Ward v. Capra, 1:17-CV-0704

• Decision Date: 30 May 2019
• Docket Number: 1:17-CV-0704
• Parties: Langsden Ward, Petitioner, v. Michael Capra, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Langsden Ward, Petitioner, v. Michael Capra, Respondent.

1:17-CV-0704

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 30, 2019

Not for Publication

Opinion & Order

ROSS, United States District Judge:

The petitioner in this action is seeking a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his state-court conviction was tainted by (1) the trial judge's refusal to allow petitioner to obtain substitute counsel, (2) an improper jury instruction regarding the reasonable-doubt standard, and (3) the erroneous admission of prior-bad-acts evidence. Under the limited review allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, I find that none of petitioner's objections rise to the level of a violation of his constitutional rights, and therefore I deny his petition.

BACKGROUND

Proceedings Before the State Trial Court

Petitioner, Langsden Ward, was convicted at trial in New York Supreme Court of two counts of predatory sexual assault, one count of second-degree rape, three counts of third-degree rape, three counts of third-degree criminal sexual act, one count of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Trial Tr. 696:22-698:25, ECF No. 9-7. He now petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated at trial. See Pet. 16, ECF No. 1. Rather than recount the entire factual background of Ward's case, I recite below only the facts salient to his petition.

On March 26, 2012, on the eve of trial, the trial court held a Sandoval hearing.¹ At the outset of the hearing, Ward's trial counsel, Judah Maltz, stated: "Judge, I think my client has a little problem with me now. He just told me he doesn't want to talk to me. Disagreeable and doesn't want to communicate with me now. So I'm going to ask the Court to address the issue." Sandoval Hr'g Tr. 4:12-16, ECF No. 9-3. Ward then told the judge: "I don't want him anymore. First and foremost not helping me at all. I don't see myself even surviving this jungle right here with him even representing me." Id. at 4:19-22. The judge informed Ward that he "ha[d] the right to hire any attorney that he wishes to hire to represent him," to which Ward interjected, "[n]ot going to happen." Id. at 5:3-5. The trial judge continued: "But [you've] been represented by several different attorneys already.² I am not going to relieve Mr. Maltz from representation and assign you a new attorney." Id. at 5:6-8.

Ward and the trial judge then engaged in a lengthy colloquy regarding Ward's representation:

THE DEFENDANT: I am putting it on the record, I don't want him as a lawyer.

THE COURT: You can also proceed . . . by yourself, if you wish, as well. You can proceed pro se and represent yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to proceed with him. And I'm going to tell you, I'm not a lawyer or nothing like that. But I think I can do better than him.

THE COURT: The alternatives that you have, Mr. Ward, are either to represent yourself in this matter, to hire your own counsel to represent you; or if you wish to represent yourself, I will have Mr. Maltz remain as legal adviser to represent you during the course of the trial.

THE DEFENDANT: First and foremost, like I said, I'm not a lawyer. You know what I'm saying?

THE COURT: And that's why I am going to advise you, you should not represent yourself in this matter, because the stakes in this case are extremely high.

Mr. Maltz is an extremely able attorney. . . . So I would recommend that you stay with Mr. Maltz.

I'm not going to assign you a new lawyer given that you have been through several lawyers in this matter already.³

So I will not prevent you from representing yourself if you wish to do that, but I suggest that you allow Mr. Maltz to conduct your representation in this matter.

THE DEFENDANT: So you're forcing me to have him.

THE COURT: I'm not forcing you to have him. I am indicating to you that you can hire a lawyer or that you can represent yourself . . . .

But I am not going to assign you a new Court-appointed attorney. . . .

So you can either proceed with Mr. Maltz, or . . . you can represent yourself in this matter. Now, how do you wish to proceed?

THE DEFENDANT: You're forcing me, like I said, to put on the record, you're forcing me to have him. And I don't want him.

THE COURT: Then you wish to represent yourself; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't wish to represent myself.

THE COURT: Then I will allow Mr. Maltz to continue to represent you in this matter.

THE DEFENDANT: Like I said, I'll put on the record, no disrespect to you, but the last Judge said the same thing about the last lawyer, and the last lawyer called me an asshole. And no disrespect, all kind of false stuff like these attorneys and whatever, and came out here and said I was the aggressor, and the last Judge said the same thing you said, just with him.

