Ware v. Brewer
| Decision Date | 23 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case Number 17-11356 |
| Citation | 502 F.Supp.3d 1216 |
| Parties | Leonard WARE, Petitioner, v. Shawn BREWER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Leonard Ware, Jackson, MI, pro se.
Jared D. Schultz, John S. Pallas, Scott Robert Shimkus, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
Petitioner Leonard Ware, serving a lengthy prison term for murder and firearms offenses, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging those convictions. He returned to state court to exhaust additional claims, and now presents an amended petition. He argues that his trial was unfair for several reasons and his lawyer performed in a constitutionally deficient way. Because the state courts’ rejection of these claims was consistent with federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, the petition will be denied.
In 2012, Ware shot and killed a co-worker not far from their manufacturing plant in Ypsilanti, Michigan. He was charged with open murder and various firearms offenses. A jury convicted him of second-degree murder, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of firearm as a convicted felon, and commission of a felony with a firearm. He was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of at least 25 years and up to 50 years. In its opinion on direct review of the convictions, the Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant shot and killed a coworker not far from the manufacturing plant where they worked following a day of bickering and altercations between the two at the plant, including an incident in which the victim slapped defendant in the face, knocking off his safety glasses and dislodging his earplugs. The two ultimately agreed to engage in a fight after work, with the victim suggesting to defendant, through words and gestures, that defendant should bring his gun to the fight. Defendant and the victim walked away from the plant at the end of the workday and eventually squared up to fight in the middle of a nearby street. According to defendant, the victim, who purportedly was hot-headed and had bragged about being on parole for nearly killing a person, then turned "like he was reaching for something." Defendant, who had earlier retrieved a firearm from his truck, testified that he panicked, drew his gun, and began shooting because he was fearful that the victim was going to kill him. A witness testified to hearing gunshots and then observing the victim collapse, defendant standing over the victim, and defendant firing several more times into the victim's motionless body before running away. Defendant conceded that he did not see a weapon in the victim's hand. The county medical examiner testified that the victim sustained ten gunshot wounds, and the medical examiner described each of the wounds, which testimony was supplemented by the introduction of autopsy photographs. Defendant argued self-defense, and the trial court gave the jury extensive instructions on self-defense, directing the jurors that the prosecution had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. With respect to a count of open murder, the jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, as well as the various weapons charges.
People v. Ware , 2015 WL 3974526, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 30, 2015) (citations omitted).
Following his conviction of the above-described offenses, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to 23 to 50 years for murder, two to five years for carrying a concealed weapon and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, and a consecutive term of two years for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. His convictions were affirmed by the court of appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Ware , 2015 WL 3974526 ; People v. Ware , 499 Mich. 857, 873 N.W.2d 578 (2016)
The petitioner then filed his habeas corpus petition, alleging that his trial was unfair because the trial court admitted gruesome autopsy photographs in evidence, he was shackled during trial, and a police officer sat close to him when he was testifying on his own behalf. He also argued that his trial lawyer performed deficiently. Those claims were raised in the state court. But Ware sought to raise some new claims and asked to return to state court to present them there first. The Court granted his motion to stay the case for that purpose. Ware presented additional instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the trial court denied relief and both Michigan appellate courts denied of Ware's applications for leave to appeal.
Ware returned to this Court, moved to reopen the present case, and filed an amended petition. He asserts all the claims he presented to the state courts on direct appeal and in his post-conviction motion. The respondent filed an answer asserting among other things, that the claims do not merit relief.
Certain provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). A federal court may grant relief only if the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or if the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
"Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta , of Court's decisions." White v. Woodall , 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The distinction between mere error and an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent creates a substantially higher threshold for obtaining relief than de novo review. Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (quotation marks omitted)). The AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be "given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett , 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010).
For his first argument, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred by admitting gruesome autopsy photos of the victim. He states that his trial attorney was willing to stipulate to the number, location, and nature of the victim's gunshot wounds, and the jury was provided information regarding the wounds by the medical examiner, so it was therefore unnecessary and gratuitous to publish the photos to the jury, denying his right to a fair trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected that claim, holding that the photographs were admitted properly under state evidence law. The court reasoned that the photos were relevant to rebut the petitioner's claim of self-defense, as they "showed the great number of gunshot wounds, depicted wounds to the victim's backside, side, and wrists, and revealed a bullet wound to the victim's cheek severing his carotid artery, which appeared to have resulted from defendant discharging his gun while standing directly over the victim." Ware , 2015 WL 3974526, at *1-2. The court determined that any unfair prejudice generated by the "inherent gruesomeness" of the photos did not substantially outweigh their evidentiary value of corroborating the medical examiner's testimony, and the prosecutor was not bound to accept the petitioner's proposed stipulation in this instance. Ibid.
State evidentiary rulings will not trigger federal due process concerns unless the evidence admitted (or excluded) renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). The Supreme Court has stated that for evidence that is so unfairly prejudicial "that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). "Unfair prejudice" means that the evidence would be used by the jury for an improper purpose, such as declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).
The state courts did not address any question of unfairness of the photographs, fundamental or otherwise, but they did determine that the evidence has a proper purpose. And the rejection of the petitioner's objection, even in light of his offer to stipulate to the location of the wounds and the alternate proof supplied by the medical examiner, is...
To continue reading
Request your trial