Walters v. De'Andrea

• Decision Date: 05 June 2020
• Docket Number: 1190062
• Citation: 312 So.3d 430
• Parties: Clint WALTERS v. Jessica DE'ANDREA and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

312 So.3d 430

Clint WALTERS

v.Jessica DE'ANDREA and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company

1190062

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 5, 2020

Raymond J. Hawthorne, Jr., of The Cleveland Firm, LLC, Montgomery, for appellant.

Stacy Lott Bellinger, City of Montgomery, for appelleeJessica De'Andrea.

H. Warren Cobb, Jr., of Cobb, Boyd, White & Cobb, Dothan, for appelleeProgressive Casualty Insurance Company.

MENDHEIM, Justice.

Clint Walters appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of Montgomery Police Department("MPD") patrol officer Jessica De'Andrea and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company("Progressive").We reverse and remand.

I.Facts

The basic facts of this case are not disputed.On March 14, 2015, Walters was driving his motorcycle on the Eastern Boulevard in Montgomery when he came to a complete stop at a red light.De'Andrea was traveling on the Eastern Boulevard in her MPD police vehicle when she came to a stop directly behind Walters's motorcycle at the intersection of the Eastern Boulevard and Monticello Drive.De'Andrea testified in her deposition that she had completed her patrol shift and that she was on her way to the MPD South Central Headquarters on the Eastern Boulevard to

"[t]urn in paperwork for the day.

"Q.All right.So sign out basically?

"A.Yes.

"Q.Okay.When you say ‘turn in paperwork,’ what does that entail?

"A.If I had any tickets, any kind of reports, my daily activity sheet -- everything I did that day."

De'Andrea's MPD supervisor at that time, Lt. Alphonso Gumbs, submitted an affidavit in which he explained:

"The policy implemented at the time required patrol officers to meet and turn in their daily activity logs at the end of their shift.

"2.As part of their daily duties, [p]atrol [o]fficers would turn in their daily activity sheets, and any paperwork completed on shift which wasn't filed electronically.

"3.The officers would report to their precinct at the end of their shift to turn the paperwork in."

Both Walters and De'Andrea sat at the red light, waiting for it to turn green.In her deposition, De'Andrea described what happened next:

"I noticed that the light turned green.The cars ... I know the ones that were going straight on the opposite lane, they were moving.The vehicles in front of Mr. Walters [were] moving.I'm not sure if his brake light was intact.I assumed that he was moving.I proceeded to go, and I hit him from behind.

"Q.Okay.Did you see him as you drove into him?

"A.Yes.

"Q.Okay.And -- but your testimony is that you assumed he was going, is that right?

"A.Like, no brake light was on from what I recall.

"Q.Okay.

"A.So I'massuming that the car -- his motorcycle is moving.So I started moving.

"Q.And then you just hit him?

"A.I mean, he was in front of me.

"Q.All right.You weren't distracted?You weren't looking in any other direction --

"A.No.

"Q.-- or anything?

"A.I was looking straight ahead."

De'Andrea openly admits that she was at fault for the accident, stating in her appellate brief: "While she was certainly at fault when she bumped the rear of [Walters's] motorcycle, her actions were negligent at best."De'Andrea's brief, p. 13.

Walters alleges that he suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident, and on March 13, 2017, Walters filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court against De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company("State Farm").Walters asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against De'Andrea in her individual capacity; he asserted claims for uninsured-motorist benefits against Progressive and State Farm.

On April 12, 2018, State Farm filed a summary-judgment motion in which it contended that Walters did not have any insurance policies with State Farm in force at the time of the accident.Following a hearing, the circuit court subsequently denied that motion.

On August 16, 2019, De'Andrea filed a summary-judgment motion in which she asserted that she was entitled to State-agent immunity from Walter's suit under Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392(Ala.2000), and§ 6-5-338,Ala. Code 1975.On August 22, 2019, Progressive and State Farm filed summary-judgment motions in which they contended that, if the claims against De'Andrea were entitled to be dismissed based on the doctrine of State-agent immunity, then Walters was not entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage because Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover damages" from De'Andrea.See§ 32-7-23(a),Ala. Code 1975.On September 5, 2019, Walters filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment motions in which he contended that De'Andrea was not entitled to State-Agent immunity because, he said, her actions did not fall within any function that would entitle her to such immunity.Walters did not dispute that if De'Andrea was entitled to State-agent immunity, then Progressive and State Farm would likewise be entitled to a summary judgment.

On September 10, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on the summary-judgment motions.On September 12, 2019, the circuit court entered summary judgments in favor of De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm.The summary-judgment order did not detail the circuit court's reasons for its decision.On September 19, 2019, Walters filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate its summary-judgment order.The postjudgment motion was denied on September 25, 2019.

Walters appeals the judgment of the circuit court with respect to De'Andrea and Progressive.Walters has not included State Farm as a party to this appeal.¹

II.Standard of Review

Our review of a summary judgment is well settled:

"If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled to immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to a summary judgment.Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.In determining whether there is a [genuine issue of] material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial and appellate, must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, considering only the evidence before the trial court at the time it denied the motion for a summary judgment.Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912(Ala.2000)."

Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708(Ala.2002).

III.Analysis

Walters contends that the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in De'Andrea's favor on the basis of immunity because, he says, she was not performing a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity at the time of the accident.In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392(Ala.2000), this Court restated the rule for determining when a State agent sued in his or her individual capacity is entitled to State-agent immunity.²In her summary-judgment motion, De'Andrea argued that she was entitled to State-agent immunity under categories (3) and (4) of the restatement of State-agent immunity as set out in Cranman, and as modified in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300(Ala.2006)(incorporating the peace-officer-immunity standard in § 6–5–338(a),Ala. Code 1975, into category (4) of the State-agent-immunity analysis in Cranman).See, e.g., Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 203(Ala.2003)(explaining that, "[b]y enacting [ § 6-5-338,Ala. Code 1975 ], the Legislature intended to afford municipal law-enforcement officials the immunity enjoyed by their state counterparts.Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1237(11th Cir.1998).Indeed, ‘[t]his statute, by its terms, extends state-agent immunity to peace officers performing discretionary functions within the line and scope of their law-enforcement duties.’Moore v. Crocker, 852 So. 2d 89, 90(Ala.2002)(emphasis added).").

" ‘This Court has established a "burden-shifting" process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity.’Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452(Ala.2006).A State agent asserting State-agent immunity ‘bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.’946 So. 2d at 452.Should the State agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable."

Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282–83(Ala.2008).Walters in essence contends that De'Andrea never shifted the burden such that he was required to show that one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity applies.In pertinent part, the Court in Cranman stated:

"A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

"....

"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or

"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons[, or serving as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6–5–338(a),Ala. Code 1975]."

Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405; bracketed modification added by Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309 ).

De'Andrea contends that she"was clearly within prong (3) of Cranman" because "[o]ne of the daily duties of the patrol officers was to report to their precinct at the end of their shift to turn in daily activity logs."De'Andrea's brief, pp. 9-10.De'Andrea also argues that her actions fit "under category (4) of the Cranman test" because "she was still working in her capacity as a patrol officer.The nature of her duties as a patrol officer requires her...