This is where I am at now facing a hundred years to life for—THE COURT: For the record, you don't wish to represent yourself in this matter?

. . . .

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't wish to have him either.

THE COURT: That's fine.

Id. at 5:9-7:25. The trial judge then proceeded with the hearing. See id. at 7:25-8:9.

Later in the hearing, the trial judge inquired whether, in connection with the criminal-possession-of-a-weapon charge, Ward would admit to a prior felony conviction, thus obviating the state's need—and ability—to introduce evidence of that prior conviction at trial. Id. at 13:17-15:8. After discussing the issue with Ward, the trial judge said, "I'll give you a moment to discuss it with Mr. Maltz, and then I will ask you if you admit or deny the conviction." Id. at 16:18-20. Ward responded: "No disrespect; I am not talking to him. I'm not getting involved with him." Id. at 16:21-22. Ward then admitted his prior felony conviction. Id. at 16:25-17:8.

At trial, the underage victims of Ward's misconduct, P.S. and R.P., were two of the principal witnesses. The allegations against Ward included that he had had sex with both P.S. and R.P. when the two were fourteen and fifteen years old, respectively, and that he had done so as part of their initiation into his "gang." See, e.g., Trial Tr. 278:5-279:25, ECF No. 9-5.

On direct examination, P.S. testified that one day Ward "tried to hit [R.P.] on her neck" and threatened "to shoot" R.P. Id. at 324:8-21. Trial counsel objected to this testimony, but the trial judge overruled the objection, stating, "This is according to what she heard." Id. at 324:13-15. P.S. also testified that Ward once "said that he tried to kill somebody" in Florida, and she testified that that led her to believe that she would be harmed if she did not join Ward's "gang." Id. at 328:5-23. Trial counsel again made an objection, which was again overruled. Id. at 328:13-14. Finally, on redirect, when the prosecutor asked P.S. why she had had sex with Ward, trial counsel made an objection that was overruled, and P.S. answered,"Because the things that he said and the way that I had seen him treat [R.P.] before." Id. at 376:24-377:4.

At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on the law. Relevant here is the instruction that the judge delivered as to reasonable doubt:

Before a person may be convicted of a crime by the verdict of a jury the evidence must establish to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crime and that the defendant on trial is the person who committed it.

The standard of proof required by law in every criminal case is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard does not require that the People prove a defendant[']s guilt of charges beyond all possibility of doubt. It requires that the People establish the defendant[']s guilt of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . A doubt of a defendant[']s guilt to be a reasonable doubt must be a doubt for which some reason can be given. The doubt to be reasonable must therefore arise because of the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case or the lack of evidence in the case.

The doubt to be a reasonable doubt should be one which a reasonable person acting in a matter of this importance would entertain because of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. A doubt of guilt is not a reasonable doubt if instead of being based on the nature or the quality or lack of evidence in the case it's based on some guess or whim or speculation unrelated to the evidence in the case. Also a doubt of guilt is not a reasonable doubt if it's based on bias, prejudice or sympathy for a defendant or a desire by a juror to avoid a disagreeable duty.

A reasonable doubt as meant by law is an actual doubt. One which you are aware of having in your mind after having considered all the evidence in the case. If after doing so you then feel uncertain and not fully convinced of a defendant[']s guilt and you are also satisfied that in entertaining such a doubt that you are acting as a reasonable person should act in a matter of this importance[,] that is a reasonable doubt of which the defendant is entitled to the benefit. Whenever any such reasonable doubt exists as to any material element necessary for a conviction you must by law find a defendant not guilty.

On the other hand if no such reasonable doubt exists[,] if you are convinced of Mr. Ward[']s guilt of charges beyond a reasonable doubt[,] you must by law find him guilty.

Trial Tr. 643:21-645:12, ECF No. 9-6. Trial counsel stated that he did not object to the jury instruction. See Trial Tr. 669:1-3, ECF No. 9-7.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Id. at 696:22-698:7.

State Appellate Proceedings

Ward appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that "[b]ecause the court summarily denied [his] requests [for substitute counsel] without the requisite minimal inquiry, he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel" (Appellant Br. 44, ECF No. 9-1), that "the court impermissibly lightened the People's burden of proof by failing to...