Wampler v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 93A02-8602-EX-44,93A02-8602-EX-44 |
| Citation | 498 N.E.2d 998 |
| Parties | William L. WAMPLER, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, John Mowrer, David Adams and Paul M. Hutson as the members of and constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division; and Donaldson Company, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Timothy Broden, Legal Services Program of Northern Indiana, Inc., Lafayette, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cheryl L. Greiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
William Wampler appeals a denial of benefits by the Employment Security Review Board. Wampler's only contention is that based upon the Board's negative evaluation of Wampler's credibility, the Board reversed the appeals referee who heard the evidence. This, he contends, renders the Board's decision contrary to law, citing Addison v. Review Board (1979) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1037. 1
If the matter of Wampler's credibility was not determinative of the issue before the Board, we are not given cause for reversal. Therefore, before we may reach the merits of Wampler's contention, it must be clear from the record that the Board's reversal was predicated solely upon an assessment of credibility.
In this connection it is essential to state what is meant by "credibility" with regard to the process of evaluating evidence. The precise issue of credibility in the context before us is truly one of demeanor credibility. In the broad sense, credibility includes not only the witness's appearance and manner of speaking, but also the ability to testify rationally, consistently, and not in disharmony with other highly credible evidence presented. Of these components of credibility, only demeanor remains outside the reviewing authority's abilities to assess. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB (1977) 9th Cir., 565 F.2d 1074, 1084 (Duniway, J., concurring and dissenting). See also, 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Sec. 17.16 (2d Ed.1980) and 1 Koch, Administrative Law and Practice Sec. 6.73 (1985).
From October, 1981, to May, 1984, Wampler worked for Donaldson Company in Frankfort. Donaldson manufactures air filtration systems; Wampler worked a variety of positions. The events leading to his termination began with an employee evaluation on March 30, 1984. Wampler's evaluation was the lowest in the plant. Wampler knew the evaluation was low and knew his job was in jeopardy. The evaluation recommended Wampler improve both his performance and attitude toward the company.
During the next month, four separate instances of excessively low production were documented. Although Wampler worked in an area without precisely set production quotas, ranges had been established through past practice. For example, on April 9, Wampler produced 568 pieces in a two and one-half hour period. One thousand one hundred per hour was standard.
Wampler's difficulties continued into May. On May 1, he was told to obtain permission before he changed the scrubber on a floor machine over to a vacuum. Wampler and others began work on the machine without having obtained permission from the maintenance man. On May 7 and 8, Wampler was trained on a new machine and his knowledge and skills were negatively evaluated. On May 9, Wampler reportedly gave unauthorized training to an employee on a mold maker. Finally, Wampler, working on plastic scrap on May 17, cut a piece of scrap spirally. Management believed the plastic was a toy, and that Wampler cut it because he was bored.
Wampler was discharged in late May. The spiral-cut plastic toy was the catalyst for the move, though management stated other grounds, including inconsistent performance, low production and poor attitude. Management strongly believed that Wampler had the ability and skill necessary to perform his job.
For each incident leading to discharge, Wampler offered an explanation. He claimed that low production was due either to experimental molds or odd-sized inventory. He admitted the failure to obtain permission to work on the floor machine, but said it was a "team effort" and his work was "obviously misconstrued." His low training rating was due to his slow learning, Wampler believed. Wampler disclaimed any responsibility for unauthorized training, saying he had no control over the person watching his machine. Wampler stated that he did not make the spiral cut in the plastic scrap to make a toy, but rather was cutting the plastic down so that it would fit into the scrap chopper. He was merely waiting for the machine to complete a prior operation before inserting new plastic.
The initial unemployment compensation determination was denial of benefits because of discharge for just cause. 2 Wampler appealed and was granted a hearing at which Wampler and Donaldson's personnel manager, production supervisor and lead operator testified. The appeals referee concluded that Wampler's production was not substandard in the final weeks of his employment, and though he disregarded instructions about the floor machine, Wampler was not chargeable with a pattern of negligent conduct. Thus, the referee ruled, just cause did not exist.
The Review Board reversed. The Board's core findings were: Wampler had the skill and ability to perform his job duties; he failed to do so, even after his evaluation; Wampler offered no "competent evidence of probative value" to show that he worked to the best of his abilities; and, Wampler disregarded instructions concerning the floor machine. The Board confined its review to the record created at the hearing. 3 By reversing the referee without having an additional hearing, Wampler claims the Board substituted its judgment of credibility for that of the referee who heard the testimony. He urges that this makes the decision of the Review Board contrary to law.
When a decision of the Review Board is challenged as being contrary to law, our review is limited. Indiana Code 22-4-17-12 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1985) provides:
The statute causes a two-part inquiry. The first part is an examination of the relationship between the premises (or facts as found) and the conclusions of the Board. We determine if the Review Board's deductions were "reasonable," which is a question of law. Gold Bond Building Products Div. v. Review Board (1976) 2d Dist., 169 Ind.App. 478, 349 N.E.2d 258, citing, City of Evansville v. Southern Ind. Gas and Electric Co. (1975) 2d Dist., 167 Ind.App. 472, 339 N.E.2d 562. The second part is an inquiry into, "the nexus between the premises or findings of basic facts and the evidence presented to determine if the evidence justified those findings." Gold Bond, supra, 349 N.E.2d at 263. In this analysis, we do not reweigh the evidence and only that evidence favorable to the Board's determination, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, will be considered. Miller v. Review Board (1982) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 804, 806; Forster v. Review Board (1981) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 420 N.E.2d 1287, 1291.
Considering the components in reverse order, clearly the evidence supporting the Board's findings of fact is sufficient. Wampler does not controvert the evidence which, in the Board's judgment, gave rise to a prima facie case of just cause. Wampler has not contested the evidence of his output. Neither has he denied failing to obtain permission before working on the floor machine. In fact, he admitted it. Wampler also does not contest Donaldson management's assessment of his skills, aptitude, and abilities, which was favorable to Wampler. The Board had before it competent evidence from those employees having the obligation to monitor Wampler, and had uncontested evidence of low productivity, violated instructions, and ability. The evidence was sufficient to support the Board's findings. See, e.g., Osborn v. Review Board (1978) 4th Dist., 178 Ind.App. 22, 381 N.E.2d 495.
The relationship between premises and conclusions is a more difficult question. Wampler contends that it was unreasonable for the Board to conclude that, in the face of Wampler's explanations for each incident, his work was so deficient as to rise to the level of just cause for unemployment compensation purposes. Wampler contends that the Board reached the conclusion of just cause by deciding that his testimony was not credible, though it did not see or hear him...
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