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, formal notice is not required where a party "should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment [and] was [neither] taken by surprise [nor] deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings." Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Villante v. Dep't of Corrections of City of New York, 786 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jurycould return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must "constru[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[] all reasonable inferences in its favor." Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a court should grant summary judgment when a party who bears the burden of proof at trial "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[W]hen confronted with evidence of facts that would support summary judgment, the [nonmoving party] must come forward with evidence in admissible form that is capable of refuting those facts." George v. Rockland State Psychiatric Ctr., No. 10-cv-8091(NSR), 2014 WL 5410059, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (quoting Wali v. One Source Co., 678 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, "[s]tatements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999).
A party must support its position by citing to materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Importantly, a court need only consider facts that are admissible in evidence. Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
"A district court's inherent authority to manage the course of its trials encompasses the right to rule on motions in limine." Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984)). An in limine motion is intended "to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial,...
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