Ward v. State, No. 74S00-0707-DP-263.

• Docket Nº: No. 74S00-0707-DP-263.
• Citation: 908 N.E.2d 595
• Case Date: June 26, 2009
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

908 N.E.2d 595 Roy Lee WARD, Appellant (Petitioner below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below). No. 74S00-0707-DP-263. Supreme Court of Indiana. June 26, 2009.

[908 N.E.2d 596]

Steven E. Ripstra, Jasper, IN, Lorinda Meier Youngcourt, Huron, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition for Rehearing

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Roy Lee Ward, seeks rehearing of this Court's affirmation of his death sentence on direct appeal, Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946 (Ind.2009), asserting that one of the issues presented in his appeal—that the trial court should have granted his "for-cause" challenge to one of the jurors—was not addressed. Although not separately enumerated or identified as a separate issue in the appellant's brief, the defendant's assertion of this claim can be discerned within his other arguments. We elect to address this as part of the direct appeal of the defendant's death sentence and grant rehearing for this purpose, but conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

On direct appeal, the defendant claimed several grounds for reversal of his death sentence. Among these was the claim that the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss several prospective jurors for cause. In particular, the defendant pointed to ten prospective jurors whom he challenged on a variety of grounds, all of which the trial court denied. As a result, the defendant used his preemptory strikes against several of these ten potential jurors. This, the defendant claimed, prejudiced him, as he exhausted his preemptory strikes when for-cause challenges should have applied, thereby forcing him to accept jurors who were biased against his evidence. Ward, 903 N.E.2d at 954. Of the ten challenged jurors, only one—Juror 105—was ultimately selected to serve on the jury. Relying upon Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), we held that even if the trial court erred in denying the defendant's for-cause challenges, the salient inquiry is whether any of the jurors who ultimately sat was biased. Ward, 903 N.E.2d at 954-55. We now understand that the defendant sought in his appeal not only to assert error in his loss of preemptory challenges due to the trial court's denial of his challenges for cause, but also specifically to claim error in denying the for-cause challenge to Juror 105 and in permitting him to remain on the jury.

The defendant argues that Juror 105's comments indicated that he would start "at the [d]eath penalty, then wait for the evidence

908 N.E.2d 597

to determine if he should consider other options." Appellant's Br. at 37. The defendant argues that Juror 105 "wanted [the defendant] or the Court to change his mind," id., stating his objection at trial as Juror 105's alleged predisposition to "shift[] the burden to the defendant," Tr. at 801. Citing State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 475-76 (Ind.2003), the defendant argues that Juror 105's responses and opinions to voir dire questioning "showed [his] tendency to automatically impose death" and that "[t]his made [him] ineligible" to sit on the jury. Appellant's Br. at 42. The defendant concludes that "[t]hese challenges for cause should have been granted. [The defendant] was prejudiced because they were not." Id. at 43.

As a general rule, whether a particular juror should be excused for cause rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind.2005). An appellate court will not reverse a trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard "[s]o long as that discretion is not exercised in an illogical or arbitrary manner." McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as noted in our previous opinion in this case, "A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do." Ward, 903 N.E.2d at 955 (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-30, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-03 (1992)). This is not to say, however, that a juror with any predisposition is incapable of impartiality. Compare Dye, 784 N.E.2d at 476 ("The requirement of jury impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a capital defendant to challenge for cause any prospective juror who would vote to impose death automatically upon a finding of guilt."), with Monserrate v. State, 265 Ind. 153, 156, 352 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1976) ("The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. Qualified jurors need not, however, be...