Wanamaker v. Town of Westport Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date27 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 3:11–CV–1791 MPS.,3:11–CV–1791 MPS.
Citation11 F.Supp.3d 51
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesSally J. WANAMAKER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WESTPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Scott R. Lucas, Lucas Bagnell Varga LLC, Southport, CT, for Plaintiff.

Johanna G. Zelman, Michael J. Rose, Robin B. Kallor, Rose Kallor LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MICHAEL P. SHEA, District Judge.

After reviewing the record, the Court OVERRULES the Defendant's Objection [Doc. # 95] and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Garfinkel's Recommended Ruling [Doc. # 90]. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 63] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set forth in Magistrate Judge Garfinkel's Recommended Ruling. The Court adds only the following comments on the collateral estoppel argument in the Defendant's Objection.

Defendant argues that findings by the “Impartial Hearing Panel that considered whether Plaintiff's contract was properly terminated under Conn. Gen.Stat. Sec. 10–151(d) collaterally estop her from re-litigating certain issues here. While I agree that findings of fact made by the Panel may not be re-litigated in this proceeding, see Matusick v. Erie County Water Auth., 739 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.2014), none of the findings Defendant cites involved issues identical to those being contested in this lawsuit. For example, Defendant argues that the Panel's finding that the computer technology and classroom teaching assignments are “interchangeable” and that “the essential responsibilities of the positions are the same” (Def.'s Obj. at 18) precludes re-litigation of several issues in this action. Whatever that finding might have meant in the contract-termination proceeding before the Impartial Panel, the Panel took pains to make clear that it did not mean that Plaintiff was precluded from litigating whether the two positions were different enough to support any discrimination claims she might assert in court. (See, e.g., Impartial Panel's Findings of Fact and Recommendation [Doc. # 64–36] at para. 29 (We express no view as to whether [the classroom teacher and computer teacher positions] are interchangeable under state anti-discrimination laws.”); para. 46 (We express no views as to whether state anti-discrimination laws operate as an external limit on [the authority of the Superintendent to assign elementary teachers to the computer teacher assignment or vice versa”] ); para. 47 (We express no views as to whether the Connecticut anti-discrimination laws prohibit or otherwise affect the practice of shifting a teacher returning from an unpaid leave of absence occasioned by a complication from pregnancy from technology teacher to classroom teacher.”); para. 143–44 (“While we have found that the assignment of classroom teacher and the assignment of technology teacher are considered interchangeable and comparable by the Westport Schools and by the collective bargaining agreement with the Westport Education Associations, we express no view as to the state law claims advanced by Ms. Wanamaker in this proceeding. We express no view as to whether the failure by the Westport administration to remove a teacher from the assignment of technology teacher and replace her with Ms. Wanamaker violated state law.” (emphasis added).)

Similarly, the Panel's determination that Plaintiff “abandoned” her position does not foreclose the litigation of any issues in this case. First, as a matter of labeling, the Panel's conclusion that Plaintiff abandoned her position was not a finding of fact at all but a characterization of Plaintiff's behavior used by the Panel in its “Recommendation” that there was an adequate legal ground to terminate her—specifically, “other due and sufficient cause”—under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10–151(d)(6). (See id. at 17.) Second, the underlying finding of fact—that Plaintiff “did not accept a position of classroom teacher on her return from unpaid leave, and did not report for the classroom teacher assignment” for the 20102011 school year, see id. —does not preclude Plaintiff from asserting that the refusal by the Defendant to reinstate her to the computer teaching position was an adverse employment action. I agree with Magistrate Judge Garfinkel's finding that there are disputed issues of fact on the question whether the proposed transfer to the classroom teaching position altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment in a materially negative way. (See Doc. # 90 at 42.) If Plaintiff ultimately prevails on that issue, then her failure to accept what amounted to a lesser position does not undermine her claims.

The remaining arguments raised in Defendant's Objection are fully addressed by Magistrate Judge Garfinkel's Recommended Ruling, and I adopt the adopt the reasoning therein in rejecting those arguments.

For the reasons set forth above and in Magistrate Judge Garfinkel's Recommended Ruling, I grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

RECOMMENDED RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Sally J. Wanamaker, a former elementary school teacher with the Westport Board of Education (BOE), brought this suit against the BOE for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a–60(a)et seq. (“CFEPA”). On September 25, 2012, the Honorable Vanessa L. Bryant, District Judge, issued a detailed and well-reasoned opinion on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Wanamaker v. Westport Board of Education, 899 F.Supp.2d 193 (D.Conn.2012), granting it in part and denying it in part. Following this decision, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. # 41], which is now the operative complaint. Pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., Defendant has moved for summary judgment [Doc. # 63] on all five counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(a) provides that [t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp. Ltd., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

In making these determinations, the Court should review all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The Court, however, may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, which are functions for the jury. Id. Rather, the role of the Court is to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 953, 127 S.Ct. 382, 166 L.Ed.2d 270 (2006). “Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). Stated differently, “if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party,” summary judgment must be denied. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir.2002).

Factual Background

Judge Bryant's previous ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss sets forth the factual background of this case in detail. Wanamaker, 899 F.Supp.2d at 196–99. Those facts were based upon the factual allegations of Plaintiff's complaint, which the Court properly accepted as true for the purpose of determining whether they “plausibly [gave] rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 199 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on Defendant's summary judgment motion, however, the Court must base its decision on the evidence in the record-not mere factual allegations. Thus, although largely duplicative of the factual background set forth in Judge Bryant's ruling, the Court includes herein a detailed discussion of the facts based upon the evidence presented by the parties both in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant's motion.

The facts as presented are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.1

Plaintiff began her relationship with the Westport Board of Education as an elementary school paraprofessional at Kings Highway Elementary during the 1998–99 school term, where she assisted three second grade teachers. She then did her student teaching at Green's Farms Elementary School. In the fall of 1999, Plaintiff served as a substitute teacher and, in January 2000, she was hired as a substitute library media specialist at Green's Farms (Pl.'s Ex. 31 at 111). For the 2000–01 school year, Plaintiff was hired on a full-time basis at Green's Farms, with her time allocated as .6 FTE (full-time equivalent) to math support, .2 FTE to gifted math, and .2 FTE as a computer teacher. As an elementary school teacher, the terms and conditions of her employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (Def.'s Ex. A).

Plaintiff testified that,...

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