Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n. of Southeastern Pennsylvania

• Citation: 168 F.3d 661
• Decision Date: 23 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-2000,97-2000
• Parties: 9 A.D. Cases 34, 14 NDLR P 198 Sandra J. WALTON, Appellant v. MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 661

168 F.3d 661

9 A.D. Cases 34, 14 NDLR P 198

Sandra J. WALTON, Appellant v. MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA

No. 97-2000.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Oct. 7, 1998.

Decided Feb. 23, 1999.

Ronald V. Cole (Argued), Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Nancy C. Ryan (Argued), Stouffer & Ryan, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee

BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, NYGAARD, and NOONAN, ^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,

Appellant, Sandra Walton, was fired by the Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania ("MHASP") and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994), claiming harassment, disparate treatment, and failure to accommodate. The District Court granted summary judgment for MHASP on these claims and denied Walton's motion to amend the complaint to add a discrimination claim based on her obesity as a perceived disability. Walton now challenges these decisions. We will affirm.

I.

The facts are generally uncontested and are accurately set forth in the District Court's Memorandum. See Walton v. Mental Health Assoc. of Southeastern Pa., No. CIV.A.96-5682, 1997 WL 717053 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 17, 1997). We will summarize.

Walton worked for MHASP, an advocacy organization for people with mental illness, from January 1990 until she was terminated on January 6, 1994. She was the Director of Advocacy Consumer Training for New Opportunities ("ACT NOW"), a program within MHASP that provided employment training and job placement for mental health services consumers. As Director, Walton was responsible for managing the program and supervising its staff. In 1992, Walton was assigned a new supervisor, Carmen Meek. The relationship between the two was not good.

Like approximately eighty percent of MHASP's employees, Walton is a mental health services consumer. Specifically, she suffers from depression. As a result, she was hospitalized six times between March 1990 and December 1993. Because of her illness, Walton was absent twenty-one days in 1990, forty days in 1991, fifty days in 1992, and fourteen and a half days in 1993 before taking leave on October 26, 1993. On that date, Walton was hospitalized for her illness, and she did not return to work before she was terminated in January 1994. MHASP policy provides eighteen days of sick leave per year.

For over a year before Walton was terminated, the results of the ACT NOW program--measured by actual job placement--had declined significantly. ACT NOW was funded through grants from the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation and the City of Philadelphia. The drop in job placements led MHASP executives to fear for the continued sponsorship and existence of the program.

Upon being hospitalized in October 1993, Walton requested a leave of absence without pay. MHASP's Human Resources Manager granted her request in a letter in which he stated: "In the near future would you please let me know the expected duration of your leave. It is our policy that a leave without pay should not exceed 6 months." Walton wrote MHASP a letter indicating that her doctor did not want her to return to work until November 22 and that she intended to be back on that date. She did not return on that date. On December 30, Walton's doctor wrote MHASP to inform them that Walton had regressed and that she should not return to work for several weeks. On January 4, 1994, Walton notified MHASP that she would report to work on January 10. On January 6, 1994, Walton was terminated. The above facts are undisputed as are all others material to the District Court's summary judgment ruling.

Walton filed a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission which, in turn, lodged it with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Human Relations Commission notified Walton that it had found "No Cause" in its investigation of her complaint, and she requested a Right-to-Sue Notice from the EEOC. Walton then sued MHASP.

II.

Walton's first claim is that the District Court erred by denying her petition to amend the complaint to add a claim of discrimination based on the perceived disability of obesity. We review the Court's decision for abuse of discretion. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir.1990).

When a complaint is not amended within the time that amendments are allowed as a matter of course, a party may amend its complaint "by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Nevertheless, a trial court may consider whether the amendment would be futile. See F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 874 (3d Cir.1994). Here, the District Court held that Walton's proposed new claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at * 15.

The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities ...; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Walton argues that MHASP perceived her as disabled because she is obese, and that this claim, therefore, falls under the third prong of the disability definition.

We have not recognized a cause of action against an employer who discriminates against an employee because it perceives the employee as disabled by obesity. Nor need we do so now because Walton has not claimed that MHASP discriminated against her because it perceived her as disabled by some impairment that substantially limits one of her major life activities.

Although the ADA does not define "major life activities," see Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1996), an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity when she is "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform" or is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

Major life activities include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i). Walton asserts that MHASP did not release a promotional video in which she appeared because she was too obese. She apparently argues that, if MHASP refused to publish the video for this reason, it must have perceived her as substantially limited in her ability to work because appearing in the video was a part of her job. However, "[w]ith respect to the major life activity of working[, t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Furthermore, "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Id.

Even if MHASP did cancel the video because of Walton's appearance (a fact MHASP disputes), her claim fails. By asserting that MHASP prevented her from performing a single minor aspect of her job, Walton simply has not claimed that MHASP perceived her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working under this standard. Nor is there any indication that MHASP perceived her obesity as limiting her other major life activities.

Finally, Walton argues that the District Court first asked her to amend the complaint and then ignored the petition to amend once filed. See Appellant's Brief at 26-27. This is incorrect. The District Court did refer to Walton's delay in petitioning to amend. It did not, however, ignore the petition. Nor did the Court deny the petition because Walton delayed. Rather, the District Court addressed Walton's attempted amendment in the order granting summary judgment. It denied the petition because Walton failed therein to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Walton was not prejudiced by the Court's decision to deny the petition to amend, ¹ and the Court did not abuse its discretion.

III.

Walton also appeals the District Court's conclusion that she did not produce sufficient evidence of an objectively hostile work environment to make out a prima facie case of harassment. The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). We have not previously determined whether the ADA creates a cause of action for harassment under this section. The District Court proceeded on the assumption that a claim for a hostile workplace--i.e., harassment--could be stated under the ADA, see Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at * 12, and the parties on appeal have followed suit.

The Supreme Court has held that language in Title VII that is almost identical to the above language in the ADA creates a cause of action for a hostile work environment. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2374, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). In addition, we have recognized that:

[i]n the context of employment discrimination, the ADA, ADEA and Title VII all serve the same purpose--to prohibit discrimination in employment against members of certain classes. Therefore, it follows that the methods and manner of proof under one statute should inform the standards under the others as well. Indeed, we routinely use Title VII and ADEA caselaw interchangeably, when there is no material difference in the question being addressed.

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