Warboys v. Proulx

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Hall
• Citation: Warboys v. Proulx, 303 F.Supp.2d 111 (D. Conn. 2004)
• Decision Date: 04 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 302CV1456JCH.,CIV.A. 302CV1456JCH.
• Parties: Stacy WARBOYS, Plaintiff, v. William PROULX, Town of East Hartford, and Mark Sirois, Defendants.

Page 111

303 F.Supp.2d 111

Stacy WARBOYS, Plaintiff, v. William PROULX, Town of East Hartford, and Mark Sirois, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 302CV1456JCH.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

February 4, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donald Edward Freeman, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.

Clayton S. Miller, Balaban Law Frim, Middletown, CT, Daniel C. DeMerchant, Howd & Ludorf, Jay T. DonFrancisco, Howd & Ludorf, Thomas R. Gerarde, Howd & Ludorf, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 24] AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]

HALL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stacy Warboys brings this section 1983 action against the Town of East Hartford in Connecticut and against one of its police officers, William Proulx, and its chief of police, Mark Sirois, in their individual and official capacities (collectively, "the defendants"). The lawsuit arises from an incident in which Proulx shot and killed Warboys' pitbull dog as it approached him and his police canine while they were attempting to track a fleeing suspect. The original complaint alleges state claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Proulx and indemnity against East Hartford, as well as federal causes of action, including a negligent supervision claim and due process claims. See Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 1], Complaint (attached). The defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to the entire complaint [Dkt. No. 17]. Warboys subsequently moved to amend his original complaint [Dkt. No. 24], by, among other things, adding a Fourth Amendment claim. For the reasons that follow, the court grants both motions.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following recitation presents the facts in the light most favorable to Warboys but notes any material factual disputes between the parties. On May 12, 2001, Officer Proulx and his trained police canine, Dakota, were tracking a fleeing car theft suspect. They were being assisted by two fellow officers, who were following as back-up. Dakota wore a tracking harness. The scent trail of the suspect led the police dog and the three officers to the rear parking area of 21 Linden Street, where they stopped to allow Dakota to identify a pool of scent,¹ possibly left by the suspect.

While in the rear of 21 Linden Street, Proulx saw a young male exiting the door of 25½ Linden Street, a neighboring multi-family residence. (The young man was later identified as Anthony Malave, the teenage brother of Warboys. Warboys, Blitz's owner, was not present during the incident.) Proulx advised the teenager to return to the residence for his own safety. The family's pet pit bull dog, Blitz, who weighed an estimated 90-100 lbs, then escaped through the opened door, at which point Malave made a failed attempt to grab Blitz. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl's Mem. Opp.") [Dkt. 22], Ex. D: Malave Dep., at 17. One of the accompanying officers yelled, "Pit bull!" As the dog moved toward Proulx and his canine, Malave yelled to the officers something to the effect of: "[H]e won't hurt you." Proulx unholstered his service pistol and fired one shot into the dog's head, killing him. Blitz was shot approximately 30 feet from the door of 25½ Linden Street and approximately 5-10 feet from Officer Proulx.² The parties also agree that incident occurred very quickly, with not more than approximately 5 seconds elapsing from the time the pit bull ran from the house until Proulx shot him.³

For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the court accepts the testimony offered by Malave that, rather than barking or growling, Blitz emerged from the house "in a friendly mood," "with his tail wagging." Pl's Mem. Opp., Ex. G: Malave Dep., at 20. The court further accepts the testimony offered by Warboys that Blitz was a gentle, loving pet that had never attacked an animal or a person. See, e.g., Pl's Mem. Opp., Ex. B: Lois Warboys Dep., at 22.

Warboys commenced this action by filing the original complaint, dated July 18, 2002, in Connecticut state court. However, on August 20, 2002, the defendants together removed the case to this court, alleging federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The Amended Complaint, dated June 18, 2003 [Dkt. No. 24], alleged seven counts, only two of which include federal claims: 1) a state law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Proulx; 2) a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Proulx; 3) Fourth Amendment claims⁴ and due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Proulx; 4) a state law indemnity claim against East Hartford, brought pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465 arising from Proulx's negligence; 5) a state law claim against Sirois for negligent supervision; 6) a second negligent supervision against Sirois, brought pursuant to section 1983; and 7) a second indemnity claim under Conn. Gen. Stats. § 7-465 against East Hartford based on Sirois' negligence. Warboys seeks compensatory damages as well as attorney's fees and costs under § 1983. In their Answer [Dkt. 12], the defendants assert a number of affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity.

On April 30, 2003, the defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to the entire complaint. However, on June 27, 2003, Warboys moved for leave to file an Amended Complaint [Dkt. 24], dated June 18, 2003, which adds a cause of action for unlawful seizure of Blitz under the Fourth Amendment and alters some descriptive language in the original complaint concerning the sped with which Blitz approached Proulx and his canine. The defendants have objected to the motion and request that the court deny leave to amend, citing the fact that the time for amending the pleadings has expired and arguing that they would suffer undue prejudice if the request were granted. See Objection to the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend ("Defs' Objection `to Motion to Amend") [Dkt. No. 26].

II. DISCUSSION

For the reasons stated below, the court grants Warboys' motion to amend the complaint. The court also grants in full the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all causes of action in the Amended Complaint. Because the court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Warboys' constitutional claims, it does not need to reach the qualified immunity defense raised by the defendants.⁵

A. Motion to Amend Complaint

The court grants Warboys' motion to amend the complaint. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a liberal policy in favor of allowing amendments. See generally Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Even if the time limit for amending the pleadings has expired, "Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend

`shall be freely given when justice so requires'; this mandate is to be heeded." Id. According to the Supreme Court in Foman,

[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be `freely given.'

Id. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. The defendants have not alleged bad faith, and the court concludes that allowing the amendment would not prejudice the defendants. As will be explained in more detail below, even if the court accepts the alterations in the language used in the complaint to describe the sped with which Blitz approached Proulx and his canine and also considers the new Fourth Amendment claim alleged in the Amended Complaint, a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to all claims is warranted. Thus, the court exercises its discretion and grants the motion to amend.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Legal Standard. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave. Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir.2000). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994)). In assessing the record to determine if such issues exist, all ambiguities must be resolved and all inferences drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 721 (2d Cir.1994). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When reasonable persons applying the proper legal standards could differ in their responses to the questions raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question is best left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2000).

Once the moving party has met its burden, in order to defeat the motion the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor, Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000). A party may not rely "on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Lipton v. The Nature Company, 71 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting ...