Walters v. Moore, 2002-CA-002128-MR.

Citation121 S.W.3d 210
Decision Date24 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. 2002-CA-002128-MR.,No. 2002-CA-002256-MR.,2002-CA-002128-MR.,2002-CA-002256-MR.
PartiesCarol Dean WALTERS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Tebbs MOORE, Individually and as City Attorney of the City of Harrodsburg; Ollie Joseph Hood, Lonnie Campbell and Jack Springate, Individually and as Commissioners of the City of Harrodsburg; Lorene Hembree, Individually and as City Clerk of the City of Harrodsburg; Ernest R. Kelty, Jr., Individually and as Chief of Police of the City of Harrodsburg; and Ed Music, Individually and as Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Harrodsburg, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Kent Masterson Brown, Christopher J. Shaughnessy, Lexington, KY, for appellant/cross-appellee.

A. Stuart Bennett, Mary E. Naumann, Mary E. Naumann, Lexington, KY, for appellees/cross-Appellants.

Before EMBERTON, Chief Judge; JOHNSON and KNOPF, Judges.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge.

Carol Dean Walters, former Mayor of the City of Harrodsburg, has appealed from an order entered by the Mercer Circuit Court on September 23, 2002, which awarded her attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $19,500.00. The appellees, Tebbs Moore, Ollie Joseph Hood, Lonnie Campbell, Jack Springate, Lorene Hembree, Ernest Kelty, Jr., and Ed Music, individually and as representatives of the City of Harrodsburg, filed a cross-appeal claiming that the trial court erred in its determination that Walters was a "prevailing party" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Having concluded that the trial court properly found Walters to be a "prevailing party," but that the trial court failed to provide a sufficient basis for reducing the amount Walters claimed for attorney's fees, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The attorney's fees awarded in this case stem from two sets of complaints filed against Walters and Jerry Royalty, a former member of the City Commission.1 Walters was elected Mayor of the City of Harrodsburg in 1998. As Mayor, Walters presided over the City Commission2 which consisted of appellees, Hood, Campbell, and Springate, and Royalty. As a result of complaints filed against Walters and Royalty, the City Commission held an evidentiary hearing on March 10, 2000,3 after which it decided to file formal charges of official misconduct against Walters and Royalty. The Commission filed seven joint charges against Walters and Royalty, two charges against Royalty alone, and one charge against Walters alone. The Commission also voted to hold a separate hearing pursuant to KRS 83A.040(9) for the purpose of determining if the charges warranted removing Walters and Royalty from office.4 Prior to the removal hearing, the Commission held a hearing on March 20, 2000, for the purpose of discussing the voting procedures required for a removal action, at which time Walters and Royalty were informed that they would not be allowed to vote on the seven joint charges that had been filed against them.

Consequently, on April 7, 2000, Walters filed a complaint for declaration of rights and injunctive relief in the Mercer Circuit Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walters sought both temporary and permanent injunctions to prohibit the appellees from conducting the proposed removal hearing. In her complaint, Walters alleged that the appellees had violated state law, in particular KRS 83A.040(9),5 by filing joint charges against Royalty and her. Walters also raised numerous federal claims in her complaint. Walters alleged, inter alia, that (1) the grievances lodged against her were insufficient to warrant removal under state law because they were based on her exercise of protected speech, and as result, the hearings concerning those grievances violated state law, the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the notices she received concerning the hearings were inadequate, and as result, violative of state law, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the formal charges submitted against her were insufficient, and as a result, any removal hearing on those charges would violate state law, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the Commissioners prejudged the charges to be heard at her removal hearing by way of their participation in previous hearings, and as a result, any removal hearing would violate state law, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) precluding her from voting on the charges lodged against Royalty, and precluding Royalty from voting on the charges lodged against her would violate the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walters also filed a motion for a temporary injunction to prohibit the appellees from conducting a removal hearing, in which she alleged, inter alia, that the appellees had violated KRS 83A.040(9) by arbitrarily considering the charges against Royalty and her as joint charges, thereby excluding Royalty from voting on the charges against her, and vice versa.6

