Ward v. United States, 8644.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1938
• Docket Number: No. 8644.,8644.
• Citation: 96 F.2d 189
• Parties: WARD v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

96 F.2d 189 (1938)

WARD v. UNITED STATES.

No. 8644.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 1938.

W. A. Bootle, of Macon, Ga., for appellant.

T. Hoyt Davis, U. S. Atty., and H. G. Rawls, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Macon, Ga.

Before FOSTER, HUCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted upon two indictments consolidated for trial, one charging him with possession and transportation, and one with possession, in violation of Sections 1152a and 1152g, 26 U.S.C.A. of whiskey in containers not having affixed revenue stamps as required by those sections. He is here insisting that in the course and conduct of the trial there was error to his prejudice. Under fourteen specifications he presents eight grounds of error: (1) That the statutes on which the indictments are based are unconstitutional, because they constitute an attempt to penalize for the nonpayment of a tax. (2) That there was prejudice to him in the consolidation of the indictments for trial. (3) that the evidence against him was obtained by a wrongful search and seizure, and his motion to suppress it should have been sustained. (4) That it was error to admit, in impeachment of the Government's witness McGahee, a statement made jointly by him and a fellow officer. (5) That verdict should have been directed for him on his motion. (6) That the court erred in the charges given and refused, in that (a) after charging the jury that they would be authorized to convict of illegal possession of liquor, if liquor in containers having no stamps on them was found in defendant's possession and nothing else was proven, they were instructed that "if the evidence goes further and convinces the jury that the liquor was possessed not for the purpose of selling it, but for the purpose of pouring it out or drinking it, then the jury ought to find a verdict of not guilty," because that charge placed the burden on the defendant to acquit himself, instead of upon the Government to convict him, as it ought to have done; (b) there was a refusal to give defendant's requested charge, that if the jury had a reasonable doubt from all the evidence, as to whether or not defendant possessed intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, they should acquit him. (7) There was error in permitting the district attorney, in his closing argument, without correction or rebuke from the court, to state to the jury as to the witness McGahee: "I will tell you what happened. Dewey Ward is a likeable fellow and has a lot of friends. McGahee is thin-skinned and sympathetic, and the defendant, Dewey Ward, has himself, or through his friends been talking with this witness in an effort to influence his testimony in this case and get him to soften up." And finally (8) the verdict in one of the cases was inconsistent with itself.

Many of these assignments are wholly without merit. They may be briefly disposed of by little more than saying so.

The constitutional objection, we think, misapprehends the purpose and effect of the statute. It certainly points out no defect in it. Cf. Deutsch v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 80 F.2d 677; Cf., also, Wheeler v. United States, 5 Cir., 80 F.2d 678, in which the very act in question was given effect by us.

Nor is the objection to the consolidation of the indictments any better taken. Section 557, title 18 U.S.C.A.; Stokes et al. v. United States, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 744. There was no fatal inconsistency in the jury verdict, Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356, 80 A.L.R. 161, nor, if the motions to suppress the evidence were properly overruled, was there error in denying appellant's motion for an instructed verdict.

But the motions to suppress were well taken. They should have been sustained, and the evidence obtained by the unlawful searches and seizures should have been excluded from the jury. With this evidence excluded, the Government's cases failed. It was therefore reversible error to overrule these motions.

The search and seizure in one of the cases was made by state officers; that in the other, was made by an investigator of the Alcohol Tax Unit, J. O. Stewart. The search and seizure in the first case was justified below, and it was attempted to justify it here, on the ground that it was made by state officers acting independently of the federal officers, and so made was not subject to be excluded. Milburne v. United States, 2 Cir., 77 F.2d 310; Ferracane v. United States, 7 Cir., 47 F.2d 677. This, however, will not do, for the officer who made the arrest testified positively and without contradiction, that he made it for Mr. Stewart; that he told Stewart he would catch Ward and turn him over to him, and Mr. Stewart said OK. The mere fact on which the Government would stand that no federal officer was with McGahee and that Stewart did not know they were planning to catch Ward on that particular day, is of no importance. It is settled law that searches and seizures made by state officers under circumstances like these, are from the standpoint of the admissibility of the evidence obtained by them, treated as in the same case as though federal officers were actually present, making or assisting in making the search and seizure. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293, 52 A.L.R. 1381; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520; Fowler v. United States, 7 Cir., 62 F.2d 656.

It is not contended that the search and seizure would have been justified if it had been made by federal officers; but if such contention were made, it would be unavailing, for the case is ruled by Ray v. United States, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 654; Emite v. United States, 5 Cir., 15 F.2d 623; Moring v. United States, 5 Cir., 40 F.2d 267.

The search and seizure made by Stewart was justified below; it is defended here, on the ground that it was consented to.

We have had recent occasion in Ray v. United States to consider and reject the contention made there for this same officer that he had searched a private home by consent. This case is in our opinion a more flagrant violation of the invoked constitutional amendments than that one was. It can hardly be doubted that "the Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances." Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281; or that if this is to constitute a government de jure, of laws, and not of men, "There is, there can be, no place in our...