Wardle v. Miller

• Decision Date: 04 January 1954
• Citation: 101 A.2d 720,375 Pa. 565
• Parties: WARDLE et al. v. MILLER et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

101 A.2d 720

375 Pa. 565

WARDLE et al. v. MILLER et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 4, 1954

Personal injury action arising out of automobile accident in which plaintiffs recovered judgment against automobile owner and thereafter caused attachment execution to be issued against automobile owner's insurer. Insurer defended upon ground that notice of accident was not given in conformity with requirements of policy. The Court of Common Pleas No. 4 (tried in C. P. No. 6) of Philadelphia County at No. 3538 March Term, 1952, Gerald F. Flood, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Nos 292, 293 January Term, 1953, held that where one of the plaintiffs at time of automobile accident suffered bumped head without any break in skin, and suffered no further discomfort for period of over three months, and after period of three months suffered retinal detachment resulting in blindness in one eye, and while in hospital was informed that eye injury was result of accident, and thereupon informed automobile owner who notified insurer of accident, notice to insurer was given ‘ as soon as practicable’ as required by automobile policy.

Judgment affirmed.

Where plaintiff at time of automobile accident suffered bumped head without any break in skin or lump and relieved slight headache following accident by aspirin pill, and suffered no further discomfort for period of over three months and after period of three months suffered retinal detachment resulting in blindness in one eye, and while in hospital was informed that eye injury was result of accident, and thereupon informed automobile owner who notified insurer of accident notice to insurer was given " as soon as practicable" as required by automobile policy.

The following is the opinion of Judge Flood in the court below.

Plaintiffs recovered judgment against defendant Miller as a result of an automobile accident and thereafter caused an attachment execution to be issued against Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, Miller's insurer. In the answers to the interrogatories filed by the plaintiff the insurer defends upon the ground that notice was not given ‘ as soon as practicable’ as required by the policy.

The accident occurred on October 15, 1951. The plaintiff, according to the testimony, suffered a bumped head without any break in the skin or any lump and considered the accident of no importance at the time and so told the defendant. In January 1952, the plaintiff experienced eye flashes and suffered a retinal detachment which resulted in blindness in one eye. While she was in the hospital, defendant was informed that the eye injury might have been a result of the accident. The testimony is that defendant learned of the accident sometime in March. He notified the insurer on March 7, 1952. The question before us then is whether the circumstances excuse what would otherwise be a late notification. Unverzagt v. Prestera, 1940, 339 Pa. 141, 13 A.2d 46.There is no question that circumstances of extenuation offered by the plaintiff prevent a finding by the court that the notice is too late. The question before us is whether the court, without submitting the matter to a jury, can decide as a matter of law that the notice was given within a practicable time in view of extenuating circumstances.

In the case of Unverzagt v. Prestera, supra, Mr. Justice Drew stated that lack of knowledge of the accident excuses delay as a matter of law provided the insured is not guilty of lack of due diligence. Id., 339 Pa. at page 145 13 A.2d 46.There was certainly no question...