On April 13, 2000, the trial court entered an order denying Walters's motion for a temporary injunction,7 reasoning that she had not demonstrated irreparable harm since "any substantive errors or mistakes may be remedied by appeal."8 On April 21, 2000, Walters filed a CR9 65.07 motion for interlocutory relief in this Court, seeking emergency relief which would prohibit the Commission from holding the proposed removal hearing.10 Walters argued that such a hearing would violate her statutory rights under KRS 83A.040(9) and KRS 83A.140(4), and her constitutional rights under Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court heard Walters's motion with Royalty's motion; and on May 2, 2000, the Court entered an order granting, in part, their motions for CR 65.07 relief. The order reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the motions for CR 65.07 relief be GRANTED to the extent that the City Commission of the City of Harrodsburg is PROHIBITED from preventing Commissioner Royalty from voting on Mayor Walters removal and from preventing Mayor Walters from voting on Commissioner Royalty's removal.

All other matters raised by the motions are matters which are reviewable on a judicial appeal of the Commission's removal of either officer. Accordingly, all other relief is hereby DENIED.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and on April 25, 2002, the Court rendered a published opinion affirming this Court's decision.11 The Supreme Court concluded that since removal votes taken pursuant to KRS 83A.040(9) must be unanimous, with the exception of the charged member, the uncharged majority members of a faction of the Commission cannot be allowed to bring joint charges against members of a minority faction of the Commission. The Supreme Court reasoned that to permit such a disqualification procedure for all the charged members would allow a majority faction of the Commission to eliminate a rival minority faction of the Commission by simply joining the charges against the members of the minority faction.12

On May 20, 2002, Walters filed a motion in the Mercer Circuit Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requesting an award for her attorney's fees and expenses incurred throughout the course of the litigation, which included her appeals before this Court and the Supreme Court. Walters sought attorney's fees in the amount of $44,100.00 and expenses in the amount of $1,234.34. More specifically, Walters stated that she had been billed for attorney's fees totaling 252 hours at a rate of $175.00 per hour and that she had incurred litigation expenses of $1,234.34. Walters provided the trial court with detailed invoices setting forth the hours for which she had been billed and an itemized list of the litigation expenses she had incurred. The appellees filed a response to Walters's motion for attorney's fees on July 16, 2002, in which they claimed that Walters was not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and that the amount of attorney's fees she requested was excessive.

The trial court heard arguments on Walters's motion for attorney's fees on July 18, 2002, at which time the trial court requested that the appellees provide a summary of the cost incurred in defending the litigation. Shortly thereafter, the appellees submitted a detailed billing summary setting forth the hours and expenses incurred in defending the litigation. Specifically, the appellees stated that they were billed for a total of 108.6 hours, at a rate of $90.00 per hour for attorney services, and a rate of "$50.00 or $60.00" per hour for non-attorney professional services, totaling $9,149.00. The appellees further stated that they were billed for expenses in the amount $344.17.13

On September 23, 2002, the trial court entered an order awarding Walters's attorney's fees in the amount of $19,500.00. The trial court found that Walters was a prevailing party and that she was entitled to attorney's fees under state and federal law.14 The trial court went on to conclude that Walters "should be awarded [ ] attorney's fees in the amount of $19,500.00 which constitutes 130 hours of reasonable research, document preparation, and Court appearance time at the rate of $150.00 per hour."15 The trial court found that the $45,334.34 in attorney's fees and expenses sought by Walters was "less than reasonable given the lack of complicated issues of law or fact presented in this matter." The trial court further opined that "neither the questions of law nor the facts of the case seem to be particularly complicated or convoluted."16 This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

Walters contends the trial court considered irrelevant factors in reducing the amount of attorney's fees she was awarded, and that the trial court arbitrarily reduced the amount she...

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