Walworth Cnty. v. M.R.M. (In re M.R.M.)

• Docket Number: 2022AP140-FT
• Decision Date: 29 June 2023
• Citation: 2023 WI 59
• Parties: In the matter of the mental commitment of M.R.M.: v. M.R.M., Respondent-Appellant. Walworth County, Petitioner-Respondent,
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

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2023 WI 59

In the matter of the mental commitment of M.R.M.:

Walworth County, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
M.R.M., Respondent-Appellant.

No. 2022AP140-FT

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

June 29, 2023

Oral Argument: February 20, 2023

APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth County(L.C. No. 2021ME9), Kristine E. Drettwan, Judge.

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by Megan Sanders-Drazen and the Wisconsin Defense Initiative, Madison. There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen.

For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Cortney J. Iverson, assistant corporation counsel. There was an oral argument by Cortney J. Iverson, assistant corporation counsel.

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DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

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REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.

¶1 M.R.M. was involuntarily committed^[1] and forcibly medicated for six months following a mental health crisis. When Walworth County sought to extend M.R.M.'s commitment, he filed a jury demand at least 48 hours prior to his rescheduled final hearing date. The circuit court denied that jury demand as untimely, held a final hearing, and extended his commitment for 12 additional months.

¶2 We subsequently decided Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, 399 Wis.2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, holding that a jury demand is timely if it is filed at least 48 hours before a rescheduled final hearing. M.R.M. contends that E.J.W. applies retroactively to his case. He further argues that reversal of the extension order,^[2] rather than reversal and remand, is the proper remedy because the circuit court would lack competency on remand.

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¶3 We hold that E.J.W. applies retroactively and that the circuit court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous. We further hold that remand is inappropriate because the circuit court lacks competency on remand when, as in this case, an extension order is reversed on appeal and the preceding commitment order has expired.

I

¶4 M.R.M. was involuntarily committed in Walworth County in January 2021 for a period of six months. In July 2021, the County petitioned the circuit court to extend M.R.M.'s commitment for 12 months. The circuit court adjourned the date originally set for the final hearing so M.R.M. could retain counsel. At least 48 hours before the August 12 rescheduled final hearing, M.R.M. filed a jury demand.

¶5 The circuit court concluded that M.R.M.'s jury demand was untimely based on Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI.App. 20, 392 Wis.2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, which held that Wis.Stat. § 51.20(11) (a) "requires a subject individual to request a jury trial at least forty-eight hours before 'the time set for final hearing,' not at least forty-eight hours before the final hearing actually occurs." R. J. 0., 392 Wis.2d 157, ¶41. The circuit court then held a bench trial and extended his commitment for 12 months.

¶6 After the final hearing but before M.R.M. filed this appeal we decided E.J.W., which overruled R.J.0. in part and held that a jury demand is timely if it is filed at least 48

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hours before a rescheduled final hearing takes place. See E.J.W., 399 Wis.2d 471, ¶¶38-39, ¶38 n.9. M.R.M.'s jury demand would have been timely if E.J.W. had been decided before his rescheduled final hearing.

¶7 M.R.M. filed an appeal which the court of appeals certified to this court. He raised two issues: (1) whether E.J.W. applies retroactively, and (2) if it does, whether the appropriate remedy for the denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand is reversal or reversal and remand.^[3]

II

¶8 The retroactivity of a prior decision and the appropriate remedy on appeal are both questions of law we review de novo. See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶15, 402 Wis.2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733; State ex rel. Krieger v. Borgen, 2004 WI.App. 163, ¶7, 276 Wis.2d 96, 687 N.W.2d 79.

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III

A

¶9 We first address whether our holding in E.J.W. applies retroactively to M.R.M.'s case.^[4] If it does, then the circuit court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous.

¶10 There is a general presumption that civil decisions apply retroactively. See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶69, 274 Wis.2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405. The County argues, however, that E.J.W. should not be applied retroactively. We have previously recognized three factors that guide us in deciding whether a civil decision should apply only prospectively. These factors are set forth in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis.2d 103, 109, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), and adopted from Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) .^[5] See Trinity Petroleum, Inc, v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶76, 302 Wis.2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1. They are:

(1) Does the rule establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed?

