Ward v. Chapman
| Decision Date | 31 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-12543 |
| Parties | MICHAEL C. WARD, Petitioner, v. WILLIS CHAPMAN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Hon. Arthur J. Tarnow
On August 26, 2019, Michigan prisoner Michael C. Ward filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Michigan Parole Board's denial of parole on the life sentence he is serving for a 1981 drug possession conviction. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401(2)(a)(1). Two of Petitioner's grounds for relief were dismissed. ECF No. 21. Respondent was ordered to respond to the remaining claim: that Petitioner was denied parole in retaliation for his continued litigation in Ward v. Wolfenbarger, Case No. 03-72701, which challenged the Michigan Department of Corrections' continued use of expunged convictions in security classification and parole board decisions.
Petitioner filed this separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus following the Court's suggestion in Petitioner's 2003 habeas case, most recently in an August 2019 order. Case No. 03-72701, ECF No. 355. Petitioner's continued incarceration on a now-obsolete statutory life term for a non-violent offense serves no purpose and does not enhance the public safety of Michigan - especially as he will be 71 years of age when next eligible for parole review. Nonetheless, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate his entitlement to habeas relief.
On June 22, 2020, the Court dismissed with prejudice Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 30. The Court also denied several pending motions, including Petitioner's motion for bond. Id. Petitioner has filed duplicate motions for reconsideration of that order and relief from judgment. ECF No. 40, 41.
Petitioner has experienced significant mail and docketing delays over the last few months due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, Petitioner filed a timely reply brief to Respondent's answer to Petitioner's motion for bond, under Local Rule 7.1(e)(1)(C), but itwas not received and docketed until June 22, 2020. ECF No. 32. Similarly, a timely reply brief to Respondent's answer to Petitioner's habeas petition was not received and docketed until June 23, 2020. ECF No. 33.
Petitioner also filed a "comprehensive" reply brief opposing Respondent's answer to his second habeas claim. ECF No. 37. That pleading was signed June 8, 2020, postmarked June 25, 2020, id. at PageID.56, and docketed July 7, 2020. A supporting volume of exhibits was received and docketed separately as ECF No. 36. Petitioner has also submitted supplemental authority, ECF No. 35; and two letters and a notice relating to the delayed pleadings. ECF Nos. 34, 38, 39.
More recently, the Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 44, which he requested be held in abeyance pending this order; letters, ECF Nos. 42, 47; a "Motion-Addendum/Supplement of Authority," ECF No. 46, which expands upon but largely duplicates his argument in ECF No. 35; and a motion for extension of time to file for a certificate of appealability and in forma pauperis status, and for reconsideration of the Court's denial of appointment of counsel. ECF No. 43. He also filed a motion requesting a conference and for appointment of appellate counsel. ECF Nos. 49, 50.
Now having reviewed all outstanding motions and exhibits, the Court will deny Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. While Petitioner is correctthat AEDPA deference does not apply to his case, and his petition must be reviewed de novo, the correction of that error does not result in a different outcome. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). This is also true of other errors Petitioner claims. An explanation follows.
Petitioner has litigated since 2003 a habeas challenge to the institutional use of two invalid 1971 criminal convictions by the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board. See Case No. 03-72701. Petitioner is serving a life sentence for a 1981 conviction for possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine. This petition argues the 1971 convictions were unconstitutionally used over several years, from 2005 parole violation charges and subsequent denials of parole up through the parole board's most recent finding of "no interest" in April 2017 and its recommendation against executive clemency in 2018. In addition to those claims, Petitioner argues that the parole board's motivation for its denials is retaliation for his continued litigation in the 2003 case, in violation of his First Amendment rights. He raised a third claim that his continued incarceration is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment protections.
In its June 22, 2020, order, this Court denied Petitioner's motion for bond and dismissed the surviving claim of retaliation (the two other claims had been dismissed in a previous order). ECF No. 30. At the time the Court's most recent order was entered, neither of Petitioner's reply briefs had been received.
In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner cites as error the Court's application of AEDPA deference to his case, which he argues is inapposite because the parole board decision is not a "state court judgment." Petitioner also argues in the motion and through supplemental authority filings that he possesses an enduring liberty interest because he was at one time granted parole. He claims that his petition is based not 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but on 28 U.S.C. § 2241, resulting in a different standard for relief. Petitioner argues that the Court's failure to wait for his reply briefs before issuing its recent orders is a due process violation. Finally, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing that will demonstrate he is entitled to habeas relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
However, if the state court did not adjudicate a claim on the merits, "the deferential standard of review mandated by the AEDPA does not apply." Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, the claim is reviewed de novo. Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct., 1401; Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d 819, 822-23 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Cullen also held that a federal court reviewing a habeas petition under § 2254(d) is restricted to the record before it, when the state court ruled on the merits. Williams v. Lafler, 494 F. App'x 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398-99). However, when de novo review applies, the court is "free to expand the record, provided that the petitioner diligentlyattempted to present those facts in state court . . ." Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 721-22 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000); Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2013)) (other citations omitted). Even when a petitioner has been diligent, the decision to hold "an evidentiary hearing is discretionary." Williams v. Lafler, 494 F. App'x at 534. In determining whether a hearing is appropriate, "the district court must consider whether the hearing could enable the petitioner to prove factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him or her to federal habeas relief." Id. (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). "'[I]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.'" Id. (citing Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.)
Petitioner brings his motion under both federal and local rules. Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule 7.1 of the Eastern District of Michigan. Hence v. Smith, 49 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1999). A motion for reconsideration should be granted if the movant demonstrates a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled and that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof. Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 340 F. Supp. 2d, 773, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Hence, 49 F.Supp. 2d at 550-51 (citing L.R. 7.1(g)(3)). A motion for reconsideration which merely presents "the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable implication," shall be denied. Ward, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
A party seeking to amend or alter a judgment under Rule 59(e) must show one of four things: "(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice." Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is available "in only two situations: (1) when a party has made an excusable mistake or an attorney has acted without authority, or (2) when the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in...
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