Ward v. Oliver
| Decision Date | 09 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | 92-3407,Nos. 92-3406,s. 92-3406 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Stephen WARD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Robert OLIVER, M. Jordan, and F. Mussatto, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before ESCHBACH, FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Ward, a prisoner of Illinois, filed two complaints pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of his hearing before the adjustment committee at the Stateville Correctional Center. In the first complaint, No. 91 C 1436, Ward alleged that the defendants, who were members of the adjustment committee, violated the Due Process Clause in failing to give him advance notice of the charges against him, the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. He sought $60,000 in punitive damages from each defendant. In the second complaint, No. 91 C 1468, Ward alleged that the punishment handed down by the adjustment committee, a seven-month suspension of commissary privileges, was a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This time he sought $70,000 in punitive damages from each defendant. The district court consolidated the two cases for all purposes. After reviewing the pleadings and the final pretrial orders submitted by the parties, the district court found that the Eighth Amendment claim was frivolous, and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the deprivation of liberty claim. Accordingly, on August 25, 1992, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order resolving those claims (case No. 91 C 1468) in favor of the defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(c)(1); Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Wirtz v. Young Elec. Sign Co., 315 F.2d 326, 327 (10th Cir.1963); Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee's note.
Although the court indicated that it was entering a final, appealable judgment, it was not. Because the court did not make an express determination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that the Eighth Amendment and deprivation of liberty claims were immediately appealable, a final, appealable judgment could not be entered until all consolidated matters were resolved, see Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir.1992), and Ward's procedural challenges to his disciplinary hearing (case No. 91 C 1436) remained unresolved. Those claims went to trial. The court entered a judgment--the final, appealable judgment--on September 8, 1992. On October 2, 1992, Ward filed two notices of appeal: one relating to the final, appealable judgment of September 8, 1992, No. 92-3406, and the other relating to the "judgment" of August 27, 1992, No. 92-3407. Because Ward could not appeal from the "judgment" of August 27, 1992, we dismiss appeal No. 92-3407. Nevertheless, because the district court's rulings that served as the basis of appeal No. 92-3407 were subsumed by the final judgment that served as the basis of appeal No. 92-3406, see Sere v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir.1988), the issues raised by appeal No. 92-3407 may be considered in appeal No. 92-3406.
Following a pretrial conference, a district court may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(1), summarily dispose of claims that present no genuine issue of material fact. See Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d 1371, 1375 n. 6 (11th Cir.1983) (citing cases). In this case the district court used Rule 16(c)(1) to dispose of Ward's Eighth Amendment and deprivation of liberty claims after concluding that neither claim raised a triable issue of fact. The elimination of a claim pursuant to Rule 16(c)(1) on the ground that there is no triable issue of fact is tantamount to the grant of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See 6A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1529, at 299-300 (1990). We therefore treat the court's resolution of the Eighth Amendment and deprivation of liberty claims in favor of the defendants as a grant of summary judgment on those claims. Our standard of review is de novo. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We view the record and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to Ward, the party against whom judgment was entered. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). We will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact for a trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Ward contends that he was denied liberty without due process of law when the defendants denied him commissary privileges for seven months as a sanction for violating prison regulations. A person seeking to assert a protected liberty interest must "establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). A liberty interest may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or may be created by state law. Castaneda v. Hanman, 914 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1124 (1991). The Due Process Clause itself does not create a substantive liberty interest in visiting the prison commissary. See Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986). Neither do the regulations governing prison administration in Illinois. For a liberty interest to be created by statute or regulation, the statute or regulation must place "substantive limits on official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). That is, the statute or regulation must use "language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed absent specified substantive predicates." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983). Section 210.20(a) of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code provides that each Illinois prison "may establish a commissary or canteen for committed persons." Section 504.20(c) prohibits prison adjustment committees from imposing certain types of punishment, among them corporal punishment and restrictions on diet, medical, or sanitation facilities, and reductions in the frequency of use of toilets, washbowls, and showers. No statute or regulation, however, limits the discretion of a prison adjustment committee to punish a prisoner found guilty of violating prison regulations by denying him access to the commissary. Access to the commissary is a privilege, not a liberty interest. As such, Ward cannot establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to access to the commissary, and the district court correctly concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the due process claim. 1
Ward also contends that his inability to purchase soda pop, cigarettes, or snacks from the commissary for seven months violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim as well. There is both a subjective and objective component to a finding of cruel and unusual punishment. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323-25 (1991). The objective component concerns whether the punishment was sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 2324. The Eighth Amendment "does not mandate comfortable prisons," Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), and prohibits only those punishments denying "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," id. at 347. The areas within the purview of the Eighth Amendment include shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, medical care, and clothing. See James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 63 (1992); Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1988); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 926 (6th Cir.1985); Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381, 1387 (11th Cir.1985); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1982); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 & n. 8 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). It cannot be meritoriously argued that regular access to soda pop, cigarettes, and snacks falls within the basic necessities of life protected by the Eighth Amendment. Thus, denial of access to these items does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Ward's procedural challenges to his disciplinary hearing were tried before a jury. At the close of all the evidence, the district court granted the defendants' motion for a judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Ward contends that the evidence presented by the defendants at trial was insufficient to support the judgment in their favor. The grant of a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) is reviewed de novo. Continental Bank N.A. v. Modansky, 997 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1993). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Ward, see id., and we will reverse the judgment only if enough evidence exists that might sustain a verdict for Ward. See Von Suckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1471 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 419 (1993).
We conduct our review by examining the record of the proceedings below. It is the appellant's burden to provide a reviewing court with a sufficient record to permit meaningful review of alleged errors. See Wilson v. Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir.1990); ...
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Joseph v. Nelson Coleman Corr. Ctr.
...has repeatedly been found not to constitute an "extreme deprivation" for Eighth Amendment purposes. Ward v. Oliver, 19 F.3d 1436, 1994 WL 66653, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 1994) (Eighth Amendment does not dictate access to particular commissary items); Allen v. DeTella, No. 96 C 5120, 1997 WL ......
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