Wansitler v. Hurley Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-12404 |
| Parties | Rick Wansitler, Plaintiff, v. Hurley Medical Center, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Plaintiff Rick Wansitler ("Wansitler" or "Plaintiff") filed this action against his former employer, Defendant Hurley Medical Center ("HMC" or "Defendant"), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), § 19811, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and related state claims. The matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have briefed the issues and the Court heard oral argument on July 14, 2011. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Plaintiff's FMLA claims and DENY Defendant's motion as it relates to Plaintiff's WDCA, Title VII, ELCRA, ADA, and PWDCRA claims.
Plaintiff filed this action against HMC on June 18, 2010. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following counts: "Retaliation Under the Family and Medical Leave Act" (Count I);"Interference Claim Under the Family and Medical Leave Act" (Count II); "MCLA §418.301(11) Workers Compensation Disability Act Retaliation Claim" (Count III); "Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act MCLA §37.2202 Race Discrimination Claim" (Count IV); "42 USC §1981 Race Discrimination Claim" (Count V); "Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act Claim" (Count VI); and "Americans with Disabilities Act Claim" (Count VII).
Following the close of discovery, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 15, 2011. (Def's Br., Doc. No. 15). The following material facts are gleaned from the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
HMC hired Plaintiff, a white male, for two, consecutive, 90-day temporary assignments as a Public Safety Officer on August 14, 2007. HMC hired Plaintiff as a "regular, part-time, probationary employee " on February 10, 2008. According to HMC's Labor Relations Administrator, David Szczepanski, if a probationary employee accumulates three absences during any four-month evaluation period, that employee's attendance is considered less than "satisfactory" and may warrant termination. (Szczepanski Dep. at 21-22, 29). Dawn Woodruff, one of Plaintiff's direct supervisors, testified that "generally four" absences result in a discharge.
After his first four months of regular employment (February 11, 2008 to June 10, 2008), Plaintiff was evaluated by Dawn Lovett, Plaintiff's Senior Supervisor, who is an African-American woman. Ms. Lovett gave Plaintiff a "satisfactory" score of 3.8 out of 5 on his performance review. (Def's Br, Ex. R).
On June 16, 2008, during the course of his employment, Plaintiff injured his knee in an altercation with a psychiatric patient. Plaintiff allegedly suffered a meniscus tear in his right knee. (Plf's Br., Ex. 9). As a result of this injury, Plaintiff was out of work for approximatelyfive weeks. Upon his return to work, Plaintiff could not resume his previous duties because of his knee pain, and was restricted to working at the officer dispatch desk.
Plaintiff alleges that he began receiving hostile treatment from his supervisors immediately after he submitted his application for workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff states that on June 26, 2008, Ms. Lovett delayed Plaintiff from timely attending a medical appointment and told him "that his injury was not serious and that he did not need to be off work." (Wansitler Declaration at ¶ 8). Additionally, Roy Pruitt, the Charge Officer who supervised Plaintiff and union president, stated that during the summer of 2008, Nancy Roschival, the Workers' Compensation Assistant at HMC, told him that Plaintff had been "'milking' his workers' compensation." (Pruitt Declration at ¶ 28).
After Plaintiff's next four months of employment (June 13, 2008 to October 11, 2008), Plaintiff was evaluated by Mark Mitchell, a white male. Mr. Mitchel gave Plaintiff a "very good" score of 3.5 out of 5 on this second performance review. (Def Br., Ex. S).
On November 1, 2008, Mr. Mitchell notified Plaintiff that he was put on a "Notice of Investigation" because of an absence on October 27, 2008. (Plf's Br. at 3). This absence, however, was approved without pay on November 3, 2009 by one of Plaintiff's other supervisors. (Plf's Br., Ex. 12).
On November 3, 2008, Ms. Roschival terminated Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits after Plaintiff scheduled a biopsy at the recommendation of his treating physician, Dr. Safley, in order to "rule out" whether Plaintiff had a sarcomatous lesion in his knee. (Plf's Br., Ex. 14). Apparently, a sarcomatous lesion is an ailment that would be unrelated to Plaintiff's knee injury that occurred on June 16, 2008.
On January 6, 2009, a meeting occurred in the dispatch office between Plaintiff, Ms. Lovett, Public Safety Officer Jamal Dozier, and Public Safety Officer James Williams. (Plf's Br. at 4). At that meeting, Ms. Lovett gave Plaintiff a "Notice of Investigation" regarding the possession of a personal recording device. Recording conversations on the HMC premises without the consent of the person being recorded is a violation of HMC's policies. (Def's Br., Ex. L).
Ms. Lovett first issued a Notice of Investigation that stated, "You are being placed on notice for possibly having possession of a recording device." According to Plaintiff, after the meeting with Ms. Lovett, Plaintiff relayed to Mr. Pruitt that he had received a Notice of Investigation. Mr. Pruitt, as union president, approached Dawn Woodruff, another of Plaintiff's supervisors, about the notice and explained to her that simply possessing a recording device is not a violation of policy. After Mr. Pruitt spoke to Ms. Woodruff about Plaintiff's Notice of Investigation, Ms. Lovett issued a second Notice of Investigation to Plaintiff that same day. The updated Notice of Investigation added the following statement: "When asking about the recording device you admitted you had and it was out on the counter recording while I was in dispatch." (Plf's Br., Ex. 17). Plaintiff denies ever using the recorder to record any conversations with others. (Wansitler Dep. at 23). Furthermore, Mr. Dozier and Mr. Williams issued declarations (which are not dated) stating that Plaintiff had not been recording the January 6, 2009 meeting with Ms. Lovett. (Plf's Br., Exs. 18, 19).
On January 25 and 26 of 2009, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff called in to work and notified HMC that he would be absent on those days. These were his second and third absences in the four-month rating period.
Plaintiff provided Ms. Lovett with a physician's note on January 27, 2009, indicating that he was undergoing surgery and would be out of work for six weeks. HMC contends that Plaintiff was not placed on disability leave because Plaintiff was not eligible for fringe benefits due to his probationary employment status.
On January 28, 2009, Plaintiff received a phone call from Mr. Pruitt, who informed Plaintiff that he had been fired that morning. (Plf's Br. at 6). That same day, Ms. Lovett, mailed Plaintiff a "Record of Disciplinary Action," which stated:
On 1/06/09 you were placed on notice by me for an alleged violation of HMC SP Number 150 'Recording Conversation.' By your own admissions you had been recording conversations and in fact were observed recording our conversation in the presence of Local 814 representatives on 1/06/09. As a result of this investigation and due to two less than satisfactory ratings (attendance, accountability) on your third probationary evaluation, your employment is being terminated as an unsatisfactory probationary employee.
(Def's Br., Ex. P).
Plaintiff contends that his absences were not sufficient to warrant his termination. Plaintiff states that, of his five absences alleged by HMC during his third evaluation period, two of those absences were excused and he wasn't even scheduled for two more of the alleged absences. (Plf's Br. at 7).
On February 5, 2009, following the letter from Ms. Lovett, Plaintiff was evaluated for the period from October 15, 2008 through the date of his termination. Plaintiff was evaluated by Dorinda Broom, a white female, who gave Plaintiff a "questionable" score of 2.43 out of 5. (Def's Br. Ex. T). Ms. Broom gave the following reason for Plaintiff's poor score on his performance review:
HMC sent a "Notice of Termination" to Plaintiff on February 25, 2009. (Def's Br., Ex Q). Plaintiff filed an EEOC claim for race and disability discrimination on September 24, 2009. On April 21, 2010, Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file together with the affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts...
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