Wannebo v. Gates
Decision Date | 26 November 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 34713.,34713. |
Citation | 227 Minn. 194,34 N.W.2d 695 |
Parties | WANNEBO v. GATES et al. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Municipal Court of Minneapolis; Theodore B. Knudson, Judge.
Action by Anne Wannebo against Elnathan Gates and another, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, the question presented having been certified as important and doubtful, defendants appeal.
Order reversed.
Meagher, Geer & Markham and Clyde F. Anderson, all of Minneapolis, for appellants.
R. S. Lammers, of Minneapolis, and Allan L. Johnson, of Wayzata, for respondent.
Defendants appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint herein, the question presented having been certified as important and doubtful.
On July 2, 1947, defendant Frances L. Gates parked a car owned by defendant Elnathan Gates on a public street in a business area in Minneapolis. She went shopping and left the car unattended and the doors and ignition unlocked. The key was not removed from the ignition switch and taken with her. The car was stolen. That night, at about 11:30, the stolen car, negligently operated by a person unknown, collided with plaintiff's automobile, damaging the same and injuring plaintiff. The above facts state briefly the material allegations of the complaint to which defendants demur.
A part of § 11 of an ordinance of Minnepolis, known as the Traffic Ordinance (Vol. 70, Council Proceedings, 1944-1945, p. 800), in force at that time, reads as follows:
"Every person parking a passenger automobile on any public street or alley in the City shall lock the ignition, remove the key and take the same with him."
In this appeal, there is no question raised as to the negligence of defendants. They deny liability solely on the ground that the damage complained of was not the proximate result of a violation of the ordinance. Therefore, this is the question presented to us: Can it be said as a matter of law that the criminal act of the thief in stealing the car from its parked position on a public street and the subsequent negligent operation of the car by a party or parties unknown, presumably the thief, at a place probably five miles or a little more distant from where the car was parked when it was stolen, and at a time several hours after the theft, constituted an intervening efficient cause which insulated defendants' acts from liability?
Several cases have arisen in other jurisdictions where the fact situation is similar or somewhat similar. In our jurisdiction, Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W. 302, has been cited as most nearly analogous. However, it is of little assistance here because of the dissimilarity in facts. In the Kennedy case, defendant parked his car on a city street in Minneapolis with the motor running. A statute prohibited the parking of a car unattended with the motor running. While defendant was gone, a passenger whom he had left sitting in the car, thinking the car was parked in a prohibited zone, proceeded, without any authorization from defendant, to move it, and, because of his unfamiliarity with the operation of the car, he drove it up onto the sidewalk and struck a pedestrian. As the car was not left unattended, there was no violation of the statute. However in affirming the order of the trial court in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this court observed (159 Minn. 79, 198 N.W. 303):
The weight of authority in outside jurisdictions is to the effect that, in situations similar to ours, the negligence of the actor is insulated by the act of an intervening efficient cause. As the cases are few, we shall review them. In Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 425, 158 N.E. 778, cited most often, a statute required that "automobiles shall be provided with a lock, a ratchet brake which can be set, a key or other device to prevent such vehicle from being set in motion by unauthorized persons". G.L.Mass.1921, c. 90, § 7. A parked car was left unlocked with the key in the lock and the ratchet brake not set. The car was stolen, and the thief drove it at a high rate of speed through the public streets a distance of a mile and a half to the place where the accident, caused by the thief's negligence, happened. Plaintiffs contended that the defendant's negligence in leaving the automobile unlocked was the proximate cause of the accident. The court denied recovery, holding that the larceny of the automobile and its use by the thief were intervening independent acts, which the defendant was not bound to anticipate and guard against. It is to be observed that this accident happened while the thief was in flight. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330, followed the Slater case. In the Sullivan case, a car which had been left unattended and unlocked, with the key in the ignition, was stolen. The thieves drove it about for an hour and then parked it a mile from defendant's home. Later the thieves returned to the car, and it was driven around by them until the accident happened. The court said (318 Mass. 361, 61 N.E.2d 332):
* * *'
It is to be noted in the Sullivan case that the accident did not happen while the thieves were in flight. In Massachusetts, therefore, the same result follows whether the thieves were in flight or not at the time of the accident.
Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E.2d 1001, cited by the trial court in support of plaintiff's position, was decided after the Slater and before the Sullivan cases. The car in the Malloy case was parked on a public street with the doors unlocked and the key in the ignition. The car was stolen, and within two hours an accident happened through the negligence of the thief. The court held that the negligent conduct of the owner might properly be found to have been the proximate cause of the accident. There is one feature in the Malloy case which distinguishes it from the Slater case, and apparently the decision of the court was based on that feature of the case. In the Malloy case, defendant had no permit to operate his car in Massachusetts, as required by law. His car could not lawfully be operated or be permitted to remain upon a Massachusetts highway. The court observed that there was evidence on the part of defendant which was not present in the Slater case, namely, that the defendant's car was not registered as the statute required. It thus distinguished the two cases. The Slater case was not overruled by the Malloy case. It was expressly so stated in the later Sullivan case.
In Walter v. Bond, 292 N.Y. 574, 54 N.E. 2d 691, a taxicab driver left his car parked in the street unattended, with doors unlocked and ignition key in switch. His passenger, who had not discharged the cab and who was intoxicated, to the knowledge of the cab driver, went to a doctor's office, and the driver to a tavern. When the passenger returned, he entered the cab and drove it onto the sidewalk, injuring plaintiff. The complaint against the taxicab owner was dismissed.
In Wilson v. Harrington, 295 N.Y. 667, 65 N.E.2d 101, the court of appeals of New York affirmed a judgment of the appellate division of the supreme court, which in turn had affirmed a judgment of the supreme court in favor of defendant. Defendant testified that his car had been stolen early in the morning from in front of a club in the city of Watertown. The collision occurred outside the city during the same early morning. The appellate division had held that an automobile owner did not become liable for injuries suffered in a collision while his automobile was being driven by a thief, on the theory that the owner, by leaving the keys in the automobile, started a chain of events which led to and proximately caused the accident. A fair inference is that the accident happened while the thief was in flight. To the same effect, see Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App.Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599.
In Castay v....
To continue reading
Request your trial