Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 3:11–cv–1791 (VLB).

• Decision Date: 25 September 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11–cv–1791 (VLB).
• Citation: 899 F.Supp.2d 193
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Sally J. WANAMAKER, Plaintiff, v. WESTPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, and Elliot Landon, Individually, Defendants.

899 F.Supp.2d 193

Sally J. WANAMAKER, Plaintiff,

v.WESTPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, and Elliot Landon, Individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:11–cv–1791 (VLB).

United States District Court,

D. Connecticut.

Sept. 25, 2012.

Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Lucas Bagnell Varga LLC, Southport, CT, for Plaintiff.

Johanna G. Zelman, Michael J. Rose, Robin B. Kallor, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. # 14]

VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Sally Wanamaker (“Wanamaker”), brings this action against the Westport Board of Education (“Board”) and Superintendent Elliot Landon individually asserting several violations of federal and state employment laws relating to the circumstances of her return to her position as a computer teacher in the Westport public school system following a difficult pregnancy. Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by both Defendants seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff was employed by the Westport Public Schools from January 2000 until April 27, 2011. [Dkt # 1, Complaint ¶ 2]. She began to work for Westport Public Schools as an unpaid intern in December 1998, became a full-time teacher in January 2000, obtained tenure in 2004, and served as a “Computer Teacher in the Green Farms School from September 2002 through June 2009.” Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff contends that she was an “exemplary performer during her tenure,” noting that she “received raises and favorable reviews every year, and was never subject to any negative personnel action.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 12.

In April 2009, while on maternity leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), Plaintiff gave birth to her daughter. Id. at ¶ 13. “Wanamaker incurred a spinal injury and disability, transverse myelitis, resulting from the birth of her daughter. In addition, her daughter was born in April 2009 with a serious, congenital heart defect which would require future surgery to repair.” Id.

Article XIX(A) of the contract between Westport and the Westport Education Association pertains to maternity leave and provides that:

An employee requiring leave of absence because of disability resulting from pregnancy shall be granted necessary leave. Such leave shall be granted from accumulated sick leave as set forth in article XVII of this Agreement, in conformity with Section 46a–60 of the Connecticut General Statutes.

[Dkt. # 1, Complaint ¶ 34].

In July 2009, before the 2009–2010 school year began, Plaintiff's doctor, Peter McAllister recommended that she take a 30 to 60 day leave at the start of the school year “depending upon how she felt in August.” Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff spoke with Margaret Breines “of Westport's human resources department” about the possibility of a brief medical leave at the beginning of the school year and Ms. Breines “stated that her position would be held for her if she needed to take a health-related medical leave.” Id. at 15. On July 24, 2009, Dr. McAllister sent a letter to John Bayers, Principal of the Green's Farm school, notifying him that Plaintiff might not be able to return to work at the beginning of the school year, and might require 30 to 60 days of leave. Id. at 16. Principal Bayers told Plaintiff that the substitute teacher who had been trained to cover her computer teaching position during her maternity leave would continue to cover her responsibilities during Plaintiff's 30 to 60 days of leave. Id. at ¶ 17.

However, Plaintiff alleges that on August 10, 2010, Principal Bayers, “at the direction of defendant Landon, informed Wanamaker that he had decided to replace her permanently.” [Dkt. # 1, Complaint ¶ 18]. Plaintiff contends that the individual selected to replace her, Nicole Fieschel, “did not suffer from any physical disability, did not have any children, and was not perceived as needing intermittent time off in the future relating to a disability.” Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff further contends that Fieschel “was also less qualified in terms of computer teaching experience,” thus, “[a] non-tenured teacher whose position had been made redundant due to enrollment, Sarah Stefans, was thereupon moved into Fieschel's position. Stefans also did not suffer from any disability that might require future medical leave.” Id. at ¶ 19.

In sum, Plaintiff asserts that she was “selected out of her position due to her disability, perceived need to take medical leave in the future, and exercise of FMLA rights.” Id. at ¶¶ 19–20.

Principal Bayers informed Plaintiff that “when she was ready to return, she could come back as a substitute classroom teacher.” Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff asserts that a substitute classroom teacher position “was not equivalent to the computer teacher position she had held since 2001, and was in reality a demotion.” [Dkt. # 1, Complaint ¶ 21]. Plaintiff alleges that she informed Principal Bayers that he was asking her to choose between her job and medical leave. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff further informed Principal Bayers that “if her employment was indeed at stake she would return by the beginning of the school year, and at most would need a brief medical leave, or some reasonable accommodation such as teaching from a chair instead of standing.” Id.

On August 16, 2009, Plaintiff spoke with Edward Huydic, the former president of the Westport Education Association union. [Dkt # 1, Complaint ¶ 23]. During the conversation, Huydic inquired about the health of Plaintiff's daughter and whether her heart condition would require surgery. Id. Plaintiff notes that she “had never shared this personal information with Huydic before this phone call.” Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. Plaintiff alleges that Huydic told her that Defendant Landon had brought up the subject during an earlier conversation and stated that this situation “was one of the reasons why her computer teacher position had been assigned to another teacher.” Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff further alleges that Huydic informed her that Landon “expressed concern that Wanamaker's disability, and the future heart surgery on her infant daughter, might result in future absences.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that prior to her maternity leave in February 2009, Defendant Landon “displayed hostility and illegal animus toward teacher absences, regardless of whether the absences were health-related or otherwise legitimate.” [Dkt. # 1, Complaint ¶ 26]. In particular, Landon distributed a letter to the union regarding teacher absences, causing “what Huydic described as a ‘fury’ among Westport teachers.” Id. Plaintiff contends that Huydic asked Landon to apologize to the teachers in the union.” Id. at ¶ 27.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Landon continued to communicate with members of the union regarding teacher absences. Id. at ¶ 29. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 2008, Landon sent an email expressing “regret” over not distinguishing between absences related to “in-district professional activities” and absences related to “occasional illness, various personal and other non-continuous absence-related reasons,” thus implying that “the latter category were somehow problem or illegitimate absences, whereas in-district professional activity absences were acceptable.” Id. at ¶ 30.

On August 17, 2009, Plaintiff alleges that Principal Bayers asked her to clean out her classroom on and placed her on leave. [Dkt # 1, Complaint ¶ 31]. Plaintiff retained counsel and sought reinstatement to the computer teacher position in May 2010. Plaintiff alleges that this request was again denied as the Defendant Board instead offered her a full-time classroom teacher position, which Plaintiff contends “was (i) not equivalent to her computer teacher position and (ii) was contrary to her doctor's recommendation that she not be placed in a position other than the computer teacher position due to her disability.” Id. at ¶ 32.

On August 16, 2010, the Defendant Board gave Plaintiff notice of her proposed termination. [Dkt # 1, Complaint ¶ 37]. On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff requested a “termination hearing pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10–151.” ¹Id. A termination hearing was held “in late 2010 and early 2011.” Id. Finally, on April 27, 2011, the Defendant Board terminated Wanamaker's employment.” Id. at ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Board terminated her employment “on the false grounds of ‘other due and sufficient cause.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant Board based its decision “upon the recommendation of an arbitration panel which was not binding and [...] expressly declined to follow or apply applicable law, instead deferring to administrative agencies and the courts.” Id.

III. Standards of Review

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (internal quotations omitted) “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ' ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the...