Wansley v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., CAUSE NO. 4:10-CV-149-CWR-FKB
| Decision Date | 30 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 4:10-CV-149-CWR-FKB |
| Parties | JEFFERY WAYNE WANSLEY PETITIONER v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; EMMITT L. SPARKMAN RESPONDENTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Before the Court are respondents' motion to dismiss, Docket No. 8, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 29, and Jeffery Wayne Wansley's objection to that Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 31.1 The Court appointed counsel for Wansley and held a hearing on November 2, 2012. Docket No. 43. Additional briefing was later submitted by the parties. Docket Nos. 52, 54-55. Having reviewed the facts, arguments, and applicable law, the Court is now ready to rule.
On December 8, 1999, Jeffery Wayne Wansley was convicted in the Circuit Court of Newton County, Mississippi, of selling $100 worth of cocaine within 1,500 feet of a church. Wansley v. State, 798 So. 2d 460, 461-62 (Miss. 2001); Docket No. 1, at 1. He was charged and convicted under two statutes. Docket No. 1, at 17 (Indictment), 19-20 (Judgment).
The first statute, Mississippi Code § 41-29-139(a)(1), makes it unlawful to sell cocaine, among other controlled substances. Wansley's violation of that statute carried a maximum 30-year term of imprisonment. Id. § 41-29-139(b)(1).
The second statute, Mississippi Code § 41-29-142(1), authorizes a defendant's sentence and fine to be doubled by the trial judge when a controlled substance is sold within 1,500 feet of a church, school, or other public facility. The relevant section reads as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (f) of Section 41-29-139 or in subsection (2) of this section, any person who violates or conspires to violate Section 41-29-139(a)(1), Mississippi Code of 1972, by selling, bartering, transferring, manufacturing,distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance, in or on, or within one thousand five hundred (1,500) feet of, a building or outbuilding which is all or part of a public or private elementary, vocational or secondary school, or any church, public park, ballpark, public gymnasium, youth center or movie theater or within one thousand (1,000) feet of, the real property comprising such public or private elementary, vocational or secondary school, or any church, public park, ballpark, public gymnasium, youth center or movie theater shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by the term of imprisonment or a fine, or both, of that authorized by Section 41-29-139(b) and, in the discretion of the court, may be punished by a term of imprisonment or a fine, or both, of up to twice that authorized by Section 41-29-139(b).
Id. (emphasis added). When a defendant's punishment is increased pursuant to this statute, it is referred to as a "sentence enhancement."
The jury found that Wansley had sold cocaine within 1,500 feet of a church. Docket No. 1, at 19-20 (Judgment). Accordingly, the second statute required Wansley to be punished in accordance with § 41-29-139(b), and then, "in the discretion of the court," permitted the trial judge to double that punishment. The trial judge sentenced Wansley to 30 years of imprisonment, the maximum term authorized under § 41-29-139(b). Id. No further sentence or fine was assessed.
Wansley's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Wansley, 798 So. 2d at 465. His state habeas petitions were denied. See Docket No. 11, at 4 (collecting petitions). A federal habeas petition also was denied. Wansley v. Sparkman, No. 4:02-cv-150, Docket No. 18 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2003).
During his federal habeas proceeding, Wansley argued, inter alia, that the second statute's authorization of sentence enhancements for selling drugs near churches violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. The Mississippi Attorney General's Office responded to this argument as follows:
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b) provides that upon conviction for the sale of cocaine, a person may be sentenced to not more than thirty (30) years. Mississippi law also provides that a sentence for the sale of cocaine may be enhanced under four enhancement statutes, one of which is § 41-29-142. Section 41-29-142 provides for discretionary sentencing of up to twice that authorized for sale of controlled substances within certain distances of schools, churches and other public buildings and locations. The law only gives judges discretion as to whether to apply the enhancement statute - lower court judges are not mandated to double the punishmentunder § 41-29-142. Furthermore, as a general rule, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum period allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. Most importantly, however, the enhancement provision of § 41-29-142 was not applied here. Although indicted under both § 41-29-139(b) and § 41-29-142, Wansley was sentenced to only thirty (30) years - the maximum allowed under § 41-29-139(b). The sentence was not doubled to sixty (60) years as provided for by § 41-29-142. Accordingly, because the enhancement provision was not applied here, Wansley's claim has no merit.
