Walton v. Long
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-00040-SA-DAS |
| Parties | THOMAS WALTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES of ANNIE WALTON, Deceased; and ALIVEN WALTON PLAINTIFFS v. J.B. LONG; CITY OF VERONA; and JOHN DOES 1-25 DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
On June 10, 2021, this Court entered an Order and Memorandum Opinion [115] granting the Defendants' respective Motions for Summary Judgment [71, 74] and dismissing all claims with prejudice.[1] Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration [116]. The Defendants responded in opposition. Having reviewed the filings, along with the relevant authorities, the Court is prepared to rule.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a district court to “alter or amend a judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). “A Rule 59 motion is the proper vehicle by which a party can ‘correct manifest error of law or fact' or ‘present newly discovered evidence.'” Surratt v. Tractor Supply Co. 2020 WL 6051260 at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 13, 2020) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2004)) (additional citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has explicitly directed that Rule 59(e) motions should not be granted unless: “(1) the facts discovered are of such a nature that they would probably change the outcome; (2) the facts alleged are actually newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by proper diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Infusion Resources, Inc. v. Minimed, Inc., 351 F.3d 688, 696-97 (5th Cir. 2003).
Importantly “motions for reconsideration ‘should not be used to . . . re-urge matters that have already been advanced by a party.'” O'Hara v. Travelers, Also Named, The Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 2012 WL 12884579, *1 (S.D.Miss. July 20, 2012) (quoting Nationalist Movement v. Town of Jena, 321 Fed.Appx. 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2009)) (additional citations omitted). Stated differently, “[a] party should not attempt to use the Rule 59 motion for the purpose of ‘rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Surratt, 2020 WL 6051260 at *1.
The Plaintiffs alleged three different causes of action in their Complaint [1]. Particularly, they asserted Section 1983 claims against both Defendants based upon purported due process violations arising from (1) abuse of executive power and (2) state created danger. The Plaintiffs also asserted a state law claim against the City of Verona.
As noted above, the Court granted summary judgment in the Defendants' favor on all claims. See [115]. In their Reconsideration Memorandum [117], the Plaintiffs are not clear on which of the claims they seek reconsideration. Instead, arguing that this Court improperly failed to view the evidence in their favor, the Plaintiffs generally contend there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Long carried out his obligations as Police Chief, including: (1) “the arrest warrant established probable cause, and the recanted witness statements and the father's alibi did not change that;” and (2) “a telephonic bond hearing was not the ‘normal procedure.'” [117] at p. 4, 9. The Plaintiffs also aver that “[t]here were genuine issues of material fact about Long withholding information from Judge Holland.” Id. at p. 9-10. Finally, they assert that “[t]here was no ‘misunderstanding' about what Judge Hopkins discussed with Long.” Id. at p. 12. They therefore contend that the Court should not have granted summary judgment in the Defendants' favor.
The Court begins with the Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger claim. As addressed at length in the Court's previous Order and Memorandum Opinion [115], that claim is not recognized in the Fifth Circuit. In particular, this Court, after setting forth the general parameters of a state-created danger claim, noted that “the Fifth Circuit has consistently, on numerous occasions, declined to join its sister circuits in recognizing [the state-created danger] theory on multiple occasions. . . Although recognizing the arguments urged by the Plaintiffs, this Court is bound by the above-referenced authorities which clearly and unequivocally decline to adopt the state-created danger theory.” [115] at p. 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). While the Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Memorandum [117] specifically identifies issues of fact which they contend the Court improperly weighed, the Plaintiffs provide no legal argument that the Court improperly interpreted the law in this area.[2] Ultimately, regardless of the underlying facts, the state-created danger theory is not currently recognized in the Fifth Circuit. The Court declines to change its ruling on the Plaintiffs' state-created danger claim.
The Court next turns to the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment abuse of executive power claim. As in its Order and Memorandum Opinion [115], the Court begins with the allegations of the Plaintiffs' Complaint [1] on that claim:
[1] at p. 5.
Concerning this claim, the Court finds instructive the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012). In pertinent part, the Fifth Circuit described the tragic facts of Covington as follows:
At some point during the school year, Jane's guardians filled out a “Permission to Check-Out Form, ” on which they listed the names of the individuals with exclusive permission to “check out” Jane from school during the school day. On six separate occasions between September 2007 and January 2008, school employees allowed a man named Tommy Keyes (“Keyes”), who allegedly bore no relation to Jane and was not listed on her check-out form, to take Jane from school. On these occasions, Keyes took Jane from school without the knowledge or consent of her parents or guardians, sexually molested her, and subsequently returned her to school. On the first five occasions, Keyes signed out Jane as her father. On the final occasion, he signed her out as her mother. The complaint alleges that Keyes was able to gain access to Jane because the policy promulgated by the various school officials permitted school employees to release Jane to Keyes without first verifying Keyes's identification or whether he was among those people listed on her “Permission to Check-Out Form.” The complaint contends that this policy created a danger to students and the implementation and execution of the policy constituted deliberate indifference towards the rights and safety of those students, including Jane. This policy is alleged to be the direct and proximate cause of Jane's injury.
After reiterating that the state-created danger theory has never been recognized in the Fifth Circuit and therefore finding that claim was not viable, the en banc court turned to the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment “shocks the conscience” claim against the school district. Id. at 866-67. The Fifth Circuit provided some background on that theory of recovery:
The Supreme Court recognized the shocks the conscience standard in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). There, the Court found a violation of Rochin's substantive due process rights after police officers who had arrested Rochin ordered doctors to pump Rochin's stomach to induce him to vomit two capsules of morphine that he had previously swallowed. Id. at 166, 72 S.Ct. 205. The Court determined that the state's conduct “shocked the conscience, ” and therefore violated Rochin's due process rights. Later, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that substantive due process is violated by executive action “only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.'” . . . Conduct sufficient to shock the conscience for substantive due process purposes has been described in several different ways. It has been described as conduct that “violates the decencies of civilized conduct”; conduct that is “so brutal and offensive that it does not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency”; conduct that “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”; and conduct that “is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47 & n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708.
Id. at 867 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the plaintiff could not satisfy this high standard. Id. at 868. In particular, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the general overarching rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Deshaney v....
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