Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie

• Decision Date: 03 March 1930
• Docket Number: No. 4891.,4891.
• Parties: WARDMAN-JUSTICE MOTORS, Inc., et al. v. PETRIE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

59 App. DC 262, 39 F.2d 512 (1930)

WARDMAN-JUSTICE MOTORS, Inc., et al. v. PETRIE.

No. 4891.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued February 6, 1930.

Decided March 3, 1930.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1930.

D. T. Wright, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

John P. Earnest and Geo. B. Springston, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia awarding appellee, Edith M. Petrie, plaintiff below, damages against the appellant for the alleged illegal and malicious seizure of her automobile.

It appears that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in question, purchased from a salesman in the employ of the Justice Motor Company, which was subsequently merged with the defendant corporation; that the employees of said corporation seized the car where it was parked on the street by plaintiff, in her absence, and took it to the place of business of the said corporation. Plaintiff replevined the car, and, upon a trial by jury to determine the ownership thereof, she was awarded possession, together with a judgment for costs and one cent damage for detention.

Plaintiff then brought the present suit for damages for the alleged illegal, malicious, and wrongful taking of the car. On trial, the jury awarded plaintiff "five hundred ($500.00) dollars punitive damages." The judgment thereafter was amended on motion of counsel for defendants by adding thereto the words "and no compensatory damages." As we shall observe later, this neither adds nor detracts from the force and effect of the original verdict and judgment.

Appellants rely for reversal of the judgment upon four grounds:

"1. The matter is res judicata.

"2. Exemplary damages cannot be assessed against a corporation unless the act complained of is conceived in the spirit of malice.

"3. Punitive damages cannot be assessed in the absence of compensatory damages.

"4. Error in the admission and exclusion of evidence."

The replevin suit was brought in conformity with the provisions of the District Code. Section 1559 provides in respect of damages: "The damages shall be the full value of the goods, if eloigned by the defendant, including, in every case, the loss sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the detention, and judgment shall pass for the plaintiff accordingly." Section 1562 provides: "The judgment in such cases shall be that the plaintiff recover against the defendant the value of the goods as found and the damages so assessed, to be discharged by the return of the things, within ten days after the judgment, with damages for detention, which the jury shall also assess."

It will be observed that the statute provides that, if the goods are not recovered in the replevin proceeding, or returned within ten days after judgment, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment for the value of the goods as damages, and also damage for the detention; but, where the goods have been recovered in the replevin action, as in this case, or returned, then the judgment for damages shall be for detention only.

In Crockett v. Miller, 112 F. 729, 735, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Circuit had before it a case closely analogous to the case at bar, which depended upon a construction of the statutes of Nebraska relating to replevin. The facts in the case briefly were that one Belle Miller was the owner of a stock of merchandise contained in a store at Creighton, Neb., and had in her employ one Horkey, who formerly owned the store. An execution was levied upon the stock of merchandise by a judgment creditor of Horkey. An action in replevin followed, which resulted in a judgment for the return to Miller of her goods, and for one cent damages and costs. Thereupon Miller instituted suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska against Crockett, the sheriff, and the sureties on his official bond to recover the sum of $5,000 damages, alleged to have been sustained by her in loss of credit and business standing as the result of the malicious conduct of the sheriff in making the levy; and for a further sum of $1,000 alleged to have been paid out and expended by her as attorney's fees and expenses. The trial resulted in verdict and judgment for $2,157.11. The chief assignment of error was the refusal of the trial court to hold that the judgment in the replevin suit was res adjudicata.

It will be observed that the case, in all particulars, is closely analogous to the case at bar. Section 4701 of the Consolidated Statutes of Nebraska, relating to replevin, provided as follows: "In all cases where the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, where the jury shall find for the plaintiff, on an issue joined, or on inquiry of damages upon a judgment by default, they shall assess adequate damages to the plaintiff for the illegal detention of the property; for which, with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for defendant."

The court, after reviewing a number of authorities relating to the measure of damage which can be allowed in a replevin action, stated the rule as follows: "The only damages which can be recovered by a plaintiff in an action of replevin under the statutes of Nebraska as construed by the supreme court of that state, where the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, are interest on the value of the property during the time plaintiff is deprived of its possession, the injury or damage done thereto by the officer in taking the same and while in possession thereof, and, in some cases, the usable value or the value of the use of the property while so detained. * * * Accordingly it follows that the collateral or consequential damages occasioned by a seizure of property by the officer against whom the replevin suit is brought, such as injury to the business reputation, credit, and standing of the plaintiff occasioned by the malicious conduct of the officer making the seizure, coupled with the express purpose and intention of so injuring the plaintiff, are not within the purview of the statutory damages flowing from the unlawful detention of property, within the meaning of replevin acts. They are totally different from them, in that they do not flow proximately from the act of detention merely, but are special and consequential damages, arising out of facts specially pleaded in this case showing an intention to inflict them."

The court then held that the expenses, attorney's fees, etc., incurred in the replevin case were not a proper subject for judgment under the detention clause of the replevin act, but were a proper subject for damages in the subsequent action for malicious trespass. After full discussion, the court reached the following conclusion: "For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' contention that the claim asserted in this action is res adjudicata cannot prevail."

In that case, as in the present, the question of estoppel was raised. It was there contended that the plaintiff was estopped from prosecuting the action for malicious trespass "by the doctrine of election of remedies." The court, holding that the action for malicious trespass for seizing the goods of the plaintiff is not inconsistent with the replevin suit, said: "A replevin action has for its immediate object the restoration to the plaintiff of his goods, and affords the incidental remedy of recovering the direct and...