Ward's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 19 August 1954
• Citation: 273 P.2d 601,127 Cal.App.2d 207
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re WARD'S ESTATE. COLEMAN v. WALKER. Civ. 20114.

Page 601

273 P.2d 601

127 Cal.App.2d 207

In re WARD'S ESTATE COLEMAN v. WALKER.

Civ. 20114.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Aug. 19, 1954.

Spiegel, Turner & Wolfson and Albert A. Spiegel, Santa Monica, for appellant.

Carl B. Sturzenacker, Los Angeles, for respondent Robert E. Walker.

McCOMB, Justice.

From an order decreeing that respondent, Robert E. Walker, is the person entitled to distribution of the estate of Herbert W. Ward, deceased, entered after hearing on appellant's petition for a determination of heirship, appellant (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) appeals.

Facts: Herbert W. Ward died intestate on May 14, 1949. His sole heir was his father, James R. Hickman. At the time of his death he owned, among other things, at least a 50% interest in a corporation known as Ward Enterprises, Inc. A suit is now pending in the superior court of Los Angeles County to determine the ownership of the other 50% interest. One of the claimants to the remaining 50% interest is the estate of Herbert W. Ward.

In February of 1951, Mr. Hickman assigned all of his right, title and interest in and to the estate of Herbert W. Ward in the State of California to Ward Enterprises, Inc.

In April, 1952, Mr. Hickman for a valuable consideration executed an assignment of his interest in the estate of petitioner. At about the same time Ward Enterprises, Inc. purportedly assigned its interest in the estate of Herbert W. Ward to respondent. January 14, 1953, petitioner filed in the probate court of Los Angeles County a petition for determination of heirship in the estate of Herbert W. Ward, deceased. On March 6, 1953, the petition for determination of heirship was called for hearing and respondent's attorney said: 'I have not filed a petition, so far as Walker is concerned. I expected Reinhaus would take care of this and they have not done so, apparently, and if it does appear notice is necessary before the termination of this proceeding I will then ask the court to file such notice.'

Thereafter petitioner objected to respondent's being heard for the reason that he had not complied with the provision of section 1080 of the Probate Code by filing a written statement of his interest in the estate. Over petitioner's objection the probate judge proceeded to hear the matter and enter the decree from which the present appeal is taken.

Questions: First: Did the probate judge err in taking evidence relative to respondent's claim to decedent's estate because respondent had failed to 'file a written statement setting forth his interest in the state?'

Yes. Section 1080 of the Probate Code reads in part as follows: 'When the time to file or present claims against the estate has expired, and a petition for final distribution has not been filed, * * * any person claiming to be an heir of the decedent or entitled to distribution of the estate or any part thereof may file a petition setting forth his claim * * * and praying that the court determine who are entitled to distribution of the estate. * * * Any person may appear and file a written statement setting forth his interest in the estate. No other pleadings are necessary and the allegations of each claimant shall be deemed to be denied by each of the other claimants to the extent that they conflict with any claim of the latter.'

The procedure outlined in the foregoing section is clear. It means exactly what it says; that any person claiming an interest in the estate adversely to the petitioner, in order to have a judicial determination thereof, must file a written statement setting forth his interest in the estate.

Neither counsel has directed our attention to any authorities construing this section since its enactment in 1931. However, prior to the enactment of the present section of the Probate Code, section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure had provisions similar to those in the present section 1080 of the Probate Code, and the appellate courts of this state have held that in the absence of the filing of a document setting forth the facts constituting a party's claim to heirship he could not be heard to contest the right of another claimant. (Blythe v. Ayres, 102 Cal. 254, 260, 36 P. 522; O'Day v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 540, 543, 116 P.2d 621.)

In Blythe v. Ayres, supra, 102 Cal. at page 260, 36 P. at page 524, our Supreme Court said: 'No party has a standing in the trial court unless he has averred 'his claim of heirship,' etc., and has set forth the facts constituting such claim; and he would not be there heard to contest the right of another claimant, if he did not set up any right in himself.'

Again in O'Day v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.2d at page 543, 116 P.2d at page 623, it was declared: 'Former section 1664 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was enacted in 1885, and upon which sections 1080-1082 of the Probate Code are based, outlined a detailed procedure for the conduct of heirship hearings, including provision for notice, appearance, entry of defaults, limitation of time for filing pleadings, appeals, costs, and other matters. Upon enactment of the Probate Code in 1931, most of these detailed items of procedure were omitted from the new sections 1080-1082. That fact, however, is not indicative of an intention to dispense with these procedural steps in hearings to determine heirship, but rather of an intention that essential matters of procedure not expressly covered by the language of sections 1080-1082 should be governed by the rules of practice for civil actions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, made applicable by sections 1230-1233, supra. Other considerations compel that conclusion. * * *

'Such is a proceeding to determine heirship, which is in essence a proceeding in rem but also constitutes, to a certain extent, an adversary contest. First of all the claimant to heirship must take affirmative action to establish his own relationship to the decedent and his right, flowing from that relationship, to inherit the estate, the res. Second, he may then contest the claims of other alleged heirs in the same or a closer degree of relationship. When conflicting claims are involved the proceeding becomes an adversary one and partakes of the nature of a civil action. Estate of Kasson, supra, [141 Cal. 33, 74 P. 436]; Estate of Friedman, 173 Cal. 411, 160 P. 237, 238. This dual character was recognized in the Friedman case, which was a proceeding to determine the heirship and succession to the estate of a decedent, where the court said:

"Each person filing a complaint or answer in the proceeding, and setting up title to the whole estate by a distinct line of kinship is necessarily an actor for himself and against all other persons who also claim the entire estate. His claim is antagonistic to that of all the others, and the claim of each of the others is antagonistic to him. With respect to every other claimant so alleging an interest, the case...