Walton v. Roosevelt Univ.
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1-21-0011 |
| Parties | William WALTON, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
David M. Schultz, John P. Ryan, and Adam R. Vaught, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.
Ryan F. Stephan, James B. Zouras, and Haley R. Jenkins, of Stephan Zouras, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.
Catherine Simmons-Gill, of Offices of Catherine Simmons-Gill, LLC, of Chicago, for amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association et al.
Melissa A. Siebert, Matthew C. Wolfe, and Elisabeth A. Hutchinson (pro hac vice), of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce.
¶ 1 This case is before the court for an answer to a certified question under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). The certified question asks us to determine whether claims asserted by union member-employees under the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Privacy Act) ( 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2020)) are preempted by federal law. The question certified by the circuit court for appeal is:
"Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 ) preempt [Privacy Act] claims ( 740 ILCS 14/1 ) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement?"
¶ 2 The defendant argued that the claims asserted by the plaintiff are preempted and moved to dismiss the complaint. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss but certified the relevant question for interlocutory review. For the following reasons, we conclude that the plaintiff's claims are preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018) ) and answer the certified question in the affirmative. Having answered the certified question, we remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
¶ 4 Plaintiff William Walton was an employee of defendant Roosevelt University (Roosevelt). Walton worked in Roosevelt's campus safety department. Like the other employees in the campus safety department, Walton was a member of the SEIU Local 1, a collective bargaining unit. Roosevelt required Walton and similarly situated employees to enroll scans of their hand onto a biometric timekeeping device as a means of clocking in and out of work. During the course of his employment, Walton allegedly scanned his hand geometry repeatedly for the purpose of Roosevelt keeping track of the hours he worked.
¶ 5 Under Illinois law, private entities that collect and use individuals’ biometric data, such as scans of their hand, must secure informed consent from those individuals or their legally authorized representatives and take other steps to ensure that the data is not stolen or used for improper purposes. See generally 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2020). Recognizing the importance of biometric identification data to the individual and in recognition of its immutability, the General Assembly enacted the Privacy Act to "regulat[e] the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information." Id. § 5(g). When an entity collects biometric information but fails to comply with the Privacy Act's requirements, the Privacy Act provides that aggrieved individuals are entitled to file a civil action and collect damages for each violation of the Privacy Act committed by the collecting entity. Id. § 20.
¶ 6 Among other requirements, in order to comply with the Privacy Act, a private entity that wishes to collect and use individuals’ biometric information must secure informed consent from the individual or his legally authorized representative before collecting and storing the data. Id. § 15(b). Further, the collecting entity must develop, publish, and follow a publicly available retention schedule and destruction guidelines. Id. § 15(a). The collecting entity is prohibited from disclosing the biometric data to third parties without consent from the individual or his legally authorized representative. Id. § 15(d).
¶ 7 Walton filed this case seeking damages from Roosevelt for its collection, storage, use, and dissemination of his biometric data. Specifically, Walton claims that Roosevelt collected and used his biometric data without complying with the Privacy Act's informed consent requirements and without developing and following the required retention policies. Walton also claims that Roosevelt disclosed his biometric data to a third-party payroll service without his consent. Roosevelt moved to dismiss the complaint.
¶ 8 In its motion to dismiss, Roosevelt argued that Walton's claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (2018) ). In moving to dismiss, Roosevelt's position was that the manner by which employees clock in and out of work is a subject covered by the collective bargaining agreement between Roosevelt and Walton's union. Thus, Roosevelt argued, Walton's claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, which governs most disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Management Relations Act has been interpreted to preempt any claims that substantially depend on the analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler , 481 U.S. 851, 857, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
¶ 9 Roosevelt pointed to the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement, which gives the employer broad authority to control the terms of the employees’ employment.
¶ 10 The circuit court disagreed with Roosevelt that Walton's claims were preempted by federal law. The circuit court reasoned that claims arising under the Privacy Act are "not intertwined with or dependent substantially upon consideration of terms of a collective bargaining agreement." The circuit court explained that a person's rights under the Privacy Act exist independently of their employment and any given collective bargaining agreement. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that "[p]reemption is not appropriate in this matter," and it denied the motion to dismiss.
¶ 11 Roosevelt moved the trial court to reconsider its ruling on the motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to certify a question for review by this court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). The court denied the motion to reconsider but did certify the question at issue in the case for appeal. We granted Roosevelt's application for review of the certified question. The parties fully briefed the issue, and we also received amicus briefs from interested third parties on this important labor law question.
¶ 13 Rule 308 authorizes this court to allow an appeal from an interlocutory order when the trial court has found that (1) the order involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019); Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co. , 2012 IL 111792, ¶ 12, 362 Ill.Dec. 462, 973 N.E.2d 858. Because it is a prerequisite that a certified question presents a question of law, our review of a certified question is done without deference to the circuit court and is, therefore, de novo. Williams v. Athletico, Ltd. , 2017 IL App (1st) 161902, ¶ 9, 412 Ill.Dec. 124, 74 N.E.3d 1047.
¶ 14 The certified question we are presented with in this appeal is:
"Does Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 ) preempt [Privacy Act] claims ( 740 ILCS 14/1 ) asserted by bargaining unit employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement?"
¶ 15 Article VI of the Constitution of the United States of America provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Under the supremacy clause, a federal statute preempts a state law when there is " ‘(1) express preemption—where Congress has expressly preempted state action; (2) implied field preemption—where Congress has implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme in an area, thus removing the entire field from the state realm; or (3) implied conflict preemption—where state action actually conflicts with federal law.’ " Performance Marketing Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer , 2013 IL 114496, ¶ 14, 375 Ill.Dec. 762, 998 N.E.2d 54 (quoting Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co. , 237 Ill. 2d 30, 39-40, 340 Ill.Dec. 196, 927 N.E.2d 1207 (2010) ). " " Coram v. State of Illinois , 2013 IL 113867, ¶ 71, 375 Ill.Dec. 1, 996 N.E.2d 1057 (quoting ...
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