Ward's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 06 July 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 39818,39818 |
| Citation | 178 Kan. 366,285 P.2d 1081 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Charles H. WARD, Deceased. Daisy, R. WARD, Appellant, v. C. G. DENNIS, Administrator, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where it appears that an antenuptial contract was understandingly made and freely executed, and where there is an absence of anything showing fraud or deceit, the mere fact the intended husband did not disclose in detail to the intended wife the nature, extent and value of his property will not, of itself, invalidate the contract or raise a presumption of fraudulent concealment, and if from a consideration of all the facts concerning the situation of the parties, such as their respective ages family conditions, property rights, etc., at the time the contract was made the trial court concludes the intended wife was not overreached, the contract should be sustained (following In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546, 119 P.2d 483).
2. Where party voluntarily signs antenuptial contract and thereafter seeks to refute it on ground that its execution had been obtained by fraud, such fraud must be made to appear clearly before the contract may be declared invalid.
3. Determination of issuable facts is no concern of an appellate court provided there is sufficient evidence on which the judgment is based, and judgment on facts made by trial court will not be disturbed upon appeal unless all competent and credible evidence constrains a different conclusion.
4. A written antenuptial contract signed by the parties bound thereby imports consideration. G.S.1949, 16-107.
5. Marriage is a valuable consideration sufficient to support an antenuptial contract.
6. The record examined in a proceeding to determine the validity of an antenuptial contract, and held, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment in holding the contract valid.
J. Donald Lysaught, Kansas City, argued the cause, and John William Wood, Liberal, and Arthur J. Stanley, Arthur J. Stanley, Jr., J. E. Schroeder, Lee E. Weeks, Leonard O. Thomas, and William H. Pringle, Kansas City, were with him on the briefs, for appellant.
Bert J. Vance, Garden City, argued the cause, and C. E. Vance and A. M. Fleming, Garden City, Charles H. Fleming, Scott City, and C. G. Dennis, Sublette, pro se, were with him on the briefs, for appellee.
This was an action involving the validity of an antenuptial contract and to determine the rights of the surviving widow in the assets of the estate of her deceased husband. This appeal involves only the validity of the contract. The essential facts may be summarized as follows: On February 20, 1953, the deceased, Charles H. Ward, and appellant executed an antenuptial contract, at which time both were 72 years of age and each had several living children by prior marriage. The terms of the contract are not in dispute. The pertinent portion reads:
'* * * Now, Therefore, This indenture witnesseth, that each of the said C. H. Ward and Daisy R. Simonson [Daisy R. Ward] hereby agree, covenant and declare it to be his and her desire that during their marriage each of them shall be and continue completely independent of the other as regards the enjoyment and disbursement of all property owned by them or either of them at the commencement of the marriage, or coming to either of them by gift or inheritance; and each of them hereby agrees and covenants with the other in view and consideration of said marriage that so far as legally possible by their private act and agreement all the property belonging to either of them at the commencement of the marriage or acquired by them by gift or inheritance during their marriage shall be held and enjoyed by him or her and be subject to his or her disposition as his or her separate property in the same manner as if the said proposed marriage had never been celebrated. * * *
'And the parties hereby specifically further agree and covenant to and with each other that upon the death of either, the survivor shall not have and will not assert any claim, interest, estate or title under the laws of any state, because of such survivorship, in or to the property, real, personal, or mixed, of which such deceased party shall die seized or possessed and which was owned by such deceased party at the beginning of the marriage or acquired by him or her by gift or inheritance during the marriage, and such survivor hereby relinquishes to the heirs, administrators, executors and assigns of such deceased party any and all of his or her claim, distributive share, interest, estate or title that he or she would be entitled to as the surviving husband or wife respectively; and agrees upon demand to make, execute and deliver to the heirs, executors and assigns of such deceased party any and all acquittances, assignments, assurances, deeds, instruments and receipts, that may be necessary and required to effectually carry out and make effective his or her agreements herein contained.
* * *
* * *
'Party of the first part intends to purchase and pay for out of his present fortune a home for the parties and if party of the second part survives party of the first part she shall have the use of the home and the right to occupy the same during the remainder of her life and at her death it shall go to the heirs or devisees of party of the first part.'
The parties were married February 22, 1953. They lived in an apartment until April 7, at which time they moved into a trailer house purchased by deceased and located on lots owned by him. They were looking for a house at the time of Charles' death, May 15, 1953. Proceedings were filed in the probate court of Seward county for appointment of an administrator of the estate of Charles H. Ward, and appellee C. G. Dennis was so appointed. During the course of administration of the estate, appellant Daisy Ward filed her petition in the probate court against the estate alleging the execution of the antenuptial contract, but asserting that the deceased at the time the contract was executed failed to make a fair disclosure of his property and to deal with petitioner with utmost fairness, candor and sincerity, and that the provisions made for the petitioner in the contract were unreasonable, inadequate and disproportionate; that she entered into the contract not understanding and without knowledge that it was unjust and inequitable; that the deceased concealed from her his true worth, and overreached and misled her into signing the contract; that he did not exercise good faith when he asked the petitioner to sign the contract, and he failed to comply with the provisions set forth in the contract during his lifetime; that the deceased died intestate and she, as widow, elected to take her statutory share of one-half of the property, and asked that the antenuptial contract be set aside and she be permitted to take her statutory allowance under the law of intestate succession, and for such other and further relief as might be equitable and just.
The administrator and the heirs at law of the deceased filed their answer to appellant's claim, asserting the contract had been freely and fairly entered into by deceased in his lifetime; that the terms were reasonable, and the agreement was a valid and subsisting contract. Subsequent to the marriage, deceased purchased the lots and trailer in question, and the parties were residing in the trailer house at the time of the death of Charles. The answer further alleged appellant was entitled to occupy the trailer house as her home as long as she lived, and denied she was entitled to any portion of the estate of the deceased, and prayed that the contract be adjudged valid and binding, and appellant be declared to have no interest in the property of the deceased.
Appellant replied to the answer by way of a general denial. On the issues thus framed by the parties, the case was certified to the district court for trial. It was stipulated that the antenuptial agreement in controversy was executed by the parties on February 20, 1953; that the parties were married, and Charles H. Ward died a resident of Seward county on the dates stated; that the property occupied by the parties at the time of the death of Charles was worth...
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