Ward v. Benton County, Civil Action No. 3:99CV060-B-A (N.D. Miss. 12/13/2000)

• Decision Date: 13 December 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:99CV060-B-A.
• Parties: DARNELL F. WARD PLAINTIFF, v. BENTON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JAMES WILLIAMS, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Constable of Benton County, Mississippi; UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO.; SAM ALLEN; and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1, 2, and 3 DEFENDANTS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

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DARNELL F. WARD PLAINTIFF, v. BENTON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JAMES WILLIAMS, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Constable of Benton County, Mississippi; UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO.; SAM ALLEN; and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1, 2, and 3 DEFENDANTS.

Civil Action No. 3:99CV060-B-A.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Western Division.

December 13, 2000.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on motion of the defendants James Williams and Benton County for summary judgment. In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including an order for entry of final judgment on any or all of the plaintiff's claims. After review of the pleadings and briefs of the parties, the court finds as follows:

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case have been set out in this court's Memorandum Opinion of March 13, 2000, and need not be reiterated here. Two of the named defendants in the present action — James Williams and Benton County — have moved for summary judgment. Both defendants argue that the plaintiff has provided no evidence to the court that would created a genuine issue as to any material fact. Benton County argues that it cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions allegedly taken by James Williams when the plaintiff has provided no evidence that Williams' alleged actions were done pursuant to a custom or policy of Benton County. Williams argues that he cannot be held liable in his individual capacity because he is entitled to qualified immunity. The court will address both parties' arguments in turn.¹

II. DISCUSSION

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5^th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5^th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5^th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5^th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5^th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5^th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5^th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5^th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).

B. BENTON COUNTY/ WILLIAMS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

The plaintiff named in his complaint both Benton County and Constable Williams in his official capacity. The plaintiff's suit against defendant Williams in his official capacity is treated as a claim against Benton County, the governmental entity of which Williams is an employee, representative, or official. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5^th Cir. 1996). A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S 658, 694 (1978). A governmental entity cannot be liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Id. See also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5^th Cir. 1979). Official policy is defined as:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the county lawmaking officers or be an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of county officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents county policy. Accrual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the county or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5^th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5^th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself, and show that his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5^th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must establish that the governmental entity through its deliberate conduct was the moving force behind the injury or harm suffered and must establish a direct causal link between the governmental entity's action and the deprivation of a federally protected right. Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997). Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the governmental entity's policy, and not the policy of an individual official. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769.

In the present action, aside from the allegations surrounding the specific incident at issue involving Constable Williams and the plaintiff, there is absolutely no evidence of an official policy or custom of Benton County that led to the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. However, it is well established that a county may be held liable for the illegal or unconstitutional actions of its final policymakers themselves as they engage in the setting of goals and the determination of how those goals will be achieved. Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5^th Cir. 1990). A single unconstitutional decision is sufficient to create county liability if the decision maker has been given final policymaking authority by virtue of his office. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Consequently, the court is faced with the troublesome issue of whether an episodic act of an elected official is chargeable to the county as its policy under Monell. Whether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82. An employee, agency, or board of a governmental entity is not a policymaker unless the governmental entity, through its lawmakers, has delegated exclusive policymaking authority to that employee, agency, or board and cannot review that action or decision of the employee, agency, or board. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Worsham v. City of Pasadena 881 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (5^th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the determinative issue before the court is whether a constable is seen as a policymaker under Mississippi law.

To determine whether a constable is a policymaker under Mississippi law, the court looks first to Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107 (5^th Cir. 1985). The facts in Rhode are strikingly similar to those in the present action. In Rhode, the defendant was a constable sued for allegedly violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights when he arrested him following a high speed chase. Rhode, 776 F.2d at 108. A jury returned a verdict, finding that the constable had deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights while apprehending and arresting him. Only the county appealed. The county argued that it should not be held liable for the episodic acts of the constable because the constable was not a policymaker under Texas law. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury decision, stating "[w]e are unpersuaded that a constable of a Texas county precinct occupies a relationship to the County such that his edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official county policy." Id.

The court is aware that the issue presented is determined by looking to state law. However, the court also finds the reasoning behind the Rhode decision in which Texas law was applied to be persuasive. The characteristics of a Texas constable examined by the Fifth Circuit in making their decision in Rhode are no different from the characteristics of a constable in Mississippi. After examining the duties of a Texas constable, the Rhode court wrote:

The...