Ward v. State Of Tenn.

Decision Date07 July 2010
Citation315 S.W.3d 461
PartiesMarcus WARD v. STATE of Tennessee.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Nov. 5, 2009 Session.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ryan B. Feeney, Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Ward.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Colin Campbell, Assistant District Attorney General; and J. Ross Dyer, Senior Counsel, District Attorney General's Office, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

In this post-conviction case, the issue we review is whether the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made when the trial court did not advise the defendant of the following consequences of his guilty plea: (1) mandatory registration as a sexual offender, and (2) a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to his incarceration. We hold that the trial court was not required to advise the defendant of the requirement of sex offender registration because it is a remedial and regulatory measure, and therefore a collateral consequence of the guilty plea. We further hold that the trial court was required to advise the defendant of the mandatory sentence of lifetime community supervision because it is a punitive and direct consequence of the guilty plea. Because the trial court failed to ensure that the defendant was informed of the lifetime supervision consequence, we hold that his guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 8, 2005, Marcus Ward pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of especially aggravated kidnaping and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. Mr. Ward was sentenced to eight years on the aggravated sexual battery charge to be served at 100%, three years on each of the aggravated assault charges to be served at 30%, thirteen and one-half years on the especially aggravated kidnaping charge to be served at 100%, and one year on the intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle charge; all the sentences were to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Ward was not advised by the trial court that he was required to register with the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registry or that he was subject to lifetime community supervision.

On July 11, 2005, Mr. Ward filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his guilty plea to the aggravated sexual battery charge was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made.1 The post-conviction court held that although the trial court's failure to advise Mr. Ward of the sex offender registration requirement during the plea colloquy was deficient, notice of the requirement was not constitutionally required for a valid guilty plea because the registration was only a collateral consequence of the plea. As to Mr. Ward's claim that he was not advised of the requirement of lifetime community supervision, the trial court ruled that this claim failed for the same reason.

A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals panel affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment, concluding that neither the sex offender registration requirement nor the mandatory sentence of community supervision for life constituted punishment, and therefore both were collateral, not direct, consequences. Accordingly, the majority ruled that Mr. Ward was not required to have been advised of those consequences in order to enter a constitutionally valid guilty plea. Ward v. State, No. W2007-01632-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 113236 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan.14, 2009). Presiding Judge Tipton dissented, reasoning that the imposition of a sentence of community supervision for life as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 imposes a direct and punitive consequence upon a defendant entering a guilty plea. Id, at * 11.

Issue

We granted review in this case to determine whether Mr. Ward's plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery2 was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made when the trial court did not advise him of the following consequences of his guilty plea: (1) mandatory registration as a sexual offender, and (2) a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to his incarceration.

Analysis

To prevail on his claim for postconviction relief, Mr. Ward bears the burden of proving factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f) (2006); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn.2009). The trial court's factual findings "are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those findings." Jaeo v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tenn.2003). "Whether a guilty plea meets the constitutional standards of voluntary and knowing is a mixed question of law and fact." Id. We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo, applying a presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court's findings of fact. Id. at 830-31.

Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Flea

When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives several consti tutional rights, including the right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront his or her accusers. State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn.2003). To pass constitutional muster under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. North Carolina v. Alford 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn.1977). In making the determination of whether a guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, the standard of inquiry is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Grindstaff, 297 S.W.Sd at 218 (quoting Jaco, 120 S.W.3d at 831); see also Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. 160. A plea is not voluntary unless the defendant understands the consequences of his or her plea. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d at 345. It follows then that "a plea is not 'voluntary' if it results from ignorance, misunderstanding, coercion, inducements, or threats." Id. (quoting Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn.1993)). The waiver of these fundamental rights cannot be presumed, but must be evident in the record. Id. Thus, "the record of acceptance of a defendant's plea of guilty must affirmatively demonstrate that his decision was both voluntary and knowledgeable, i.e., that he has been made aware of the significant consequences of such a plea; otherwise, it will not amount to an 'intentional abandonment of a known right.'" Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 340; see also State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn.1999). To find that the plea was entered "intelligently" and "knowingly," the trial court must discuss the matter with the accused to make sure he or she "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences." Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904 (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709) (emphasis omitted).

In Tennessee, before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court is required to inform the defendant of, and determine that he or she understands, the following:

1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered and the mandatory minimum and maximum penalty provided by law;

2) the right of the defendant to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings;

3) the right of the defendant to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea, the right to a jury trial, the right to assistance of counsel at trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right against compelled self-incrimination;

4) that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant waives the right to a trial; and

5) that if the defendant enters a guilty or nolo contendere plea, the trial court may question the defendant regarding the offenses and that any of the defendant's answers made under oath, on the record, and in counsel's presence may later be used against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution for perjury or false statement.

Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 331 (Tenn.2006) (citing Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11(c)(l)(5)).3 In addition to these matters specified by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), the defendant must be advised, "if applicable, that a different or additional punishment may result by reason of his prior convictions or other factors which may be established in the present action after the entry of his plea." Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 341.

However, neither our federal nor state constitution requires that an accused be apprised of every possible or contingent consequence of pleading guilty before entering a valid guilty plea. Courts are constitutionally required to notify defendants of only the direct consequences— not the collateral consequences—of a guilty plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463; Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 905. In Blankenship, we observed that "[b]y contrast, some consequences are considered 'collateral, ' rather than 'direct.'" 858 S.W.2d at 905. The distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence has often been formulated as turning on "whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment." Bautista v. State, 160 S.W.3d 917,...

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