Walter Bledsoe Coal Co. v. Review Bd. of Employment Sec. Division of Dept. of Treasury

Decision Date28 January 1943
Docket Number27829-27832.
Citation46 N.E.2d 477,221 Ind. 16
PartiesWALTER BLEDSOE COAL CO. et al. v. REVIEW BOARD OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY et al. KNOX CONSOL. COAL CORPORATION v. REVIEW BOARD OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DIVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY et al. LINTON-SUMMIT COAL CO. et al. v. ABERCROMBIE et al. PRINCETON MINING CO. v. REVIEW BOARD OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY et al.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Cooper Royse, Gambill & Crawford, of Terre Haute, for appellant Walter Bledsoe Coal Co. and others.

Adamson, Blair & Adamson, of Terre Haute, for appellant Knox Consol. coaL co.

Hays & Hays, of Sullivan, and C. Richard Templeton, of Terre Haute, for appellant Linton-Summit Coal Co. and others.

Morton C. Embree and Gerald E. Hall, both of Princeton, for appellant Princeton Mining Co.

McDonald & McDonald, of Princeton, for appellees.

FANSLER Judge.

The employees of the appellant coal companies filed claims for compensation under the Employment Security Act § 52-1501 et seq., Burns' 1933, § 10168-1 et seq., Baldwin's 1934 Supp.1937. The claims were referred to the Review Board which held that the claimants were entitled to receive unemployment benefits. The coal companies began these actions in the Appellate Court questioning the legality of the decision.

The facts are not in dispute. The appellants operate coal mines. The employees are members of the United Mine Workers of America. On March 31, 1941, the agreement existing between the Indiana Coal Operators Association and the International Union, United Mine Workers of America, concerning wages hours, and working conditions, under which the local union operated, expired. The United Mine Workers of America was recognized as the bargaining agent of the employees, members of the local union. The International Union of Mine Workers of America is composed of two districts: (1) The Appalachian Area and (2) the Outlying Districts, including Indiana. Prior to March 31, 1941, the International Union of United Mine Workers of America was negotiating with the Operators of the Appalachian Area for a new contract to become effective April 1, 1941. On March 20, 1941, the appellants' employees who made the claim for employment benefits, and who were members of the local union, proposed to the appellant companies that at the expiration of the contract ending at midnight March 31, 1941, they would continue work in the mines subject to any agreement which was ultimately reached in the negotiations between the United Mine Workers and the Appalachian Operators in respect to increased wages and improvement in hours and conditions, and that any such increases or changes when agreed upon should be retroactive as of April 1, 1941. The coal companies declined to enter into such an agreement, and on March 28, 1941, countered with a proposal that, pending the Appalachian Area agreement, the employees continue to work under the terms and conditions of the contract that was to expire on March 31st. This counter-proposal was rejected, and the employees stopped work at midnight on March 31, 1941.

The question involved is whether, under these facts, the employees were entitled to benefits under the Employment Security Act. The Appellate Court sustained the action of the Review Board.

The first section of the act, § 52-1501, Burns' 1933, § 10168-1, Baldwin's 1934, Supp.1937, declares the purposes of the law as follows: 'Economic insecurity due to unemployment is declared hereby to be a serious menace to the health, morale and welfare of the people of this state and to the maintenance of public order within this state. Protection against this great hazard of our economic life can be provided in some measure by the required and systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits to the unemployed during periods of unemployment and by encouragement of desirable stable employment. The enactment of this measure to provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own, to encourage stablization in employment, and to provide for a state employment service is, therefore, essential to public welfare; and the same is declared to be a proper exercise of the police powers of the state.' Section 52-1506, Burns' 1933, § 10168-21, Baldwin's 1934, Supp.1937, provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits: 'For any week with respect to which the board finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last employed.'

Appellants contend that the employees voluntarily stopped work because of a labor dispute. The Appellate Court did not agree with this contention, and held that there was no labor dispute involved. What is meant by the term 'labor dispute' has been the subject of our inquiry, and, to determine the question, we have looked to the entire act and its purposes. The declared purpose quoted above is to provide benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to encourage stabilization in employment.

Appellees say that the word 'fault' means 'something worthy of censure.' We cannot believe that the word as used in the statute was intended to have such a meaning. We cannot believe that it was intended that, under war-time conditions such as now exist, a person with regular employment with which he has been satisfied may voluntarily quit work...

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