Walton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 5:17-CV-00085-BR,5:17-CV-00085-BR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: CECELIA D. WALTON Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.

CECELIA D. WALTON Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.

No. 5:17-CV-00085-BR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION

September 13, 2017

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the 8 May 2017 motion to dismiss filed by defendant North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("NCDHHS"). (DE # 15.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on 16 May 2017, in which she requests leave to amend her complaint should the court grant the motion to dismiss. (DE # 18.) NCDHHS did not file a reply brief, and the time within which to do so has expired. This matter is therefore ripe for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was laid off from her employment at NCDHHS on 30 June 2014. (Compl., DE # 5, at 4.) After being laid off, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id.) Plaintiff was rehired in May 2015 as a trainee with Disability Determination Services ("DDS"), a division within NCDHHS. (Id.) In October 2015, the EEOC issued plaintiff a right to sue letter, notifying her that she had 90 days to file suit against NCDHHS for the alleged discriminatory conduct. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to continuous harassment from her trainer, Robert Englander, after she was placed in the work unit at DDS. According to plaintiff, Englander discussed his penile cancer and penis during her daily training sessions, and his inappropriate comments were supported by her supervisor, Tim Wilson. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Englander failed to properly train her and review her work. (Id.) On 19 January 2016, plaintiff complained about this treatment to an EEO officer within NCDHSS. (Id.) Plaintiff was fired nine days later on 28 January 2016. (Id.) According to plaintiff, her termination occurred soon after the initial 90-day period for her to file suit had expired. (Id.)

On 7 March 2017, Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and found plaintiff's complaint survived review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). (DE # 4.) Thereafter, plaintiff's complaint was filed. (DE # 5.) In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against based on her age and sex, that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, and that NCDHHS retaliated against her for complaining about the discrimination. (Id. at 2-3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

NCDHHS moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def.'s Mem., DE # 16, at 1.) "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although the court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the court "need not overlook a clear failing to provide factual enhancement in support of a particular claim that would cause the Court toconclude it is facially plausible," Joyner v. Poole, No. 4:14-CV-208-BO, 2015 WL 1179492, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Age and Sex Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff first alleges that she was discriminated against based on her age and sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Additionally, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's age." The ADEA's age-based protections apply to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631.

NCDHHS argues that plaintiff's age and sex discrimination claims must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA. (Def.'s Mem., DE # 16, at 4-5.) The Supreme Court has indicated that "an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to survive [a] motion to dismiss" because "[t]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 510 (2002). However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that Swierkiewicz did not abrogate the requirement that the plaintiff allege "facts sufficient to state all the elements of her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); see Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)(explaining that Swierkiewicz does not nullify the heightened pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal).

A plaintiff's prima facie case requires proof of the same elements for both sex discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) "the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising an inference of unlawful discrimination." Webster v. Rumsfeld, 156 F. App'x 571, 578 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Hill, 354 F.3d at 285).

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated, despite successfully completing classroom training, because she was both over 40 and a female. (Compl., DE # 5, at 4.) To demonstrate that her termination was based on her age and sex, plaintiff focuses on Englander's frequent comments about his anatomy during training sessions. (Id.) While these comments were likely unwelcome and uncomfortable for plaintiff, plaintiff has to failed to allege facts showing a "nexus . . . between the alleged discriminatory statements and . . . the employment decisions made by [the employer]." EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1992). Although plaintiff claims that Englander made unwelcome comments, and that Wilson supported these comments, she does not allege that the subject matter of these comments related in any way to her termination or that either Englander or Wilson were involved in her termination. See Green v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 832 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (E.D. Va. 1993) (concluding that gender-based comments made by plaintiff's manager to another employee were "not indicative of any intention by [the manager] to make any decision in any mannerunfavorable to women generally or to [plaintiff] in particular"), aff'd 23 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. Supp. 3d 562, 567 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim because she failed to allege any facts to suggest a nexus between her discharge and racially discriminatory remarks made by company's executive director). The court therefore finds that plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that her termination was motivated by her age or sex.

Plaintiff also asserts that Englander's failure to review her work and provide her with feedback amounted to discriminatory treatment. (Compl., DE # 5, at 2, 4.) Failure to train can be considered an adverse employment action. See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649-50 (4th Cir. 2002). However, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of her age or sex. While plaintiff references Englander's comments about his anatomy, she does not indicate how these comments related to Englander's failure to train her. Furthermore, plaintiff's complaint does not contain allegations about how her training differed from other similarly situated employees who were not members of her protected group. See id. (noting that to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination regarding the failure to train, a plaintiff must show that she was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination—namely, that she was denied training given to other similarly situated employees who are outside of the protected class). Because plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, NCDHH's motion to dismiss will be granted as it relates to plaintiff's claims of discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA.

B. Hostile Work Environment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment as a result of sexual harassment and discrimination based on her age. "A hostile work environment exists '[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To state a hostile work environment claim based on her age or sex, plaintiff must plausibly allege that: "(1) she experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on...