Ward v. State

• Decision Date: 24 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: 374 A.2d 1118,280 Md. 485
• Parties: , 89 A.L.R.3d 874 Robert David WARD v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 485

280 Md. 485

374 A.2d 1118, 89 A.L.R.3d 874

Robert David WARD v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 87.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 24, 1977.

Malcolm W. Houston, Kensington, for appellant.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and ROBERT F. SWEENEY (Specially Assigned), JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

For over a quarter of a century it has been a crime under the laws of Maryland "to operate an aircraft in the air, or on the ground or water, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other habit-forming drug, or, . . . in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another." Acts 1949, ch. 422, § 29; Acts 1974, ch. 363, § 2; Maryland Code (1951) and (1957) Art. 1A, § 29; Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol., 1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, § 10-1002. ¹ See Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol., 1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 38, § 1. The statute has never been before the appellate courts of this State. Robert David Ward presents it to us in this appeal. In challenging the judgment entered against him upon being found guilty of operating an aircraft in a reckless manner, ² he does not dispute the accuracy of the facts and circumstances resulting in his arrest and prosecution by the State. Nor does he present any question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the offense and his criminal agency. And he offers no claim that the penalties imposed were in any way at variance with the sanctions authorized. The issue he raises is that Maryland was precluded from prosecuting him because the statute proscribing the conduct was preempted by federal law. He therefore, claims error in the denial by the trial court of his motion to dismiss the charges.

The issue for decision is narrow in lineation but sweeping in implication. The great majority of the states have enacted legislation similar to the Maryland statute, some in identical language, making it a crime to operate an aircraft so as to endanger the person or property of another. ³ If Ward's view that the state statutes are preempted prevails there could be no criminal prosecution, under existing laws, by any state, or, as we shall see, by the federal government, for operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner or while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other habit-forming drug, no matter how flagrant the conduct proscribed and regardless of the seriousness of the danger to life and property occasioned by that conduct. We have not been referred to a decision of another jurisdiction, state or federal, which addresses the matter of preemption of a statute prohibiting such operation of an aircraft. There being no decision precisely on point to bind or persuade us, we shall follow the path laid out by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the doctrine of preemption to determine whether the Maryland statute is enforceable.

I

To put the issue for decision in perspective we recount what Ward did and what happened as a result. ⁴ Ward was the holder of a valid student aircraft pilot license and medical certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), pursuant to the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). On the late afternoon of 18 May 1975 he made an instructional flight from Hyde's Airfield in Clinton, Prince George's County, Maryland. Thereafter, he and his instructor pilot enjoyed a quiet dinner complete with pre- and post prandial liquid refreshment in an amount sufficient, when Ward was examined some hours later, to show a blood alcohol level of 0.17 percent. ⁵ Later that evening, after a visit with Ward's parents, Ward and his instructor returned to the airport. Ward slept in his car for some hours. On awakening in the early morning he decided to practice some "touch and gos" taking off and landing without leaving the airport pattern. Inadvertently entering clouds, he climbed above the cloud layer and circled what he assumed to be the Chesapeake Bay area, until breaks were visible in the overcast. It was about 6:00 A. M. when he descended through a hole in the clouds. He established that his position was over Greenbelt, Maryland, and in an apparent burst of euphoria he "buzzed" nearby apartments. His activities were observed by a Maryland State Police officer in a helicopter who followed the plane back to the airport. Ward was arrested upon landing.

Ward was tried in the District Court of Maryland in Prince George's County on a charge of operating an aircraft in a reckless manner, convicted, and appealed from the judgment entered to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Tried de novo by the judge in the circuit court, he was again found guilty. He was fined $500 and costs and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 90 days. The prison sentence was suspended "upon special condition that he not operate an aircraft within the State for a period of one year from September 17, 1975." ⁶ Upon Ward's petition we issued a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

In a civil proceeding, the Federal Aviation Administration determined that Ward had violated seven Federal Aviation Regulations in his operation of the aircraft on 19 May 1975 including FAR 91.9, prohibiting the careless or reckless operation of an aircraft so as to endanger the life or property of another. It ordered that his airman certificate be revoked. Subsequently, however, "after a thorough investigation of Mr. Ward, his instructor, his level of aeronautical knowledge and the flight leading to his prosecution, FAA granted permission to reissue his license six (6) months after surrender to it."

II

The opinion of the Court in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.), reminded, at 375, 78 S.Ct. at 1305, that the Constitution of the United States "is one of particular powers given to the National Government with the powers not so delegated reserved to the States or, in the case of limitations upon both governments, to the people. Except insofar as penal remedies may be provided by Congress under the explicit authority to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the other powers granted by Art. I, § 8, the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be compendiously described as criminal justice, which in other nations belongs to the central government, is under our system the responsibility of the individual States." ⁷ It is apparent that the Constitution alone does not deny Maryland the power to enact the challenged statute. "While federal pre-emption of state statutes is, of course, ultimately a question under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, ⁸ analysis of pre-emption issues depends primarily on statutory and not constitutional interpretation." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 97 S.Ct. 987, 988, 51 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977). Thus, we are required to decide only whether federal laws in the field of aviation preclude Maryland from enforcing its statute.

The Supreme Court of the United States traced the path, "clearly laid out" by its prior decisions, which must be followed to answer this question. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). We summarize what was said. The first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, has prohibited state regulation in the area. That is, has Congress occupied the field to the exclusion of state action. "Where, as here, the field which Congress is said to have preempted has been traditionally occupied by the States, . . . '(w)e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'." Id. It is when Congress has "unmistakably . . . ordained," either explicitly by command in the statute's language, or implicitly by the statute's structure and purpose, that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, that state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall.

If Congress has not so occupied the field as to exclude all state action, inquiry turns to whether the federal and state laws conflict. "Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in the same field nevertheless overrule state laws with which they conflict." Id. State and federal laws are so inconsistent that state law must give way when, under the circumstances of the particular case, the state's law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." In this determination, there is considered "the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written." Id.

It seems, in the final analysis, that a federal statute preempts a state statute when such was the Congressional intent. Even when Congress exercises its paramount authority it may determine how far its regulation shall go. "There is no constitutional rule which compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does, state regulation outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced." Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1937). The Court said in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360, n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 933, 938, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (Stone, J. dissenting):

Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it...