Wanner v. State (In re Wanner)
| Decision Date | 03 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 37059.,37059. |
| Citation | 150 Idaho 164,244 P.3d 1250 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the License Suspension of Steven M. Wanner. Steven M. WANNER, Petitioner–Respondent, v. STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent–Appellant. |
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, Pocatello, for appellant. Stephen J. Muhonen argued.
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chtd., Pocatello, for respondent. Aaron Thompson argued.
Steve Wanner (Wanner) was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence and the results of his breath tests were over the legal limit. Based upon Wanner's failure of this evidentiary test, the officer provided him a form captioned as "Notice of Suspension" (the Notice or Notice of Suspension) provided by the Idaho Department of Transportation (IDOT). Wanner then requested an administrative hearing, although this request was not made within seven days as required by I.C. § 18–8002A(7). IDOT, acting in its administrative capacity, denied the request as untimely. Wanner appealed to the district court, arguing that the Notice did not provide sufficient notice regarding the effect of any suspension on his commercial driving privileges and thereby denied him due process. The district court agreed with Wanner, reversed IDOT's decision and held that Wanner was entitled to an administrative hearing. IDOT appeals from that decision.
Because we find that Wanner failed to timely request a hearing regarding the suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to I.C. § 18–8002A and because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relating to his disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle, we reverse.
On the afternoon of August 7, 2008, an Idaho State Police officer investigated a call reporting that a pickup truck had been driven off the road. Wanner admitted to driving the pickup, which was not a commercial vehicle. Although Wanner was the holder of a Class A commercial driver's license (CDL), he did not have the license in his possession. As the officer spoke with Wanner, he smelled alcohol and Wanner admitted that he had a couple of drinks with lunch. The officer subsequently had Wanner perform field sobriety tests. Based upon the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and Wanner's difficulty in performing other tests, the officer arrested Wanner for driving under the influence. The officer transported Wanner to the Franklin County Sheriff's office, read and explained the Notice, and Wanner submitted to a breath test. The results of the breath test were 0.094 and 0.090, both of which exceed the legal limit of 0.08. I.C. § 18–8004(1)(a).
The Notice provided to Wanner contains a variety of language relevant to this appeal. The section most relevant to Wanner's status reads:
Similar language is repeated on the back side of the Notice.
Other relevant language included on the face of the Notice of Suspension refers to CDLs. The Notice includes a box asking whether the driver was operating a commercial vehicle and states that if you refuse to take the breath tests and "you were operating a commercial motor vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not provide commercial driving privileges of any kind." In addition, the Notice states in bolded capital letters "this suspension for failure or refusal of the evidentiary test(s) is separate from any other suspension ordered by the Court." The back side of the Notice also states that "[i]f you have questions or need additional information regarding this notice or your driving privileges, call Driver Services at 334–8735."
The Notice did not address the situation presented by the underlying facts of this case: the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL who was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of contact with law enforcement. This is significant because I.C. § 49–335(2) provides that a motorist who fails evidentiary testing is disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for not less than one year.
Wanner did not request an administrative hearing within the seven days prescribed in the Notice. Rather, he first requested a hearing fourteen days later, on August 21, 2008. Although there is nothing in the record on appeal showing that IDOT provided Wanner with notice of his disqualification from operating commercial vehicles, it appears that such a notice prompted his delayed request for a hearing, although his request for a hearing was made pursuant to I.C. § 18–8002A. On August 22, 2008, IDOT mailed a "Notice of Untimely Request for Hearing" denying Wanner's request. That notice informed Wanner that his suspension would become effective September 6, 2008.
It also included the statement that "[y]ou may appeal the denial of your hearing to the district court for a judicial review within 28 days from the date of this notice." On September 18, 2008, Wanner filed a petition for judicial review with the district court. Wanner also requested a stay of his license suspension, which was granted on September 19, 2008 by the magistrate court.
IDOT filed a motion to dismiss on January 13, 2009. IDOT argued in its accompanying memorandum that because Wanner did not request a hearing within seven days and included no explanation for his untimely request, he waived his right to contest the suspension. The district court found that the petition for judicial review asserted that Wanner had received "improper and/or insufficient" notice and the officer "did not properly advise him of his rights in accordance with Idaho law." Concluding that IDOT's motion went "to the very crux of the appeal," the district court denied the motion.
After receiving oral argument from the parties, the district court issued a decision holding that the Notice of Suspension did not adequately notify Wanner of the potential consequences to his CDL. IDOT requested rehearing, seeking clarification as to whether the court's decision addressed suspension of Wanner's non-commercial driving privileges or whether it was intended to be restricted to any prospective agency action relating to Wanner's CDL. On September 10, 2009, the district court issued an amended decision. In its second decision, the district court stated:
Due process requires that drivers with CDLs, who are driving non-commercial vehicles at the time of suspension, be given notice of the impact of I.C. § 49–335(2) and its one year disqualification in the Notice of Suspension. Without that notice CDL drivers cannot make an informed decision regarding whether to file an appeal under I.C. § 18–8002 and I.C. § 18–8002A within the required seven days. Therefore, because proper notice was not given, [Wanner] is entitled to a hearing under I.C. § 18–8002, I.C. § 18–8002A, and I.C. § 49–326(4).
The district court concluded that Wanner "has seven days from the date of this Amended Decision to file proper notice of his appeal under I.C. §§ 18–8002, 18–8002A, and I.C. § 49–326(4)." On September 22, 2009, IDOT timely appealed to this Court.
A hearing under I.C. § 18–8002A results in an "agency action" and is therefore governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA). I.C. § 67–5240. See also Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002). Morgan v. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 9, 813 P.2d 345, 348 (1991). The constitutionality of a statute or administrative regulation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Am. Falls Res. Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007) (citing Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 540, 96 P.3d 637, 641 (2004) ). "On appeal, this Court reviews agency decisions directly, independent of the district court's determination." Allen v. Blaine Cnty., 131...
To continue reading
Request your trial