Walton v. United States, Case No. 20-cv-677-pp
| Decision Date | 20 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-677-pp |
| Parties | DEVONTEA M. WALTON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
On April 30, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255, challenging his conviction in United States v. Devontea Walton, Case No. 17-cr-108 (E.D. Wis.). Dkt. No. 1. The motion asserts two grounds for relief: (1) the petitioner's "sentence is in violation of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights," and (2) "the enhancement was erroneously applied to his offense level." Id. at 4, 5. Because the petitioner plainly is not entitled to relief, the court denies the §2255 motion and dismisses the case.
On June 13, 2017, the grand jury returned an indictment against the petitioner, Javon Walton and Monroe Walton III. United States v. Devontea Walton, Case No. 17-cr-108 (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. No. 1. Count One charged all three with conspiring to (1) commit Hobbs Act robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1951, (2) take a motor vehicle by force, violence and intimidation with the intent to cause death and serious bodily harm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2119(1), and (3) brandish, carry and use a firearm during and in relation to and to possess a firearm in furtherance of crimes of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Id. at 1-2. Count Four charged the petitioner and Monroe Walton III with the May 5, 2017 Hobbs Act robbery of a US Cellular store in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1951(a) and 2. Id. at 5. Count Five charged the petitioner and Monroe Walton III with knowingly using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to that crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. Id. at 6. Count Six charged the petitioner and Monroe Walton III with taking a motor vehicle by force, violence and intimidation with the intent to cause death and serious bodily harm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2119(1) and 2. Id. at 7. Count Seven charged the petitioner and Monroe Walton III with knowingly using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to that crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. Id. at 8.
On July 10, 2018, the petitioner (represented by Attorney Victor Plantinga) signed a plea agreement. Dkt. No. 62 at 14. The plea agreement was filed on July 12, 2018. Dkt. no. 62. The agreement stated that the petitioner was pleading to Counts Four and Five of the indictment. Id. at ¶4. In theagreement, the petitioner acknowledged that he had read and fully understood the charges in the indictment, "the nature and elements of the crimes with which he ha[d] been charged" and that his attorney fully explained "the terms and conditions of the plea agreement." Id. at ¶3. The petitioner acknowledged, understood and agreed that he was guilty of the offenses in Counts Four and Five. Id. at ¶5. He admitted that facts attached to the plea agreement established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and were true and correct. Id. He stated that he understood and agreed that the maximum term of imprisonment for Count Four was twenty years in prison, a $250,000 fine, three years of supervised release and an unspecified amount of restitution; he understood and agreed that Count Five carried a "[m]andatory minimum of seven years and up to life in prison" consecutive to any other sentence, a maximum of five years of supervised release and a $250,000 fine. Id. at ¶6. The petitioner acknowledged, understood and agreed that he had "discussed the relevant statutes as well as the applicable sentencing guidelines with his attorney." Id. at ¶7.
The agreement also laid out the elements of the charges. Id. at ¶¶9-10. It said that the parties understood and agreed that in order to sustain the Hobbs Act robbery charge in Count Four, the government would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the petitioner "knowingly obtained property from or in the presence of a person," (2) the petitioner "did so by means of robbery," (3) the petitioner "believed that the person parted with the property because of the robbery," and (4) "the robbery affected interstatecommerce." Id. at ¶9. The parties confirmed that they understood and agreed that in order to sustain the charge of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in Count Five, the government would have been required to prove that (1) the petitioner committed the Hobbs Act robbery alleged in Count Four and (2) the petitioner "knowingly used and brandished a firearm during that crime." Id. at ¶10.
The petitioner acknowledged and agreed "that his attorney . . . discussed the applicable sentencing guidelines provisions with [the petitioner] to [the petitioner's] satisfaction." Id. at ¶13. He acknowledged and understood "that the sentencing guidelines recommendations contained in this agreement [did] not create any right to be sentenced within any particular sentence range, and that the court [might] impose a reasonable sentence above or below the guidelines range. Id. at ¶15. The parties acknowledged, understood and agreed that the sentencing court could "consider relevant conduct in calculating the sentencing guidelines range, even if the relevant conduct [was] not the subject of the offense to which [the petitioner] [was] pleading guilty." Id. at ¶16. "The parties agree[d] to recommend to the sentencing court that the applicable base offense level for the offense charged in Count Four" was 20. Id. at ¶17. They agreed that the government would recommend "a two-level increase for [the petitioner's] vehicular flight from law enforcement . . . , which created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to another person." Id. at ¶18. The government agreed to recommend a two-level decrease under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a) for the petitioner's timely acceptance of responsibility and agreedthat if the court determined at the time of sentencing that the defendant was entitled to that two-level reduction, the government would make a motion under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(b) for an additional one-level increase because the defendant's timely agreement to plead guilty. Id. at ¶19. The parties acknowledged, understood and agreed that "[t]he sentencing court [would] make its own determinations regarding any and all issues relating to the imposition of sentence and may impose any sentence authorized by law up to the maximum penalties" set forth in the agreement. Id. at ¶23. The petitioner acknowledged, understood and agreed that under the terms of the agreement, he could not "move to withdraw the guilty plea solely as a result of the sentence imposed by the court." Id. at ¶24.
The agreement also contained the petitioner's waiver of rights. Based on the agreement, the petitioner "knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right to appeal his sentence in this case and further waive[d] his right to challenge his conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255." Id. at ¶33. The petitioner's waiver included "the waiver of any claim that (1) the statutes or Sentencing Guidelines under which [the petitioner] is convicted or sentenced are unconstitutional, and (2) the conduct to which the [the petitioner] has admitted does not fall within the scope of the statutes or Sentencing Guidelines." Id. "This waiver [did] not extend to an appeal or post-conviction motion based on (1) any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum, (2) the sentencing court's reliance on any constitutionally impermissible factor, such as race,religion, or sex, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the plea agreement or sentencing, or (4) a claim that the plea agreement was entered involuntarily." Id.
The agreement provided that if the petitioner violated any term of the agreement at any time, the agreement would "become null and void at the discretion of the government." Id. at ¶41. If the agreement "[was] revoked or if [the petitioner's] conviction ultimately [was] overturned, then the government retain[ed] the right to reinstate any and all dismissed charges and to file any and all charges which were not filed because of [the] agreement." Id. Finally, the petitioner acknowledged, understood and agreed that he was "plead[ing] guilty freely and voluntarily because he [was] in fact guilty," and that "no threats, promises, representations, or other inducements ha[d] been made, nor agreements reached, other than those set forth in [the] agreement, to induce [the petitioner] to plead guilty." Id. at ¶42.
On September 5, 2018, the court held a change-of-plea hearing. Dkt. No. 68. The petitioner appeared in person with Attorney Plantinga. Id. at 1. The court's minutes reflect that during the hour-long hearing, the court placed the petitioner under oath, reviewed the plea agreement with him, questioned him, "recounted that Count Four involved a maximum prison term of twenty years, a maximum fine of $250,000, and a maximum of three years of supervised release," recounted that "Count Five carried a mandatory minimum prison term of seven years and a maximum of life, to run consecutively to any othersentence" and mentioned that each charge carried a "mandatory special assessment of $100," for a total assessment of $200. Id. "[T]he court found that [the petitioner] understood his trial rights, the penalties associated with the charge[s], the possible civil ramifications of a conviction, and the uncertainty of his ultimate sentence." Id. "The court also found that [the petitioner] entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily, without threats or promises." Id. "The court accepted [the petitioner's] plea of guilty, and found [the petitioner] guilty...
To continue reading
Request your trial