Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. G-93-455.,G-93-455.
• Citation: 836 F. Supp. 411
• Parties: James Brady WALSH v. SEAGULL ENERGY CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

836 F. Supp. 411

James Brady WALSH v. SEAGULL ENERGY CORPORATION, et al.

No. G-93-455.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

November 8, 1993.

David A. Bickham, Francis I. Spagnoletti, Spagnoletti & Assoc., Houston, TX, for James Brady Walsh.

Jill Annette Schaar, Liddell Sapp Zivley Hill & LaBoon, Houston, TX, for Seagull Energy Corp., Seagull Energy E & P Inc., Seagull Exploration Production, Inc.

Edward J. Patterson, III, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., Teledyne Epsilon, Inc.

ORDER OF REMAND

KENT, District Judge.

The subject of the removability of saving clause cases is beset by theoretical difficulties that cannot be resolved by reference to the cases, which are in a confused state, or by exploring the inferences of history.

14 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3674 (1985).

Since the oil industry went offshore, the legal system has struggled to produce a body of injury law that is rational, fair, internally consistent, and acceptably productive of safety incentives. The result has been chaos.

David Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 Tex.L.Rev. 973, 973 (1977) (footnote omitted) (quoted in Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337, 340 n. 4 (5th Cir.1982) (Rubin, J.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 103 S.Ct. 2430, 77 L.Ed.2d 1316 (1983).

Into such chaos this Court must now plunge, striving to determine whether a state court action for personal injuries suffered on a mobile drilling vessel in the course of oil exploration operations on the Outer Continental Shelf may be removed to a federal forum. The Court concludes that, despite Congressional attempts to federalize this area of the law, removal is unavailable. Therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction over the case and it must be remanded.

Background

Plaintiff James Brady Walsh sued Defendants Seagull Energy Corporation and related entities ("Seagull") in a Texas District Court in Brazoria County, to recover for injuries he claims he suffered aboard the drilling vessel Teledyne Rig No. 19 while the vessel was moored at Galveston Block 343 off the coast of Texas. Walsh's injuries occurred while he was operating "dual string hydraulic tubing tongs," which are used to tighten or untighten tubing which the drilling vessel is either placing into or removing from a below-water well. In his Original Petition in state court Walsh stated a claim against Seagull for "negligence." He did not, however, state what body of law he believed would govern this claim.

Galveston Block 343 is located on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). Seagull timely¹ removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the theory that Walsh's claims are governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. Seagull claims a basis for removal under the grant of federal jurisdiction found in OCSLA at 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1), and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Before the Court is Walsh's motion to remand.

Saving to Suitors and Removal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the federal district courts

... have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.

By its plain language, this statute would appear to give the federal district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over maritime claims. In the manner that such rules evolve, however, the judiciary has invoked historical rationales to interpret the "saving to suitors" clause to preserve the availability of an ordinary "civil" action with "civil" remedies (as opposed to "admiralty" actions and remedies) for causes brought "in personam." Because traditionally the "civil" remedies preserved by this clause may be brought in state court, the saving clause is read to preserve the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over in personam claims. Knapp, Stout, & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 20 S.Ct. 824, 44 L.Ed. 921 (1900). The exclusivity provision applies only to actions "in rem." Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 298, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954); Charles A. Wright, et al., supra, § 3672.

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides that:

(a) ... any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States....

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the ... defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

Walsh alleges, and Defendant Seagull does not contest, that Seagull is a citizen of Texas. Therefore the only possible ground for removal which it may assert under § 1441 is that Walsh has asserted a claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction and which is founded on a right "arising under" the laws of the United States.

Again because of the historical treatment of maritime claims, and because of the wording of the Constitution's grant of judicial power in Article III, the Supreme Court has held that a maritime claim is not one "arising under" the laws of the United States for the purpose of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Romero v. International Terminal Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-80, 79 S.Ct. 468, 473-85, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959); see Charles A. Wright, supra, § 3673. The Romero court noted in oft-quoted dicta that, if maritime claims were considered "federal questions," this would eliminate the "historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common-law remedy to select his forum, state or federal ... since saving clause actions would be freely removable." 358 U.S. at 371-72, 79 S.Ct. at 480. This reasoning has led to the conclusion that Romero also stands for the proposition that maritime claims do not "arise under" the laws of the United States for the purpose of federal question removal jurisdiction. Therefore, a maritime claim brought in State court cannot be removed on the sole basis that the maritime claim presents a federal question under § 1441(b). In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991).

In his motion to remand, Walsh makes the common misstatement that it is the saving clause that bars removal of maritime claims. See, e.g., Holcomb v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 339, 343 (W.D.La. 1985) ("This non-removability rule has been established on the basis of the saving to suitors clause ..."). The saving clause, however, had no direct role at all in the reasoning of Romero. Rather, maritime claims do not qualify for federal question removal simply because they are not claims "arising under" the laws of the United States. As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

The "saving to suitors" clause does no more than preserve the right of maritime suitors to pursue non-maritime remedies. It does not guarantee them a nonfederal forum, or limit the right of defendants to remove such actions to federal court where there exists some basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty.

Poirrier v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir.1981) (diversity of citizenship is grounds for removal of a maritime claim); see also Uncle Ben's v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1988) (maritime claim removable where the remedy is governed by the federal Harter Act). Other than for its grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, the saving clause is irrelevant to the removal question. The question for this Court is solely whether Walsh's petition states a removable federal question, or whether remand is proper because this case is based on a petition which only asserts a maritime claim against an in-state defendant.

Seagull also argues that Walsh's claims cannot receive the benefit of the "saving to suitors" clause because he did not plead it in his Original Petition, nor did he state that he sought recovery under the maritime law. As the above discussion shows, this contention is irrelevant. For one thing, the burden of demonstrating the propriety of removal is on the removing party. Ray v. Bird & Son & Asset Realization Co., 519 F.2d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir.1975). More importantly, one is not required to plead "saving to suitors" in order to benefit from the general non-removability of maritime claims; by filing in State court Walsh more than sufficiently indicated his intent to try his case there. Likewise, Walsh's failure to indicate the body of law he intends to proceed under does not open the door for Seagull to supplement the petition. If the petition on its face states a claim cognizable in maritime law, and does not necessarily state a federal question under the well-pleaded complaint rule, Walsh may resist removal based on the rule of Romero.

OCSLA: The Chaos Continues

Seagull does not contest Walsh's characterization of the Teledyne Rig No. 19 as a "vessel" for the purposes of maritime law. See Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir.1966) (floating drilling rigs are vessels). Nor does Seagull contest the premise that a claim of negligence resulting in injuries suffered on a vessel in navigable waters states a cause of action under maritime law. Rather, Seagull primarily argues that the rules summarized above are inapplicable to this case because the accident occurred on a situs governed by OCSLA, OCSLA gives this Court subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, and OCSLA allows federal question removal on these facts.

Because Walsh's injuries occurred while working on an oil well on the OCS, the maritime...