Ward v. Regents of University System of Georgia

• Decision Date: 12 February 1957
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4355.
• Citation: 191 F. Supp. 491
• Parties: Horace T. WARD, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

191 F. Supp. 491

Horace T. WARD, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4355.

United States District Court N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

February 12, 1957.

A. T. Walden, Atlanta, Ga., Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter, New York City, D. L. Hollowell, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., of Georgia, Charles H. Bruce, G. Arthur Howell, and B. D. Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

HOOPER, Chief Judge.

(1) It is now well established that the authorities in control of the operation of any state-supported law school in this country may not refuse admission to any person solely on account of race and color. In all of the decided cases, however, so far as this Court is aware, the decision was either a class action or the qualifications of the applicant were admitted, or had been judicially determined.

This is not a class action but it involves the individual application of the plaintiff, a Negro citizen, which was filed in September, 1950 for admission to the Law School in June, 1951. Having been denied admission he carried his administrative appeal through the various steps pursuant to existing regulations and was ultimately denied upon the ground that he was not qualified as to attitude and character.

While his application was filed in September, 1950 the case did not come on for final trial until December 17, 1956. During this interval of time, some six and one-half years, the plaintiff had consistently failed and refused to file any new application which would give to the Board of Regents sufficient information on which to base a decision as to his qualifications as of the next term, which would have been September, 1957. Without such information the Board of Regents could not pass upon his qualifications to enter in September, 1957, consequently they did not act thereon, and as a consequence there is no action by the Board of Regents for this Court to review.

The case therefore turns upon well-recognized principles of law governing the relationship of the Federal government to the states, and of the jurisdiction of Federal courts to review the actions of administrative bodies of the individual states.

It is hornbook law that the authorities in control of the operation of a state-supported law school are charged with the primary responsibility of passing upon the qualifications for admission to the same and must in the first instance pass upon such applications fairly and without discrimination, before the Courts will interfere.

"Somebody must enroll the pupils in the schools. They cannot enroll themselves; and we can think of no one better qualified to undertake the task than the officials of the schools and the school boards having the schools in charge. *** Not until they have been applied to and have failed to give relief should the courts be asked to interfere in school administration." Language by Judge Parker in Carson v. Warlick, 4 Cir., 238 F.2d 724, at page 728.

The above principles have been applied in a number of cases decided by the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Judicial Circuit. In Peay, et al. v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123, the District Court dismissed a complaint charging that state officials in charge of an election were discriminating against colored voters and on appeal it was held that the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedy as provided by state laws, the Court stating:

"*** that the remedy by injunction, which is a discretionary remedy even when the court has jurisdiction to grant it, ought not to be had to control the State officer in the conduct of his office even though his conduct may appear to be wrong, until the remedy to correct him provided by the State has been exhausted. This rule is of special importance between the federal courts and State functionaries." See page 125.

The Court gave direction that the action remain pending in the District Court "for a reasonable time to permit the exhaustion of state administrative remedies."

Similar rulings were made by the same court in Cook et al. v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595 and Bates et al. v. Batte, 187 F.2d 142. See also Galfas v. City of Atlanta, 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 931.

The same principle has repeatedly been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, see Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638; Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 91 L.Ed. 1796, and cases therein cited.

(2) Where school authorities have been guilty of discrimination and such discrimination has affected their decision in denying admission to the school, it is the duty of the trial judge to declare such discrimination to exist, to send the matter back to the authorities for further consideration, and to enjoin future discrimination. Where, however, a plaintiff made application in September, 1950 which was denied, subsequently pursued his administrative appeal, was inducted into military service for two years, and upon his release was requested by the school authorities to comply with the reasonable and valid regulation preexisting the filing of his original application by filing a new application, giving the school authorities information as to his life and record since September, 1950, but refused to do so, such failure to pursue his administrative remedy would bar any relief to him by the courts. Particularly would the foregoing be true where his refusal to file a new application was persisted in up until the time of final trial in December, 1956 and a period of six and one-half years have elapsed during which plaintiff had had two years...