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(2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the operation of the new rule?

(3) Will retroactive application produce substantial inequitable results?

Id., ¶77.^[6]

¶11 The first factor-whether the decision clearly overruled past precedent-weighs against retroactively applying E.J.W. In R.J.0., the court of appeals held that a jury demand must be made 48 hours before the first time set for a final hearing. See 392 Wis.2d 157, ¶41. This rule governed ch. 51 cases for 18 months before this court concluded in E.J.W. that a jury demand is timely if it is made at least 48 hours before a rescheduled final hearing. See 399 Wis.2d 471, ¶3. This represents a clear break with the past precedent governing jury demands.

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¶12 Although the first factor weighs against retroactively applying E.J.W., the second and third factors weigh heavily in favor of retroactivity. The second factor asks if retroactively applying the new rule would further or impede its operation. See Kurtz, 91 Wis.2d at 109. To answer this question, our cases have looked to, for example, whether retroactive application of the new rule would further "the specific objective embodied in" a statute, and whether meaningful relief could be granted through retroactively applying the new rule. Wenke, 274 Wis.2d 220, ¶73; see also State ex rel. Buswell v. Tomah Area Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶48, 301 Wis.2d 178, 732 N.W.2d 804.

¶13 Here, there are two reasons why applying E.J.W. retroactively would further-not impede-its operation. First, doing so would give effect to the legislature's policy choices, reflected in ch. 51, "to afford due process protections including jury trials" to all persons subject to commitment. E.J.W., 399 Wis.2d 471, ¶32. To that end, the legislature adopted Wis.Stat. § 51.20(11) (a), which states that a jury demand is timely so long as it is filed at least 48 hours prior to the time set for the final hearing. See E.J.W., 399 Wis.2d 471, ¶28. This statute reflects the legislature's "determin[ation] that a minimum of 48 hours' notice is sufficient for the circuit court to secure the presence of jurors and the County to prepare for a jury trial in a mental health commitment case." Id., ¶29. Second, applying E.J.W. retroactively would provide meaningful relief to M.R.M. The

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circuit court "cannot go back" in time and grant M.R.M. a jury trial after the extension order has expired. See Buswell, 301 Wis.2d 178, ¶48. Nevertheless, reversing that unlawful extension order will further E.J.W.'s operation by relieving M.R.M. from the order's collateral consequences, such as restrictions on his constitutional right to bear arms and liability for the cost of his care. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶¶19-27, 402 Wis.2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162.

¶14 The third factor-whether retroactive application would produce substantial inequities-also weighs in favor of retroactivity. "The equity factor requires us to take into account the desirability of treating similarly situated parties alike." State v. Thiel, 2001 WI.App. 52, ¶16, 241 Wis.2d 439, 625 N.W.2d 321. E.J.W. and M.R.M. are similarly situated. Both were denied a jury trial even though their jury demands came at least 48 hours before their rescheduled final hearings. The availability of a jury trial upon timely demand is one of ch. 51's "many provisions designed to offer procedural and substantive protections to the person subject to commitment." E.J.W., 399 Wis.2d 471, ¶31. And for that reason, it would be inequitable to deprive M.R.M. of his right to a jury trial under the same circumstances that were present in E.J.W. by applying that holding only to future cases.

¶15 In sum, the Chevron/Kurtz analysis does not provide a reason for departing from our presumption of retroactivity in civil cases. Accordingly, we hold that the rule announced in

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E.J.W. applies retroactively and that M.R.M.'s jury demand was therefore timely.

B

¶16 Having concluded that E.J.W. applies retroactively, we next consider the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand. M.R.M. argues that reversal is the appropriate remedy because when the circuit court failed to enter a lawful extension order before the preceding commitment order expired, it lost competency to conduct further proceedings on remand. Before addressing that argument, we begin with some background on competency.

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¶17 Article VII, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides circuit courts with subject-matter jurisdiction in "all matters civil and criminal." Subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct from a circuit court's competency, which "refers to the court's power to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case." M.W., 402 Wis.2d 1, ¶35. Thus, although a circuit court is almost never without subject-matter jurisdiction,^[7]...