Walters v. McKinnis

• Decision Date: 06 January 1915
• Docket Number: 2.
• Citation: 221 F. 746
• Parties: WALTERS v. McKINNIS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

221 F. 746

WALTERS v. McKINNIS.

No. 2.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

January 6, 1915

Weil &amp Thorp, S. Leo Ruslander, and Simon T. Patterson, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner.

H. H Hanna and R. M. Gibson, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for respondent.

THOMSON District Judge.

In the decision of this case, I am anxious, on the one hand, not to deny to the relator any right guaranteed to her under the Constitution of the nation and the laws of the land, and, on the other hand, not to invade the province of any judicial tribunal, or violate any of those well-established principles necessary to be observed in seeking to protect the citizen against unlawful restraint or imprisonment under the great writ of habeas corpus. I will state the facts in the case as they appear, and will then endeavor to apply the legal principles which I deem applicable to such facts.

During the month of November, 1914, the relator was living at No. 11 Marion street, Pittsburgh, where she had been conducting a rooming house for a period of a year or more, and for three years prior to that time had conducted a restaurant on Liberty avenue, in said city. On November 23, 1914 petitioner went before Alderman J. J. Kirby, of the city of Pittsburgh, and sought to make an information against one E E. Clark for assault and battery. The information was not taken, but she was told by the alderman to return the next day. When she returned the following day to the alderman's office, she was arrested on an information made by the said Clark against her for assault and battery, and was thereupon committed to the county jail. Bail was first fixed at the sum of $300. This bail was shortly afterwards produced, but it seems in the meantime the bail had been raised to $2,000. Bail in this amount being produced on November 24th, the parties were informed by the alderman that the matter was out of his hands, as he had received a certificate that the petitioner had been adjudged insane. On November 24, 1914, the district attorney of Allegheny county petitioned the court of quarter sessions for the appointment of two physicians to determine the sanity of Mrs. Walters, under the provisions of an act of assembly of Pennsylvania approved June 26, 1895 (P.L. 388). Doctors Ellis and Ayers were thereupon appointed, and upon the following day, November 25th, made a return to said court certifying that they had examined petitioner at 10 o'clock a.m. on that day and found her insane. Two of the county commissioners of Allegheny county thereupon issued a commitment, wherein petitioner was directed to be removed by the sheriff to the City Poor Farm at Marshalsea, there to be detained as an indigent insane person. On the commitment was this indorsement:

'The above commitment is hereby approved by the court of quarter sessions of Allegheny county.

'By the Court.'

Under this commitment petitioner was taken to Marshalsea on November 28, 1914, and there detained and confined. No notice of any kind was given to petitioner, or to any friend or relative, of the proceeding to adjudge her a lunatic, so that petitioner was adjudged a lunatic and confined in the asylum without notice of any lunacy proceeding, without a hearing, and without opportunity to defend. On November 28, 1914, petitioner sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the court of common pleas of Allegheny county, on which a hearing was had, the writ discharged, and relator remanded, on December 17, 1914. In the opinion of his honor, Judge Haymaker, discharging the writ, and which was offered in evidence in this proceeding, it appears that the court found the petitioner insane, and for that reason alone she was remanded. The judge expressly declined to pass upon the legality of the commitment, or the regularity of the proceedings under the act of assembly, holding that the court of quarter sessions, being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, had the exclusive right to pass upon the legality of the proceedings, and that for the common pleas to do so would be to improperly assume the power of an appellate court. On December 21, 1914, a writ of habeas corpus was granted in this court, returnable December 22d. The petitioner being produced in court in obedience to the writ and return thereto being made, petitioner was admitted to bail, and a hearing was had on December 26th.

Respondent moved to dismiss the writ. The reasons assigned at the hearing, as supplemented by motion filed since the hearing, are as follows:

'1. Relator has not exhausted her remedy in the state courts.

'2. Relator has not raised in the state courts the question of the constitutionality of the act of Legislature under which she is confined, and such question has never been passed upon in the state courts.

'3. Relator has not taken her case to the highest state court.

'4. Relator's case is not an exceptional one, within the meaning of the decision of Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 27 Sup.Ct. 459, 51 L.Ed. 750, Ex parte Bartlett (D.C.) 197 F. 98, and Ex parte Powers (D.C.) 129 F. 985. She is not a person aggrieved. She has been given a hearing, both on the question of indigency and insanity, and has been adjudged to be an indigent insane.

'5. The act of June 26, 1895 (P.L. 388), is constitutional, standing alone.

'6. The act of June 26, 1895 (P.L. 388), is constitutional when read in connection with the whole system of the insanity laws of the state.

'7. Under all the decisions of the United States Courts, the writ ought to be dismissed, and relator be remanded.'

The petitioner bases her right to discharge on the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is contended that her incarceration in the asylum, without notice or an opportunity to defend, was a plain violation of her constitutional rights. If this be true, the relator should be discharged, unless there be some other substantial reason why the court, under all the circumstances, should withhold relief.

The writ of habeas corpus does not issue as of course, but is of right, when reasonable cause is shown. Section 752 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. St. 1913, Sec. 1280) provides:

'The several justices and judges of the said courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.'

In section 753 it is provided:

'The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States.'

Section 761 provides:

'The court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.'

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 41, 10 Sup.Ct. 660 (34 L.Ed. 55), after quoting the above provisions, adds:

'This of course means that, if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, or a law of the United States, * * * he must be discharged.'

Was the relator accorded that due process of law guaranteed her by the Constitution in the proceedings under which she was imprisoned? In Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 21 Sup.Ct. 836, 45 L.Ed. 1165, the court says:

'The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not necessitate that the proceeding in the state court should be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be a regular course of proceedings, in which notice is given of the claim asserted, and an opportunity afforded to defend against it.'

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Re Petition of Michael Gannon, 16 R.I. 537, 18 A. 159, 5 L.R.A. 359, 27 Am.St.Rep. 759, being a petition for habeas corpus praying for discharge from confinement in an insane asylum, in holding the statute void, as in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, said: 'Without attempting to define the exact meaning of the phrase 'due process of law,' it suffices for the present inquiry to say that it means at least some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself. The sections of chapter 74 referred to do not provide such a procedure. The only safeguard against an improper commitment which they afford is the certificate of two practicing physicians of good standing, a certificate which may be given entirely ex parte.

Bailey on Habeas Corpus, vol. 1, page 436, says:

'It is almost universally held that the person proceeded against must have notice of the proceedings to give validity to an adjudication against him.'

That the relator was committed to the asylum without due process of law would seem to be clear, both on principle and under the authorities. The right to notice and a hearing, and an opportunity to defend, before one can be deprived of his liberty, which is one of the greatest natural rights of man would seem to be a fundamental proposition based on natural justice. The act of assembly under which the relator is confined seems peculiarly void of any means or opportunity of defend. It lays hold of a person in jail or prison, when committed on a criminal charge less than felony, while the presumption of innocence still exists...