Walter v. Ports America
| Decision Date | 08 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:09-cv-3663 |
| Parties | CURTIS WALTER, Plaintiff v. PORTS AMERICA, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14). After considering Defendant's motion, the response thereto, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion must be denied.
On May 5, 2009, Plaintiff Curtis Walter ("Plaintiff" or "Walter") filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging employment discrimination based on Plaintiff's race and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and/or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On June 18, 2009, the EEOC mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue letter. Plaintiff received the Notice of Right to Sue on June 20, 2009.1 The Notice of Right to Sue advises, in pertinent part: "Your lawsuit under Title VII or the ADA must be filed in federal or state court WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost."
On September 18, 2009, ninety days after receiving the Notice of Right to Sue letter, Walter filed his complaint, alleging that Defendant discriminated against him in employment because of his race and his disability. Specifically, Walter claims that, on three separate occasions in 2008 and 2009, Defendant Ports America wrongfully withheld pay it owed Walter for his work on a rice bag gang. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1, at 4-5). The instant motion to dismiss does not address the underlying facts of Walter's claim. Instead, the sole issue at hand turns on Plaintiff's series of defective in forma pauperis applications, rendering the minutiae of each application relevant here.
Walter first filed his complaint on September 18, 2009 (Doc. No. 1, Case No. 9-mc-0462). Walter filed the complaint together with an in forma pauperis application (hereinafter "IFP application"). On September 21, 2009, Judge Gray H. Miller signed an order striking Plaintiff's IFP application, citing inadequate information with respect to Items 2 and 4 of the application. (Doc. No. 2, Case No. 9-mc-0462).
Item 2 on the IFP application form asks the affiant, "Are you currently employed?" Walter filled in the block indicating "No," but provided additional information under subsection 2a. Item 2a. directs the affiant, "If the answer is 'Yes,' state the amount of your take-home salary or wages and pay period and give the name and address of your employer." Item 2b. provides a slot for additional information if the affiant's answer is "No." Walter listed the name and address of his former employer and his hourly pay rate under Item 2a. (Doc. No. 1, Case No. 9-mc-0462).
Item 4 asks the affiant, "Do you have any cash or checking or savings accounts?" Walter checked the box next to "Yes" but did not list any amount in the corresponding line on the form.
Judge Miller's order striking the IFP application made no specific reference to the fate of Walter's complaint. The case number corresponding to Walter's complaint was marked "terminated" in the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system as of September 21, 2009.
Two weeks later, on October 6, 2009, Walter filed a second IFP application, with his complaint attached. (Doc. No. 1, Case No. 9-mc-0489). In his second application, Walter provided the additional detail requested in Judge Miller's prior order.
With respect to Item 2 on his IFP application, Walter moved the information he had previously listed in subsection 2a., concerning his place of work and hourly pay rate, into subsection 2b., the section corresponding to an answer of "No" current employment. Walter also added the date of his last work day to the information he had previously provided. In response to Item 4, Walter had previously answered "Yes" to the question regarding having some amount of money available, but had failed to state the total amount. In his second IFP application, Walter listed "$80.70" in Item 4 as the total amount available to him.
Despite Plaintiff's corrections to Items 2 and 4, Walter's second IFP application was denied on October 13, 2009. New reasons, unrelated to Items 2 and 4, were listed in connection with the second denial. The denial stated that Plaintiff provided "inadequate details as to how much disability payments he receives" [sic] and "how he can afford car payments of $435.00 per month." (Doc. No. 2, Case No. 9-mc-0489).2
The case number corresponding to Walter's second IFP application was marked "terminated" in CM/ECF as of October 13, 2009. In an unsigned letter dated October 15, 2009, the Clerk of Court notified Plaintiff as follows:
(Doc. No. 3, Case No. 9-mc-0489).
On November 12, 2009, Walter filed his complaint for the third time (Doc. No. 1, Case No. 9-cv-3663).3 Apparently giving up on his attempt to proceed in forma pauperis, Walter paid the $350 filing fee.
Defendant moved to dismiss this action, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on June 23, 2011 (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 14). This Court granted an order extending all deadlines by sixty days (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiff filed his response on September 19, 2011 (Objection to Defendant Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 21). Defendant filed its reply on September 28, 2011 (Reply to Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion, Doc. No. 22).
Defendant's sole argument in support of dismissal is that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred because his complaint was filed after the expiration of the ninety day limitations period set out in the right-to-sue notice. The right-to-sue notice issued by the EEOC gave Walter a ninety day window in which to file his action in federal court. Starting with the day Walter presumptivelyreceived the notice, Defendant calculates that Walter had until September 23, 2009 to file his complaint.4 Defendant argues that Walter's two defective IFP applications did not toll the statute of limitations, thereby rendering his successful November 12 filing untimely.
In his response, Walter argues that the rulings with respect to his first two filings addressed his IFP applications only and not the merits of his complaint. (Objection to Defendant Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 21, at 2). Walter also claims that he timely cured all deficiencies in his IFP applications by providing the information the clerk requested. Id. In its reply, Defendant explains that it does not contest the sufficiency of Plaintiff's initial complaint filed September 18, 2009, but rather argues that the pleading "was struck and thus not made a part of the record" when the IFP application was rejected. (Reply to Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's 12(b)(6) Motion, Doc. No. 22, at 2).
Neither party disputes that Walter's first attempt to file his complaint fell within the ninety day filing period. However, because Walter's IFP applications were rejected, the parties disagree on the timeliness of Walter's third and successful filing on November 12, 2009. This Court is left to decide whether Walter timely filed his civil action when he initially filed his complaint within the ninety day limitations period but, on two separate occasions, was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
A court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Ultimately, the question for the court to decide is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted). The court should not "'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs'" or "accept 'conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.'" R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2004)). A district court can consider the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto, as well as documents attached to the motion, if they are referenced in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the claims. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2000). Where relief is barred by an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc....
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