Ward v. Sevier Cnty. Gov't
| Decision Date | 24 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:18-CV-113,3:18-CV-113 |
| Parties | Shandan WARD, Plaintiff, v. SEVIER COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
David Alexander Burkhalter, III, Zachary J. Burkhalter, David A. Burkhalter, II, The Burkhalter Law Firm, P.C., Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Rhonda Bradshaw, Spicer Rudstrom, PLLC, Andrew N. Firkins, Butler, Vines and Babb, P.L.L.C., Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 22), and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 26). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will GRANT Defendant's motion.
On December 12, 2015, Plaintiff went on continuous leave from her job at the Sevier County Sheriff's Office under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to give birth to her second child. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 12, Doc. 1-4.) Prior to taking leave, Plaintiff had worked as a Patrol Officer on day shift for six years, though she had been assigned to a position with reduced hours since July 1, 2015, due to her pregnancy. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13–15.) After nearly ten weeks on FMLA leave, Plaintiff contacted Defendant requesting to return from leave early. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16, 18, Doc. 20 ¶¶ 4–5.1 ) Plaintiff also asked to work temporarily in a position with fewer hours because her newborn had colic and Plaintiff was not sleeping well at night. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) Defendant granted her request to return early to a temporary position with fewer hours and extended the request to four weeks. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff returned from FMLA leave on February 22, 2016, and began working an eight-hour day shift as Visitation Corrections Officer at the main jail facility. (Doc. 1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff states it was her intent at the end of the four weeks to return to her twelve-hour day shift Patrol Officer position. (Doc. 22 at 2.)
The day before the end of the four weeks, on March 21, 2016, Plaintiff was brought in for a re-evaluation meeting. (Doc. 1 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges she was informed at this meeting that Defendant could no longer hold her day shift Patrol Officer position open and now the only jobs available included a night-shift Patrol Officer position, a day-shift Corrections Officer position, or a day-shift Visitation Officer position. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21, 26.) Defendant alleges Plaintiff broke down crying at the meeting and explained she would not be able to handle a twelve-hour patrol shift, and thus was offered the option of remaining in the Visitation Corrections Officer position. (Doc. 21 at 3.) Both parties agree that Plaintiff had until March 28, 2016, to inform Defendant which position she would select. (Doc. 1 ¶ 27, Doc. 21 at 3.)
On March 29, 2016, Plaintiff alleges she complained to Chief McMahan that the job options she was provided were in violation of the FMLA. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.) The next day, Plaintiff attended another meeting with Sheriff Seals, Chief Michael Hodges, Chief McMahan, and Captain Stephanie Hodges. (Doc. 1 ¶ 29, Doc. 21 at 4.) At this meeting, Plaintiff was instructed to go home because she would be starting on the night shift as a Patrol Officer the following evening. (Doc. 1 ¶ 30, Doc. 21-2 at 3.) Plaintiff responded that she did not feel comfortable working the night shift because she had vision issues that made it difficult to drive at night. (Doc. 1 ¶ 30, Doc. 20 ¶ 17.) Sheriff Seals and Chief Michael Hodges requested she provide a doctor's note regarding her vision issues immediately. (Doc. 1 ¶ 33, Doc. 20 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges she was then forced to take sick leave until she provided a doctor's note. (Doc. 1 ¶ 33.)
Soon after the meeting, Plaintiff retained an attorney. Plaintiff's attorney sent a certified letter to Sheriff Seals on April 7, 2016, detailing Plaintiff's complaints of FMLA violations and sex and pregnancy discrimination. (Doc. 1-1.)
On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff received an email from Chief Michael Hodges inquiring as to the status of her doctor's note. (Doc. 21-4.) The email explained if a doctor's note was not received by the close of business, Plaintiff's employment would be terminated. (Id. ) Later that day, Plaintiff provided a doctor's note. (Doc. 21-3.) At this point, Plaintiff had been on leave since March 30, 2016. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 33, 46.) Communications between counsel eventually resulted in an agreement that Plaintiff would return to work on May 2, 2016, as a Visitation Officer on day shift at the Jail Annex. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 46; Doc. 20 at 5.) Plaintiff worked as a Visitation Officer at the Jail Annex without incident from May 2, 2016, until September 2016.
On September 23, 2016, Plaintiff received a private Facebook message from Adrienne Foster, a relative of Roy and Lonnie Gambill. (Doc. 22-1 at 33.) Ms. Foster asked why Roy Gambill was moved from the jail that day. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff responded that she did not know why he was moved and stated Lonnie Gambill, another inmate, had also been moved to the main jail because he cursed at Plaintiff and threw a stool at the door. (Id. at 28.) Defendant suspended Plaintiff on September 28, 2016, and on October 11, 2016, Plaintiff was informed she was being terminated because she disclosed "security information" about the transfer of two inmates and one of the inmate's behavior before he was transferred. (Doc. 1 ¶ 90, Doc. 1-5, Doc. 20 at 5.)
On March 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Sevier County Government, raising claims of discrimination on the basis of sex, pregnancy, and disability, claims of retaliation for previous complaints of discrimination and requests for reasonable accommodations, and claims of FMLA interference and retaliation. (Doc. 1.) On August 16, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 22), and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 26).
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Leary v. Daeschner , 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, "the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc. , 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A genuine issue for trial exists if there is "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Rodgers v. Banks , 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, should the non-moving party fail to provide evidence to support an essential element of its case, the movant can meet its burden by pointing out such failure to the court. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co. , 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
At summary judgment, the court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court should view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). If the court concludes, based on the record, that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the non-movant, the court should grant summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy , 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, prohibits sex discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Title VII also prohibits discriminating against any employee for "oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against her because of her pregnancy and retaliated against her for complaining about Defendant's unlawful practices. (Doc. 1.) Defendant contends both claims fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 21.) The Court will first consider Plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim and will then consider her retaliation claim.
A claim for pregnancy-based sex discrimination can be shown "either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. " Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 575 U.S. 206, 213, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) ).
Because Plaintiff has not alleged a workplace policy, practice, or decision relied expressly on a protected characteristic, the Court will evaluate her claim using the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
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