Ward v. Ward

• Decision Date: 12 June 1890
• Citation: 59 Conn. 188,22 A. 149
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WARD v. WARD.

22 A. 149

59 Conn. 188

WARD

v. WARD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 12, 1890.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Prentice, Judge.

Suit by Margaret M. Ward against John Ward to compel defendant to convey to complainant certain real estate, and for an injunction. From a judgment for d9-fendant, plaintiff appeals.

W. B. Stoddard and S. C. Loomis, for appellant.

W. A, Wright, for appellee.

SEYMOUR, J. In this case the plaintiff claims a judgment that the defendant convey his interest in the premises described in the complaint to her, or a decree vesting in her a title to the same. The superior court decided in favor of the defendant. The facts which it found and its conclusions thereon, together with the claims made by the parties on the trial, are set forth in the finding as follows: "The plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister, born in Ireland, aged sixty-five and sixty-seven years respectively, and never married. They came to this country together in 1854. The plaintiff has ever since remained here. Prior to 1882 she remained out at service, and accumulated several thousand dollars. The defendant returned to Ireland in 1864, and remained there until 1882. He had accumulated little or no thing. In 1882 the plaintiff became desirous of retiring from service, and of purchasing a place for her home and as a home for her insane sister, the only sister of the parties, the defendant being the only brother. About this time a correspondence sprang up between the plaintiff and defendant. As to the character of this correspondence the parties disagreed, but by means of it the defendant became informed of his sister's intention, and as the result of it he returned to this country. The relations of the parties at this time were most cordial and friendly. The defendant came to New Haven, where he had formerly lived, and, shortly after, the plaintiff left her employment in New York, and joined her brother in New Haven. They boarded together for a while, when the land described in the complaint was purchased of Massena Clark, and the conveyance taken by an ordinary warranty deed to the plaintiff and defendant. A house was immediately built upon the premises, and the parties, with their insane sister, went there to live together. The negotiations for the purchase of the place were made by the parlies together, and both evinced an interest in the preparation of it for their home. During the construction of the house the defendant was frequently about it, exercising an oversight of the work, and did more or less work upon the place. The parties continued to live in the house for several years as one family and in common, and in complete harmony and friendship. A portion of the house was rented, and a small store was carried on by the parties on the lower floor. The plaintiff carried the purse, took all moneys received from rents, from the store, or otherwise, made all expenditures, and bore all the household expenses. In all respects there was a community of interest, and no division or accounting in any way had, attempted, or desired. Differences finally arose between them, which at last culminated in a demand by the plaintiff upon the defendant for a conveyance to her of his title in the premises. This demand was refused. This action was thereupon brought. The entire purchase money of the land, about $1,700. and the money expended in the construction of the improvements thereon, also about $1,700, was paid by the plaintiff. The defendant has never put any money into the premises. The deed, upon its execution by the grantor, was by him handed to the plaintiff, who has since kept it in her possession. Both parties were present when the negotiations for the land were had, and when the deed was given. The defendant claims the right to sell or mortgage his interest in the premises at his pleasure, and recently, since differences have arisen between the parties, has threatened to do so. From the above facts and evidence I find that the deed was intended to give to the defendant a beneficial interest in the premises, that it was so conveyed for the purpose of providing a joint home for the parties and for their joint benefit, and that the transaction had no ulterior or collateral object or purpose. I therefore find that the conveyance vested an absolute estate in the defendant, and that no trust, for the benefit of the plaintiff or otherwise, resulted therefrom or was created thereby. The defendant upon the trial waived his claim for relief contained in his answer. Upon the trial the plaintiff claimed that the fact that she furnished all the money for the purchase of the land and the erection of the buildings and improvements thereon raised a resulting trust in her favor, and that the other facts in the case were not sufficient to rebut the presumption of such trust, and that she was entitled to the relief prayed for; but the court found that such presumption was rebutted by the other evidence in the case, hereinbefore detailed, and that no trust in favor of the plaintiff resulted, in view of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, and rendered judgment as on file. "

The first question presented by the record is whether the title which trie defendant had in the described property was held by him as trustee for the plaintiff; in other words, whether, upon the facts of the case, a resulting trust was created in favor of the plaintiff, so that she had a right to have the title to the property vested solely in herself. Resulting trusts are created by operation of law. They arise, notably, when the purchase money for property is paid by one and the legal title is taken in the name of another. In such a case a trust arises at once in favor of the person paying the money, and the holder of the legal title becomes a trustee for him. This result follows the natural presumption that a purchase will inure to him who furnishes the purchase price, and of course holds equally good when the title is taken to the purchaser and another jointly. There is an exception to this general rule,—when the purchaser takes the conveyance in the name of his wife or child, or other person for whom he is under a natural, moral, or legal obligation to provide. In such cases it is held that the transaction will be regarded, prima facie, as a settlement upon the nominal grantee; but, if the nominal grantee be a brother or sister, the law will...