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, in Wansley v. Sparkman, No. 4:02-cv-150, Docket No. 4, at 22-23 (S.D. Miss. July 12, 2002) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). The pleading was signed by Special Assistant Attorney General Jo Anne M. McLeod. Id. at 26. Special Assistant Attorney General Jerrolyn M. Owens was listed on the document as co-counsel.2 Id.
The United States Magistrate Judge assigned to the case denied all of Wansley's claims for relief. See Report and Recommendation, in Wansley v. Sparkman, No. 4:02-cv-150, Docket No. 16, at 12-13 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 15, 2003). The District Judge agreed and adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in full. See Order, in Wansley v. Sparkman, No. 4:02-cv-150, Docket No. 18 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2003). Several years passed.
A document attached to the present habeas petition shows that as of April 28, 2009, the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) calculated Wansley's sentence as one without any sentence enhancement. Docket No. 1, at 21. The record, a time sheet printed on May 22, 2009, showed a "Parole Date" of April 7, 2008. Id. A later time sheet, computed on July 10, 2009, and printed on July 14, 2009, showed the same thing. Id. at 22.
The time sheets likely computed a parole date because Mississippi law generally allows non-violent offenders with 30-year sentences to be eligible for parole after service of at least 10 years' time. See Miss. Code § 47-7-3(1). Wansley was approaching 10 years' time and was eligible or soon eligible for parole. If an inmate is parole-eligible, the decision of whether or not to grant parole belongs to the Mississippi Parole Board. See Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. 1990) ().
Approximately two weeks later, however, on July 29, 2009, MDOC recalculated and reprinted Wansley's time sheet. Docket No. 1, at 23. The new calculation showed that Wansley had been sentenced to an "Enhanced Penalty." Id. No parole date was shown on this new document, probably because Mississippi law does not permit inmates convicted of "felonies with enhanced penalties" to be paroled. Miss. Code § 47-7-3(1)(h). As a result of MDOC's recalculation, Wansley was no longer deemed eligible for the parole vote he once thought was forthcoming.
On September 23, 2009, Wansley filed a grievance with MDOC's Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) explaining his sentence and alleging that the enhancement first appeared after he applied for parole.3 Docket No. 8-3, at 1. MDOC denied the request in November 2009. Id. at 6. Wansley's petition for relief recited that when that was denied, he filed a second step grievance, which received no response, and then a third step, which apparently also received no response. Docket No. 1, at 7. MDOC denies receiving either of those steps. Docket No. 8, at 5.
Also in November 2009, Wansley filed a motion for clarification in the Mississippi Supreme Court. Docket No. 8-4, at 1. He again described the parole-eligibility problem and asked for either the court or the Attorney General's office "to clarify this sentence discrepancy." Id. at 2. His motion was denied as "not well taken" on December 30, 2009. Docket No. 8-5. No explanation was given.
Wansley also moved for clarification from the court that sentenced him: the Circuit Court of Newton County.4 Docket No. 1, at 7. The Circuit Judge denied his request, finding that Wansley was required to obtain leave from the Mississippi Supreme Court before filing such a motion. Docket No. 8-6, at 1. That order was dated June 17, 2010.
In September 2010, Wansley filed the present petition for habeas relief. Docket No. 1. He claimed that MDOC had erroneously denied him the right to seek parole.5 Id. at 4. He sought parole or eligibility for parole, as well as damages for his allegedly extended incarceration. Id. at 4-5, 13-15.
After a number of filings and motions,6 the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation proposing to grant the State's motion to dismiss. Docket No. 29. The matter came before the undersigned on Wansley's objection to that Report and Recommendation. Docket No. 31. The Court appointed counsel, held a hearing, and took post-hearing briefing.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's claim:
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