Wanttaja v. Wanttaja

• Decision Date: 14 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140436.,20140436.
• Citation: 873 N.W.2d 911
• Parties: Todd A. WANTTAJA, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Caroline L. WANTTAJA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

873 N.W.2d 911

Todd A. WANTTAJA, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Caroline L. WANTTAJA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20140436.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Jan. 14, 2016.

Elizabeth A. Ebert, Dickinson, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.

Craig M. Richie, Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Caroline Wanttaja appeals from a divorce judgment and from an order denying her motion to correct a clerical error or for a new trial. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to correct a clerical error or for a new trial to address the parties' medical bills. We conclude, however, the court erred as a matter of law in failing to address child support in the divorce proceedings and abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I

[¶ 2] Todd Wanttaja and Caroline Wanttaja were married in 2008 in Fargo and have one child together, born in 2003. The parties separated sometime in mid–2012. In June 2012, Caroline Wanttaja applied for and received public assistance, assigning medical support rights to the State. In November 2012, the State, through the Fargo Regional Child Support Unit, brought an action in Cass County on behalf of Caroline Wanttaja against Todd Wanttaja, seeking child support for the minor child.

[¶ 3] In January 2013, Todd Wanttaja commenced this action for divorce in Dunn County. Before the divorce action, Todd Wanttaja had moved to Killdeer, North Dakota, and Caroline Wanttaja relocated with their child to Savage, Minnesota. While the divorce action in Dunn County was pending, the parties entered into a stipulation for judgment in the Cass County child support action in March 2013, and the Cass County district court entered a judgment in April 2013 requiring Todd Wanttaja to pay Caroline Wanttaja child support.

[¶ 4] In October 2013, the district court in Dunn County held a trial in the divorce action. In January 2014, the court issued a decision addressing the parties' property and debt distribution, awarding Caroline Wanttaja spousal support, denying her request for attorney fees, and granting Todd Wanttaja parenting time with their child. Although the parties did not dispute an award of primary residential responsibility to Caroline Wanttaja, the Dunn County district court held it was without jurisdiction to modify the April 2013 child support award entered in the Cass County district court. Todd Wanttaja moved the Dunn County district court for clarification, asserting the court had not addressed the majority of the parties' marital debts and requesting the court identify how the marital debt should be divided.

[¶ 5] The district court clarified the marital property and debt distribution, allocating the marital debt equally between the parties, and issued an order for judgment in March 2014. Before entry of judgment, however, Caroline Wanttaja objected to the court's findings and conclusions, including the amount of the parties' medical debts, the denial of attorney fees, and the failure to award child support. She also offered evidence regarding various medical bills. In May 2014, the court overruled her objections and issued revised findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment. Caroline Wanttaja moved for reconsideration, again raising issues regarding the parties' medical debt, child support jurisdiction, and attorney fees. The court denied her motion for reconsideration.

[¶ 6] After judgment was entered, Caroline Wanttaja moved for a new trial on the same issues. The court denied her new trial motion.

II

[¶ 7] Caroline Wanttaja argues the district court erred in failing to grant her post-trial motions to correct a clerical error or other errors regarding the amount of the parties' medical bills. She also argues the court erred in failing to grant her a new trial because the court mistakenly believed the parties had stipulated to the amount of their medical bills.

[¶ 8] Section 14–05–24(1), N.D.C.C., requires the district court to make an equitable distribution of the parties' property and debts. "After including all of the marital assets and debts, the district court must apply the Ruff–Fischer guidelines to divide the property."

Eberle v. Eberle, 2010 ND 107, ¶ 19, 783 N.W.2d 254 ; see also Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 852–53 (N.D.1966) ; Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 784, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1952). "Once all property and debts of the parties are included, a trial court may consider which of the parties has incurred particular debts, and the purposes for which those debts were incurred, in determining an equitable allocation of the responsibility for repayment." Schiff v. Schiff, 2013 ND 142, ¶ 14, 835 N.W.2d 810 (quoting Neidviecky v. Neidviecky, 2003 ND 29, ¶ 11, 657 N.W.2d 255 ).

