Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Dept.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-532-A,92-532-A |
| Citation | 639 A.2d 1379 |
| Parties | 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1053 Melva WARD v. CITY OF PAWTUCKET POLICE DEPARTMENT et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to the appeal of the plaintiff from a Superior Court order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
The plaintiff, Melva Ward, brought an action in Superior Court against defendants, the city of Pawtucket Police Department and other city officials, (police department), alleging sexual discrimination and violation of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990, P.L.1990, ch. 231, § 1, now codified at G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) chapter 112 of title 42. The defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment) chapter 5 of title 28 prior to filing the civil action.
The trial court granted defendants' motion and indicated that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing a civil action for sexual discrimination under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990. We disagree.
In May 1975 plaintiff became the first female officer in the police department of the City of Pawtucket and the first woman to graduate from the Rhode Island Municipal Police Training Academy. 1 The plaintiff claimed that she had first applied to the police department in 1971. At that time she was informed that she would have to serve as a civilian clerk to Police Chief Joseph C. Roy for a year and a half because the chief was "not ready to have a woman on the force." No man had to serve in any apprenticeship or clerkship prior to joining the department.
The police department maintains a promotion list in which candidates are ranked numerically. To obtain the ranking, the department consults a list of objective criteria and weighs them according to a strict, contractually-required formula. The list is valid for two years from the date of issuance. In 1982 plaintiff was promoted to the rank of sergeant and in 1989 became the senior sergeant in the department. As of January 1, 1991, plaintiff was first in the sergeant category on the promotion list, with ten years of service in that rank. She asserts that no male had more than five years of service as sergeant.
On July 13, 1992, plaintiff learned that effective July 23, 1992, an allegedly less-qualified male would be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. 2 On July 16, 1992, plaintiff, through her attorney, advised the police department that a lawsuit would be filed if she were not promoted. On July 21, 1992, plaintiff completed and filed an intake questionnaire with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (RICHR), the first step in pursuing possible administrative remedies. On August 13, 1992, RICHR advised plaintiff that because of a backlog of cases, a complaint in her case would not be drafted for four to five months. By that time the promotion list would have expired and plaintiff would have had to take a retest and requalify for the new list.
On July 21, 1992, plaintiff brought suit against the police department. She sought and on July 22, 1992, obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) in Superior Court enjoining the police department from promoting anyone to the permanent rank of lieutenant. The police department moved to dismiss her lawsuit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), alleging that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action until plaintiff had exhausted all administrative remedies. The motion was heard and granted in August 1992, and the TRO was dissolved. 3 Shortly thereafter, the police department promoted a male candidate to the position of lieutenant.
The plaintiff was not promoted as of November 14, 1992, when the promotion list expired, and was forced to retest for the new list. She again ranked first.
This court will affirm the granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) only when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will not be entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts that might be proven. See Berberian v. Solomon, 122 R.I. 259, 262, 405 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1979). In this case, the trial court held that plaintiff had no standing to bring her action in Superior Court until she had exhausted her administrative remedies. 4
The Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990, chapter 112 of title 42, was enacted as a reaction to the United States Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), in which the Court narrowly interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 5 Patterson, a black employee of the credit union, brought a § 1981 suit against her employer, alleging racial harassment and discrimination because the employer had failed to promote her and had discharged her because of her race. Id. at 169, 109 S.Ct. at 2368-69, 105 L.Ed.2d at 146. The Court held that § 1981 provided protection against racial discrimination in contract formation only. Id. at 171, 109 S.Ct. at 2369, 105 L.Ed.2d at 147. The Court further held that while the failure to promote Patterson may have been a violation of § 1981 because promotion involves contract formation, harassment or discrimination on the job is not actionable under § 1981. Id. at 179, 109 S.Ct. at 2373-74, 105 L.Ed.2d at 152.
The Rhode Island Civil Rights Act provides broad protection against all forms of discrimination in all phases of employment. Section 42-112-1 addresses and defines the rights to which all Rhode Island citizens are entitled and states:
The remedies available to an aggrieved party, including the right to injunctive relief, are clearly established by § 42-112-2, which states:
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