Walters v. Walters

• Citation: 409 Ill. 298,99 N.E.2d 342
• Decision Date: 24 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 31874,31874
• Parties: WALTERS v. WALTERS.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 342

99 N.E.2d 342

409 Ill. 298

WALTERS v. WALTERS.

No. 31874.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 24, 1951.

Johnston, Thompson, Raymond & Mayer, of Chicago (Samuel W. Block and Addis E. Hull, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Cantwell & Cantwell, of Chicago, for appellee.

CRAMPTON, Justice.

In 1946, a decree was entered by the superior court of Cook County in which the parties to this suit were divorced and the defendant-husband was required to pay to the wife a substantial sum of money over a period of ten years in installments of $267 per month. Subsequently the wife remarried, whereupon the husband refused to make further payments under the decree; the wife filed her petition to show cause citing the defendant for contempt of court and the defendant answered and shortly thereafter sought a modification of the decree absolving him from future payments. The chancellor entered such an order, whereupon the case was appealed to the Appellate Court, First District, and that court reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case, with directions, in an exhaustive resume of the cases consisting of a majority, a specially concurring, and a dissenting opinion. In so far as possible, we shall avoid a repetition of the statement of facts and the analysis of the authorities as therein set forth in the report of this case, Walters v. Walters, 341 Ill.App. 561, 94 N.E.2d 726, which comes to us upon a certificate of importance granted by the Appellate Court.

The controversy arises over the proper interpretation of the divorce decree and the settlement agreement entered into between the parties and which was incorporated in, and made a part of, that decree. The contract, upon which the decree is based, recited that the payments therein provided were made as 'a lump sum property settlement and alimony in gross, in full of her right, title and interest of every kind, nature, character and description whatsoever, in and to the property, income or estate which the husband now owns or may hereafter acquire.' The words 'alimony in gross' appear here only and in no other place in the contract or in the decree. The husband contends that, upon the wife's remarriage, all right to the installment payments ceased on the theory that the payments constituted 'periodic' alimony. The wife, on the other hand, contends that this was a property settlement and the Appellate Court so held. The case in the main presents a single question: Was the agreement a property settlement and therefore a vested interest in the wife upon the signing of the decree, or were the provisions thereof alimony subject to modification under section 18 of the Divorce Act? There is an apparent conflict in the cases decided in other courts and by the various Appellate Courts in our own State and, in so far as we are able to learn, this is the first time the precise question has been presented to this court.

The plaintiff-wife first filed suit for separate maintenance in 1944. Subsequently, in 1946, a divorce decree was entered upon an amended complaint of the wife charging cruelty. All other charges and countercharges were dismissed and the case proceeded to hearing upon stipulation for an immediate hearing. The record in this case, consisting of over 400 pages, includes only a very few pages of testimony, but is replete with hearings, motions, citations, counterclaims, injunction and other orders and bespeaks the bitter controversy which has raged between these parties for over seven years and the end is not yet. The real fireworks began when the wife remarried and the defendant refused to make any further payments. He would have us construe the contract as though the same were strictly and solely an agreement for the payment of 'periodic' alimony and would have us delete from the contract any and all reference to a 'lump sum property settlement,' relying for his authority upon the case of Banck v. Banck, 322 Ill.App. 369, 57 N.E.2d 577, and in which case we denied leave to appeal. 326 Ill.App. XIV.

We shall attempt to clarify the rules applicable and to reconcile if possible, the various conflicts or apparent conflicts in the decisions. For the sake of brevity we shall not try to analyze, each in detail, the various cases bearing on the subject matter and which have already been abstracted in the three Appellate Court opinions in this same case. To do so would unduly extend this opinion. This situation cannot arise as to decrees modified subsequent to 1949 when the last amendment to section 18 went into effect. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1949, chap. 40, par. 19.) By that amendment all such settlements payable in installments and made in lieu of alimony are to be received regardless of the remarriage of either party to the suit. Further complicating the issues, the plaintiff contends that the '49 amendment is retroactive and retrospective in effect while the defendant claims that it is not.

No evidence was taken upon the hearing of the petition for the rule to show cause or upon the defendant's petition to modify, nor was any proof offered before the chancellor on the original hearing for divorce as to the respective property holdings of either party to the suit. Both seemed to be reluctant to make a full disclosure as to their holdings, although the contract recites on its face that a full disclosure had been made each to the other. The plaintiff was an astute, selfsufficient and self-sustaining business woman. It is apparent from the record and the admissions in the pleadings that she had substantial earnings in her own right. It would appear that in her capacities as saleswoman and interior decorator she was virtually self-supporting. There were no children born as a result of the marriage and there is no question of support money to minor children involved. The defendant, likewise, is a successful businessman; was possessed of various stocks and bonds, including U. S. Government bonds and stock in a prominent insurance company; owned a controlling interest in a closed corporation; was the owner of real estate, including a gasoline station at 7700 South Ashland Avenue, Chicago; derived a substantial yearly income from the operation of a successful insurance agency over a period of twenty-five years and possessed substantial sums of life insurance. It would appear from the record that the main controversy between the parties, prior to the decree, concerned the settlement of their financial affairs, for the parties had been living separate and apart for about six months prior to the institution of the separate maintenance suit. Upon execution of the settlement contract, two years after the first complaint was filed, no time was lost by either party in proceeding to decree. We must, therefore, look to the nature of the transaction and the intention of the parties to ascertain whether this particular contract was a property settlement or an agreement for 'periodic' alimony.

Recurrently, decrees in matrimonial cases refer to 'alimony in gross' or 'gross alimony.' Most generally these terms are applied to an amount agreed upon or determined in full or in lieu of all alimony and the amount is frequently payable in installments. Most of the...