[¶ 9] The district court's distribution of debts presents a finding of fact that will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See Mertz v. Mertz, 2015 ND 13, ¶ 25, 858 N.W.2d 292. "[F]indings of fact are presumptively correct." Hunt v. Hunt, 2010 ND 231, ¶ 8, 791 N.W.2d 164. The party challenging a court's finding of fact on appeal has the burden of showing that a finding is clearly erroneous. Rebel v. Rebel, 2013 ND 116, ¶ 17, 833 N.W.2d 442. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Id.

[¶ 10] Caroline Wanttaja has not raised an issue on appeal regarding the district court's analysis under the Ruff–Fischer guidelines in distributing the parties' property and debts. Rather, she contends the court erred in denying her new trial motion on grounds of a clerical error or other error regarding the amount of the parties' medical bills or in finding the parties' had stipulated to medical debt in the amount of $3,000.

[¶ 11] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), a district court may correct "a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record." See Kukla v. Kukla, 2013 ND 192, ¶ 11, 838 N.W.2d 434. Thus, "[a] court may correct, [under] Rule 60(a), errors created by oversight or omission that cause the judgment to fail to reflect what was intended at time of trial." Kukla, at ¶ 11 (quoting Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d 805, 811 (N.D.1983) ). Additionally, in Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams Co. Constr., 2014 ND 160, ¶ 22, 851 N.W.2d 164 (quoting Gisvold v. Windbreak, Inc., 2007 ND 54, ¶ 5, 730 N.W.2d 597 (citations omitted)), this Court addressed a new trial motion based on insufficient evidence, stating:

A motion for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(6) based on a claim of insufficient evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. A district court's discretionary authority to decide a motion for a new trial is different from this Court's authority on review, which is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasonable determination, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law.

[¶ 12] Here, the district court judgment held Todd Wanttaja responsible for $1,500 in medical expenses, which the court found was one-half of Caroline Wanttaja's medical bills incurred during the marriage. Caroline Wanttaja argues the district court mistakenly believed the parties had stipulated to $3,000 as the amount of medical bills. She also contends on appeal that the district court made a "clerical" or "other" error when the court stated her medical bills were $3,000, because her medical bills actually totaled $21,518.10. She also submitted additional evidence with her various post-trial motions to support a higher amount.

[¶ 13] Although she concedes on appeal that some of her claimed medical bills are for her other children, Caroline Wanttaja asserts the total amount of medical debt incurred during the marriage for her and for their child is $14,763.05. Todd Wanttaja responds, however, that since the amount of medical expenses was in dispute, he agreed to stipulate at trial that only $3,000 of alleged medical bills had been incurred during the marriage. He further contends no evidence offered or received at trial supports the amount claimed by Caroline Wanttaja.

[¶ 14] In denying Caroline Wanttaja's new trial motion, the district court specifically explained it had not mistakenly ordered $3,000 in medical bills, but rather Caroline Wanttaja had not presented "sufficient evidence" at trial to find more than the $3,000 in medical debt agreed upon by Todd Wanttaja. The court refused to allow Caroline Wanttaja to submit additional evidence after trial as part of her post-trial motions to support a higher amount of medical bills incurred during the marriage. Based on its explanation, we are able to understand the basis of the court's decision to deny Caroline Wanttaja's post-trial motions.

[¶ 15] At trial, the district court received a property and debt listing under N.D.R.Ct. 8.3 into evidence. That document, which Todd Wanttaja signed, listed a debt of $23,613.35 to a collection agency but acknowledged only $3,000 marital debt as "medical." During trial, Caroline Wanttaja testified the total medical bills incurred during the marriage was $23,613.35—the amount being sought by the collection agency. She testified the medical bills had been incurred during the marriage because she had been "on medical assistance [before the marriage] so they covered any thing [sic]." The court also received an exhibit that Caroline Wanttaja offered into evidence, showing...