Ward v. Meredith

• Decision Date: 21 February 1906
• Citation: 77 N.E. 118,220 Ill. 66
• Parties: WARD v. MEREDITH.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

220 Ill. 66

77 N.E. 118

WARD

v.MEREDITH.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1906.

Error to Appellate Court, Second District.

Action by Isabell Meredith against Frank Ward. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.Charles W. Ferguson and E. H. Marsh, for plaintiff in error.

F. H. Smith and R. K. Welsh, for defendant in error.

WILKIN, J.

This is an action on the case, brought in the circuit court of Winnebago county by defendant in error against plaintiff in error, to recover damages for a personal injury. Upon a trial before the court and a jury a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error for $2,000, and judgment was entered thereon. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District that judgment has been affirmed, and this further appeal is now prosecuted.

The declaration consists of four counts, the first and second of which charge the plaintiff in error with negligence in running and managing a certain automobile; the third charges him with running his automobile at a rate of speed in excess of 15 miles per hour, as limited by the statute; and the fourth charges him with frightening a horse hitched to a buggy, driven by the husband of the defendant in error, in which she was riding, and in refusing to stop his automobile, as required by the statute. The facts are few and in the main undisputed. On April 23, 1904, while the defendant in error and her husband were on their way to the city of Rockford, riding in a top buggy drawn by a horse, they met plaintiff in error and a party of friends in a large, two-seated, canopy-topped automobile on the public highway, and the horse became frightened at the approaching automobile and ran off the grade into a ditch, overturning the buggy and throwing defendant in error and her husband out upon the ground; the fall resulting in a fracture of both bones of defendant in error's right arm and inflicting other injuries upon her.

It is not denied that the evidence fully sustained the verdict and judgment of the trial court, if no errors of law were committed upon the trial. The errors assigned question the ruling of the court in giving and refusing instructions and in the admission of certain evidence.

The first given instruction complained of is as follows: ‘The court instructs you that in an action brought to recover damages, either to the person or property, caused by running an automobile propelled by mechanical power in the public highway at a greater rate of speed than 15 miles per hour, the plaintiff is deemed to have made out a prima facie case by showing the fact that he or she has been injured,and that the person running such automobile, either by himself or his agent, was at the time of the injury running the same at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour.’ It is claimed that this instruction is vicious and misleading, for the reason that it ignores the question as to whether or not the injuries sustained were occasioned by the running of the automobile in excess of 15 miles per hour. Section 4 of chapter 121 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, p. 1630) provides that in any action brought to recover damage, either to person or property, caused by running an automobile at a greater rate of speed than 15 miles per hour, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have made out a prima facie case by showing the fact of such injury and that such person driving such automobile was at the time of the injury running the same at a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour. This section of the statute and the foregoing instruction are in substantially the same language. We have held in many cases that no error is committed by giving an instruction in the substantial language of a statute; that the instruction must be regarded as sufficient when it lays down a rule in the words of the law itself. Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516, 75 N. E. 375;Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Peton, 192 Ill. 41, 61 N. E. 330;Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Rademacher, 190 Ill. 538, 60 N. E. 888;Duncan v. People, 134 Ill. 110, 24 N. E. 765.

But it is insisted that this instruction is not in the exact words of the statute, because it contains the words, ‘either by himself or his agent.’ The addition of these words in no way changes the legal sense or meaning of the instruction. The contention that the instruction ignores the question whether the injuries sustained were occasioned by the running of the automobile at excessive speed cannot be sustained. The first part is: ‘The court instructs you that in any action brought to recover damages, either to the person or property, caused by running an automobile propelled by mechanical power in a public highway at a greater rate of speed than 15 miles per hour,’ etc. This language is explicit, and tells the jury that the injury sustained...